The institutional economics of cultivated mushrooms in Swaziland : a study on value chains, transaction costs and collective action. by Mabuza, Majola Lawrence.
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CULTIVATED 
MUSHROOMS IN SWAZILAND: A STUDY ON VALUE CHAINS, 














Submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of  





School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
College of Agriculture, Engineering and Science 







This study focuses on commercial mushroom production, a relatively new economic activity 
in Swaziland that seeks to assist rural-based small-sc e farmers to diversify and improve their 
economic independence and livelihoods. The mushroom programme is in line with the 
National Development Strategy, which, among its major objectives, aims to address poverty-
related challenges through the promotion of non-conventional high-value agricultural 
commodities that have not been explored by local farmers despite having a relatively high 
consumer demand in local and international markets. In attempting to provide an impetus to 
the mushroom industry, the Swaziland government currently offers free training in mushroom 
production, extension services, high quality spawn at a very nominal fee, and free substrate 
bags. Considering the geographical suitability and the magnitude of investment made towards 
the mushroom development programme, there is a need to understand why many farmers are 
not participating in the industry, and why Swaziland still imports more than 95 percent of 
locally consumed cultivated mushrooms. There has also been no research so far on the 
challenges and opportunities in producing, value adding, and marketing of mushrooms in 
Swaziland. This study was, therefore, an attempt to address these knowledge gaps. It also 
provided an opportunity to draw relevant policy and management implications to inform 
future strategies in the industry. The specific objectives of the study were to: (i) identify and 
examine the factors that influence households’ decisions to participate in mushroom 
production; (ii) study the underlying mushroom production and market access constraints; (iii) 
examine the effects of transaction cost factors that influence mushroom producers’ market 
channel choice decisions and the quantity of mushrooms sold in selected channels; and (iv) 
study the effects of organisational form on producers’ participation in collective 
responsibilities. 
 
Using cross-sectional data gathered from mushroom producers and non-producers, the results 
of the Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood and Two-Stage Probit Least Squares 
estimation methods revealed that farmers’ decisions t  participate in the mushroom enterprise 
are mainly influenced by institutional factors. Farmers who have undergone training in basic 
oyster mushroom production, are located in close proximity to input and output markets, and 
have positive perceptions towards mushrooms, are likely to participate in the mushroom 
industry. The development of positive perceptions towards mushrooms is predominantly 
influenced by the knowledge gained on their nutritional and therapeutical properties. 
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The value chain approach was used to identify the underlying factors constraining mushroom 
production and producers’ participation in mainstream markets. Among the important 
findings, the study showed that producers’ plans to expand production capacities are 
hampered by the difficulty to access key inputs andservices, which are centralised and fully 
controlled by the government. Generally, local farme s produce below capacity in relatively 
small low-cost structures, which are also not well equipped. As a result, farmers apply very 
primitive management methods that eventually affect their productivity. These constraints are 
partly responsible for the extremely low locally produced volumes and inconsistent market 
supply, prompting local mushroom traders to rely on imports. Other constraints relate to the 
lack of diversification as farmers currently produce only the oyster mushroom, yet consumers 
are mostly interested in the button mushroom, which is favoured for its appearance and taste. 
 
Currently, no cultivated mushrooms are exported from Swaziland and producers have not yet 
engaged in any form of mushroom processing. Instead, from what they harvest, it was found 
that about six to 10 percent is consumed at household level and the remainder sold through 
four channels identified as: (i) the farm gate; (ii) retail market (supermarkets); (iii) 
middlemen; and (iv) food services industry (restaurants/hotels). Among the four channels, the 
retail market and farm gate were, respectively, identifi d as the most preferred. Between the 
two, the retail market offers a comparatively higher producer price and a relatively more 
dependable market. Cragg’s regression results revealed that producers who are likely to 
supply the retail market are those who manage a reltiv y large number of spawn 
impregnated bags, have a high labour endowment, owncold storage facilities, and are 
affiliated to mushroom producing groups. However, the difficulty in accessing market 
information and lack of bargaining power significantly constrains other producers’ plans to 
supply the retail market; hence, they end up selling through less remunerative channels, such 
as the farm gate. Producers’ decisions on the quantity of mushrooms supplied through the 
retail market are significantly affected by the difficulty in accessing transport and uncertainty 
about meeting the retailers’ quality requirements. 
 
Over 90 percent of mushroom producers in Swaziland currently participate in the industry 
through farmer groups. These groups are predominantly organised in two forms, depicted as 
model A and B, respectively. In model A, besides establishing their own by-laws, members 
produce mushrooms in one growing house where they sare the costs and benefits of all pre-
production, production and marketing activities. In model B, members also establish their 
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own by-laws and share all pre-production activities. However, instead of producing under one 
roof, each member manages his/her own growing house and members are at liberty to make 
their own marketing arrangements independently. The results of the Propensity Score 
Matching method indicated that producers affiliated o model B groups have significantly 
higher levels of cooperation, which is evidenced in making joint decisions and performing 
shared manual activities. Participation in such groups also improves producers’ knowledge of 
the enterprise, and reduces the likelihood of internal free-riding. 
 
The overall results of the study point to the need to strengthen farmer training in mushroom 
production and value-addition. In attempting to improve producers’ access to key inputs and 
services, it is recommended that the government should relinquish its position (to the private 
sector) as the only provider of these services, allowing public institutions to assume a 
monitoring role. Producers’ competitiveness and sustainable participation in the mushroom 
value chain can be enhanced by institutionalising ad strengthening collective action, which 
can possibly enable them to achieve economies of scale benefits in the input and product 
markets, and improve their bargaining position. As indicated in the empirical chapters, market 
availability for mushrooms is not a challenge in Swaziland. However, the lack of a market 
information system, expert assistance in agribusines  management, poor value chain 
governance, and lack of vertical coordination, predispose producers to high marketing and 
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Like many Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Swaziland is vulnerable to spells of 
drought and erratic climatic conditions, which often cause serious food shortages and 
increasing poverty levels (WFP/FAO, 2005). Despite these challenges, agriculture remains 
a critical sector in terms of food security and employment creation as it currently employs 
about 70 percent of Swaziland’s total labour force (CBS, 2009). Sugarcane is Swaziland’s 
leading agricultural export earner and has played a major role in stimulating the 
manufacturing industry, which has recently emerged as the leading contributor to the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Hassan, 2008; CBS, 2012). 
 
As noted by Levin (1986) and the World Bank (2000), for example, Swaziland’s over-
reliance on a limited range of agricultural export products has had adverse effects on the 
country’s economic stability. Such effects have become more apparent following the sugar 
trade reforms by the European Union (EU), which constitutes one of Swaziland’s most 
lucrative markets (Gotor and Tsigas, 2011). In respon e, the Swaziland government 
embarked on a review of its policies with the aim of diversifying the country’s agricultural 
export base. Policies were reviewed in line with developing sustainable economic activities 
likely to have an immediate and direct impact at household level, particularly in the rural 
areas where 75 percent of the one million population resides, of whom 63 percent live 
below the US$2/day poverty line (GoS, 2011a). This process culminated in the formation 
of three policy initiatives in 2005, namely (i) the Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action 
Programme (PRSAP); (ii) the Comprehensive Agriculture Sector Policy (CASP); and the 
(iii) Food Security Policy (FSP). Central in these policy instruments, which are all in line 
with the National Development Strategy (NDS) (see GoS, 1999), is a strong advocacy for 
investment in local production of high-value agricultural commodities (HVACs) that have 
not been explored by local farmers. These are commodities that  do not form part of 
customary diets of the local population, but are mainly grown for their cash values in 
domestic and export markets (Jaffee and Morton, 1995; Temu and Temu, 2005). 
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HVACs have a relatively high income elasticity of demand and are favourable for 
expanded trade and value-adding activities (Teklu, 1996; Kumar et al., 2011). The World 
Bank (2005) reported that in the mid-2000s, internatio l trade in HVACs grew by seven 
percent per year compared to two percent for starchy staple commodities (e.g. cereals, 
roots and tubers). Most high-value agricultural enterprises are labour-intensive, have low 
gestation periods, and are capable of generating quick returns. As such, they provide 
substantial opportunities for rural employment creation, enhancing farm incomes, and 
reducing poverty in developing countries (Birthal and Joshi, 2009). 
 
The demand for HVACs in developing countries is largely attributed to increased 
urbanization, which underlies the changes in people’s di ts (Rao et al., 2006; Gulati et al., 
2007). Despite being the least urbanised continent, Africa has the highest growth rate of 
urbanisation (Njo, 2003). For instance, between 1980 and 1991, Africa’s urban population 
grew at an average annual rate of about six percent such that by 1991 Africans residing in 
urban areas were about 29 percent of the population, increasing to 38 percent in 2007 
(World Bank, 1993; United Nations, 2008). In Swazilnd, the urban population rose from 
four percent in the 1960s to about 35 percent in 2007 (Miles, 2000; CSO, 2008). Rapid 
urbanization raises the problem of securing urban food and nutritional supplies. While 
urban agriculture could have a role to play as a source of food for urban dwellers (Obosu-
Mensah, 1999), this may not be attainable in some African countries due to land 
constraints or the existence of by-laws that prohibit certain agricultural activities in some 
municipalities (Prain and Lee-Smith, 2010), a situat on also found in Swaziland (see 
Tevera et al., 2012). Notwithstanding such possible limitations, people who migrate to 
urban areas generally do so in search of better wage employment outside agriculture; 
hence, even if there are opportunities to engage in agriculture, urban dwellers’ attempts 
may be precluded by the opportunity cost. 
 
Urbanisation in developing countries has led to the gradual emergence of a ‘middle-class’ 
category of citizens who enjoy higher disposable incomes compared to their rural 
counterparts (Louw et al., 2008). Given their circumstances, middle-class citizens are more 
likely to develop new consumption patterns and preference for processed and convenient 
(easy to cook) foods, allowing them to have more time for income-earning opportunities 
and leisure (Teklu, 1996; Popkin, 1999). In addition, as urbanization is also associated 
with women’s participation in the workforce (Miles, 2000), the opportunity cost of time 
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for women, and their share of household income, can be an important determinant of 
households’ expenditure and food consumption patterns (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). 
Research from developing countries frequently suggests  that women participating in the 
urban labour force have less time available for tradi ional food preparation and often opt 
for high-value foods that are relatively easy and quick to prepare (Senauer t al., 1986; 
Reardon et al., 2003; Carrigan et al., 2006; Gulati et al., 2007). High-value foods are easily 
accessible from supermarket chain stores, which are bett r positioned to cater for modern 
lifestyles. The involvement of such outlets in food retailing provides an opportunity for 
rural-based farmers to participate in mainstream supply chains, enabling them to 
potentially generate substantial returns (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Rickard and 
Gonsalves, 2008; Emongor and Kirsten, 2009; Minten et al., 2009). Apart from 
urbanisation, other studies (e.g. Telfer and Wall, 2000; Torres, 2003) have identified 
tourism as another leading contributing factor towards the economic importance of 
HVACs given their high demand in hotels, restaurants and other tourist destination areas. 
 
Mushrooms are among the HVACs that have been earmarked by the Swaziland 
government to spearhead the country’s fight against social challenges such as poverty and 
food insecurity (ITC, 1998; Commonwealth, 2001). Prefe ence in Swaziland is currently 
given to the oyster mushroom considering its ease of pr duction, less capital cost 
requirements, and the abundance of substrate materials1. First cultivated in Germany in the 
1900s (Eger et al., 1976), the oyster mushroom (Pleurotus spp) is popular for its fragrant 
odour and delicious flavour. It is currently ranked among the top three popularly consumed 
mushroom species in the world after button (Agaricus spp) and shiitake (Lentinula spp), 
respectively (Hall et al., 2003; Chang and Miles, 2004). Different from theconventional 
agronomic enterprises found on customary Swazi Nation Land (SNL) (e.g. maize and 
beans), which are generally mono-seasonal and rainfall-dependent (GoS, 2002), 
mushrooms can be produced year-round and do not require large areas of land to grow as 
they are produced from enclosed structures, whose environment (temperature, light, and 
humidity) is controlled by the producer. 
 
This form of diversification is capable of mitigating the effects of climate change on rain-
fed agriculture (Kandulu et al., 2012). It also provides rural dwellers with an opp rtunity 
                                                 
1 Substrate material refers to any substance on which mushrooms will grow. The substrate performs a similar 
function as soil in crop production. 
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to make returns within a short period of time as a ingle production cycle of maize, for 
instance, which takes about four to six months, is enough to produce approximately two 
cycles of oyster mushrooms (Chiroro, 2004). Moreover, there is a wide choice of oyster 
mushroom species that can be cultivated under different climatic conditions (Sher et al., 
2010) using a range of substrate materials, most of which are generated from agricultural, 
forest, and food processing waste (see Oie, 1991; Ragunathan et al., 1996; Yildiz et al., 
2002; Baysal et al., 2003). Given Swaziland’s high level of agro-industrialization (based 
mainly on sugarcane, citrus, and woodpulp) (CBS, 2012), large quantities of waste are 
generated regularly; hence, cultivation of edible mushrooms could be one viable option for 
the bioconversion of such materials, which if not utilised can cause environmental hazards 
(Akavia et al., 2009; Loss et al., 2009). 
 
Compared with other high-value food commodities (e.g. vegetables), cultivated 
mushrooms have high levels of proteins, vitamins, dietary fibre and inorganic minerals 
(Mattila et al., 2001; Guillamón et al., 2010). More importantly, they are effective in 
enhancing the human body’s defence against various types of cancers, viral infections 
(including HIV), diabetes, constipation, and cardiovascular diseases (Wasser and Weis, 
1999; Schneider et al., 2011; Roupas et al., 2012). Besides mushrooms’ income generating 
potential through trade (see Marshall and Nair, 2009; Cai et al., 2011), and their high 
nutritional and therapeutical properties, the enterprise also brings environmental benefits 
after harvesting. For instance, the spent substrate is valuable as a source of biofertilisers 
(Sagar et al., 2009; Zhu et al., 2012), growing media for horticultural plants (Medina et al., 
2009), and as a source of animal feed (Zhang et al., 1995; Villas-Bôas et al., 2002). 
Further research has established that the spent subs rate can also be used to grow other 
mushroom species (Royse, 1992), control the spread of nematodes in soils (Thorn and 
Barron, 1984; Hibbett and Thorn, 1994), and in the production of green energy sources (Li 
et al., 2011). 
 
In attempting to give the mushroom-growing sector a p ominent position in Swaziland, the 
government (through the Mushroom Development Unit (MDU)) currently offers free 
training in basic mushroom production, extension servic s, high quality spawn (mushroom 
seed) at a very nominal fee, and free substrate bags2. This intervention was pioneered by 
                                                 
2 Oyster mushrooms are grown from polyethylene bags filled with substrate material. 
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the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2001 and has been implemented 
through a collaboration with the government and Tibiyo TakaNgwane (TTN), a private 
local entity. Swaziland is also one of the six countries3 supported by the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to promote mushroom production in Southern Africa 
as an intervention that seeks to reduce rural poverty and improve the production of 
medicinal products through mushroom processing. The NEPAD initiative commenced in 
2009 and Swaziland participates as a host for a regional mushroom gene bank (SANBio, 
2012). However, despite the geographical suitability, and the substantial support received 
from the public and private sectors, the mushroom industry in Swaziland is still 
characterised by a wide range of problems that have r ised unanswered questions. For 
instance, periodic reports from the MDU indicate that the number of producers has been 
fluctuating since the programme was incepted in 2001. A typical case was the decline in 
the number of producers from 225 in 2004 to 39 in 2008 against an investment of about E4 
million4 made by the government to establish a fully-fledged mushroom laboratory and 
training facility in Malkerns (MDU, 2009a). There has also been no research so far on the 
challenges and opportunitities of producing, value adding, and marketing of mushrooms in 
Swaziland. This study is, therefore, an effort in that direction as elaborated in the next 
section, which presents the detailed research problem and justification. The specific 
objectives are presented in Section 1.3, and Section 1.4 gives an outline of the rest of the 
thesis. 
 
1.2 Research problem and justification 
 
While profit margins for the oyster mushroom enterprise have been found to be relatively 
higher than conventional agronomic crop enterprises such as maize (Chiroro, 2004; Imtiaj 
and Rahman, 2008), the low level of participation in mushroom production by Swazi 
farmers poses challenging questions for the programme implementers, policy makers, and 
Swaziland’s development partners. Despite introducing the programme in 2001 and 
conducting farmer training in several parts of the country, there remains a dearth of 
empirical information on why farmers have not included the mushroom enterprise in their 
                                                 
3 The other five countries include Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zambia. 




farming systems. Given that mushrooms were not cultivated in Swaziland prior to 2001, 
the enterprise is relatively new to local farmers and is categorised as ‘non-conventional’ in 
Swaziland’s agricultural context (Commonwealth, 2001). Since production decisions are 
normally made at household level, it is important to identify the factors that influence 
individual households to participate (or not) in oyster mushroom production. A study of 
this nature is important from a policy perspective as it will provide information on the 
socio-economic relevance of the enterprise and its acceptability in Swaziland. It will also 
inform pragmatic interventions required to improve participation of local farmers in the 
mushroom industry. 
 
Inspite of the availability of niche markets for mushrooms in Swaziland, mainly comprised 
of supermarket chain stores and the food services sector (hotels and restaurants) (ITC, 
1998), the volumes of locally produced mushrooms in such markets have been 
insignificant; hence, these buyers rely on imported supplies in their quest to meet 
consumer demands. With South Africa being the major trading partner for a number of 
Southern African countries, most of the operating supermarkets in Swaziland are sub-
branches of South African chain stores. The predominant ones include Pick n Pay, 
Shoprite, and Spar (Emongor and Kirsten, 2009). Swaziland currently imports over 95 
percent of locally consumed cultivated mushrooms, mainly from South Africa, valued at 
about E2.4 million annually with no recorded exports (Mamba, 2010; NAMBoard, 2012). 
 
Considering that the government aspires to engage mor local producers in the industry, it 
would be logical to identify and address the socio-ec nomic and institutional factors 
constraining local production, and impeding current producers from participating 
competitively in remunerative supply chains. Understanding the nature of existing 
impediments, and how they can possibly be alleviated, will assist programme 
implementors and policy makers to develop improved implementation strategies required 
to achieve the programme’s overall objective of improving rural livelihoods. While a 
considerable number of studies have been done in Southern Africa on this subject (see 
Ortmann and King, 2010, for a review), mushrooms have not featured in the debate and the 
findings and recommendations of previous studies cannot be generalised because of 
different commodity characteristics and countries’ institutional environments (Delgado, 
1999; Webber and Labaste, 2010). This study also differs from previous attempts by using 
a value chain approach, which reflects on the various activities and institutions involved 
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from production to the delivery of mushrooms and mushroom products to final consumers 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). This approach further enables the study to better identify 
unexploited opportunities and in response prioritise interventions that can possibly 
improve operations at various stages of the entire chain (Chitundu et al., 2009; Rieple and 
Singh, 2011). 
 
Consistent with other agricultural enterprises, mushoom producers can only realise 
significant benefits from their ventures if they operate within a commercialised setting and 
have access to remunerative product markets (Delgado, 1999). Such markets, as indicated 
earlier, are dominated by supermarkets and the food services industry, whose procurement 
strategies are mainly driven by consumer demands for quality standards and consistency in 
supply. Attempts to comply with these requirements come with profound challenges for 
smallholder producers as they are expected to adopt new production and marketing 
strategies that are generally complex and expensive to finance (Boselie et al., 2003). For 
instance, producers need information on the safe use of recommended inputs and 
sustainable production procedures that need to be followed before the commodities leave 
the farm. The acquisition and processing of such information involve substantial costs, 
which can easily deter smallholders from venturing to high-value agriculture (HVA) 
(Narrod, et al., 2009). Mushroom producers in Swaziland have a rare advantage in this 
regard as such information costs are currently borne by the government, which, as 
indicated earlier, provides free training and extensio  services, free substrate bags, and 
spawn at a nominal fee. However, possible problems are likely to arise in the marketing 
stage where no form of public or private support is currently rendered to producers. 
Mushrooms are highly perishable, implying that the marketing stage is invariably 
associated with a considerable level of transaction c sts, which if not contained can 
ultimately affect producers’ competitiveness in thevalue chain or perhaps increase to a 
level where markets may be adjudged to be ‘missing’ (de Janvry et al., 1991). 
 
As opposed to other food commodities that have a longer shelf life (e.g. grains and pulses), 
mushrooms require rapid and refrigerated transportati n to consumption centres or 
immediate processing into less perishable forms. This limits the period of time during 
which mushrooms can be marketed as a fresh commodity r used as raw materials in 
processing. Such conditions normally subject producers to limited marketing flexibility as 
they often find themselves in an unfavourable bargaining position, particularly against 
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buyers who have alternative sources of supply (Jaffee, 1995). Given these observations, it 
would be worthwhile to identify the forms of transaction costs that characterise the 
mushroom marketing environment, and study how they influence mushroom producers’ 
channel choice decisions and the eventual quantity of mushrooms sold in selected 
channels. In attempting to improve the benefits associated with the enterprise, it is also 
important to identify possible means of reducing transaction costs as they are often 
considered an embodiment of barriers to market participa ion by resource-poor producers 
(Key et al., 2000; Matungul et al., 2001). Given the paucity of empirical studies of this 
nature in Swaziland, the results in this regard will be instrumental towards improving the 
general agricultural marketing environment, which constitutes an indispensable element in 
the advancement of Swaziland’s on-going agricultural development programme (see FAO, 
2011, for details). 
 
Previous studies indicate that smallholders are less likely to comply with modern supply 
chain requirements if they are less integrated and less organized, have less physical, social 
and human capital, lack access to credit, and have no previous experience in high-value 
supply chains (Kersting and Wollni, 2012). Such factors impede producers from meeting 
buyers’ food safety and quality control requirements, as well as the supply of standardized 
products on a continuous basis (Henson et al., 2005; Gulati et al., 2007; Narrod et al., 
2009). In attempting to address these challenges, small- cale producers engaged in HVA 
have chosen to produce and market collectively through farmer organisations, an 
institutional innovation that has been widely accepted in most developing countries (see 
Kaganzi et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009; Mousteir et al., 2010; Shiferaw et al., 2011). 
Defined by Olson (1965) as the voluntary action taken by a group of individuals who share 
mutual interests and expect to achieve common benefits, collective action in agriculture 
raises the possibility for sharing skills and information among members as some could be 
more experienced and knowledgeable than others (Matungul et al., 2001). Farmers also 
enhance their chances to access financial services, innovation technology services, and 
policy advocacy (Delgado, 1999). Furthermore, co-operating partners, including 
government agencies and other service providers, generally prefer working with groups to 
individuals as they are able to reduce operational costs while promoting social control to 




In their quest to participate collectively in commercial agriculture, producers normally 
have to decide on the appropriate organisational or gr up form. Kruijssen et al. (2009) 
posit that in selecting the organisational form, it is important for producers to be 
considerate of its adaptability and responsiveness to internal as well as external factors. 
The common farmer organisations in Swaziland take various legal forms such as co-
operatives, associations, and companies. However, of late, an increasing number of small-
scale farmers have shown a strong preference for inmal groups, which are mainly 
commodity-based and not governed by any legal instrument (Nkambule, 2008). These 
groups are relatively easy to form, flexible, and responsive to members’ shifting needs. 
Having no externally imposed rules of managing their businesses, informal groups have a 
relatively wider latitude for decision-making, enabling them to swiftly respond to available 
opportunities. 
 
Collective action among Swaziland’s mushroom producers seems to be a very popular 
choice such that, currently, over 90 percent participate in the mushroom industry through 
farmer groups as opposed ‘sole proprietors’. These groups operate in predominantly two 
organisational forms, depicted hereafter as model A and model B. In model A, besides 
establishing their own by-laws, members produce mushrooms in one production house 
where they share all pre-production5, production, and marketing activities. In model B, 
members also establish their own by-laws and share all pre-production activities. However, 
instead of producing under one roof, each member manages his/her own production house 
and is at liberty to make his/her own marketing arrangements independently. 
 
Since the inception of the mushroom development programme, most producing groups 
have operated using model A, and only recently have oth rs opted for model B. Compared 
to model A, model B is relatively innovative in tha while it embodies the ‘traditional’ 
notion of working together, it also allows members to use their individual entrepreneurial 
abilities in the production and marketing stages. However, the question that this study 
attempts to address is whether organisational form, as depicted by the difference between 
the two forms of mushroom producing groups, induces any effects on the performance of 
collective responsibilities by the members. Such effects (if any) are likely to bring various 
types of consequences on the groups’ cohesion and sustainability. The novelty of this study 
                                                 
5 Pre-production activities are labour-intensive. They include substrate gathering, cutting, mixing, bagging, 
sterilization/pasteurisation, and spawning (see Gwanama et al., 2011, for details). 
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is that while substantial literature is available on the determinants of small-scale farmers’ 
participation in collective action (e.g. La Ferrara, 2002; Bernard and Spielman, 2009), and 
whether farmers do benefit from producing and/or maketing collectively (e.g. Wolni and 
Zeller, 2007; Bernard et al., 2008; Fischer and Qaim, 2012), empirical evidence on the 
likely implications of organisational form on the me bers’ collective behaviour remains 
scanty. Given the importance and popularity of collective action within the smallholder 
farming sector in most developing countries, a study of this nature is potentially beneficial 
to managers and policy makers of similar development programmes as it provides valuable 
insights into alternative means of coordinating commercial small-scale interventions. 
 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the mushroom industry in Swaziland is 
confronted with several challenges that require research-based informed decisions. The 
overall study’s contribution is beyond the provision f policy recommendations for 
Swaziland as the results could have an important bearing on the promotion of 
smallholders’ participation in the production and marketing of non-conventional high-
value agricultural commodities in other developing countries. The specific objectives of 
the study are presented in the following section. 
1.3 Research objectives 
 
The general objective of the study is to unpack the institutional constraints the mushroom 
industry in Swaziland currently faces and generate policy-relevant information that can 
possibly improve the mushroom value chain. This is achieved through the following 
specific objectives: 
 
(i) Identify and examine the factors that influence households’ decisions to participate 
in mushroom production; 
(ii)  Study the underlying mushroom production and market access constraints; 
(iii)  Examine the effects of transaction cost factors that influence mushroom producers’ 
market channel choice decisions and the quantity of mushrooms sold in selected 
channels; and 





These objectives are achieved by employing different co ceptual and empirical methods 
whose results are presented in chapters three to six. The next section presents the outline of 
the thesis. 
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter two lays the foundation for 
the institutional economics of cultivated mushrooms in Swaziland. It begins with a review 
of the value chain concept, highlighting the different approaches used to analyse the 
various production and distribution processes of agricultural commodities and services. It 
also provides an overview of the economic importance of transaction costs in the 
smallholder agricultural sector. The last part of chapter two discusses the rationale for 
institutionalising collective action as a means of  addressing the major constraints 
encountered by small-scale producers in their quest to competitively participate in the 
production and marketing of high-value agricultural commodities. Chapters three to six 
comprise estimation methods and empirical results presented in accordance with the 
specific objectives of the study. The results on the factors that influence households’ 
decisions to participate in mushroom production are provided in chapter three. Chapter 
four presents the results of the socio-economic andinstitutional factors constraining 
mushroom production and producers’ access to remunerativ  markets. The empirical 
estimation of the effects of transaction costs on producers’ choice of marketing channels 
and the quantity of mushrooms sold in selected channels are presented in chapter five. 
Chapter six discusses the empirical analysis of the eff cts of organisational form on 
producers’ participation in collective responsibilities. Chapter seven concludes the thesis 
with a presentation of the main findings of the study, policy recommendations, and 













THE RELEVANCE OF VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS, TRANSACTION 
COSTS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION  IN PROMOTING 






Marketing is a very crucial element for transforming smallholders into commercial 
producers, a condition that may enable them to generate substantial household income and 
possibly improve their welfare. However, market participation, particularly in high-value 
agriculture, is not costless as the participants are often subjected to various forms of 
transaction costs, which if not contained could result in the exclusion of poorly-resourced 
smallholder producers. Value chain analysis provides a useful market-based approach that 
is well suited to provide a better understanding of h w poor producers in developing 
countries can be assisted to participate competitivly and sustainably in domestic, regional, 
and international trade. This chapter, therefore, begins with a review of the value chain 
concept, underlining its relevance in the smallholder agricultural sector. It also provides an 
overview of the economic importance of transaction c sts in the production and marketing 
of high-value agricultural commodities. The last section discusses the relevance of 
collective action in attempting to reduce transaction costs encountered by smallholders 
engaged in high-value agriculture. 
 
2.2 The value chain concept and analysis methods 
 
2.2.1 The value chain concept 
 
The value chain is defined by Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) as the full range of activities 
required to bring a product or service from conception, through the intermediary of 
production, delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use. As opposed to the 
traditional exclusive focus on production, the concept stresses the importance of value 
addition at each stage, thereby treating production as just one of several value-adding 
components of the chain (UNIDO, 2009a). Although the ‘value chain’ terminology is often 
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used interchangeably with ‘supply chain’, the forme r lates to value creation via 
innovation in production, processing, and marketing (Webber and Labaste, 2010). The 
supply chain, however, refers to the logistical and procedural activities involved in the 
transfer of commodities from production to the deliv ry of a final product or service to the 
ultimate consumer (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). The supply chain mainly aims to reduce 
bottlenecks, outages or overstocks, lower transaction costs, and improve customer 
satisfaction (Webber and Labaste, 2010). Hence, the value chain is more inclusive as it 
incorporates supply logistics, value addition, transactions, andmarket linkages. 
 
The importance of value chain analysis in the agricultural sector has largely been linked to 
the understanding of markets, particularly the underlying factors that limit or impede the 
participation and competitiveness of smallholder farmers (individually or collectively) in 
modern value chains (IFAD, 2010). Value chain studies have also augmented the 
knowledge of complexities, inter-linkages, distribut onal benefits, and institutional 
arrangements of production and marketing channels (Rich et al., 2011). Given the rich 
history of how this concept has evolved over the years, several techniques have been 
applied by researchers in the past to analyse value chains. A succint review of these 
techniques is provided in the next sub-section. 
 
2.2.2 The evolution of value chain analysis methods 
 
The first analytical method is the filière. This approach gained prominence in the 1960s 
where it was used to study contract farming and vertical integration in French agriculture, 
and later in West African countries that were under th  French colony. It was generally 
applied to analyse input-output structures for agricultural commodities, assessing how 
public policies, investments, and institutions affect local production systems (Raikes t al., 
2000). Premised on several theories and methodologies (including systems analysis, 
industrial organisation, institutional economics (old and new), management science, 
Marxist economics, and various accounting techniques) (Kydd et al., 1996), filière studies 
dealt primarily with local production systems and consumption, and generally overlooked 
areas such as international trade and processing (UNIDO, 2009a). Despite its gradual 
popularity even outside France, the filière has been avoided by some scholars who argue 
that its applicability is limited to domestic commodity chains; hence, it may not be 
appropriate in analysing the flow of commodities and services in a globalised setting 
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(Raikes et al., 2000; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) add that 
this approach has also been criticised for providing static explanations of production 
relationships as it only describes relationships at a certain point in time and fails to explain 
internal dynamics in commodity or service flows, and changes in the status of value chain 
actors. 
 
Another related approach is known as the sub-sector analysis. A sub-sector is defined by 
Shaffer (1973) as the vertical set of activities and i terdependent array of organisations, 
resources, laws, and institutions involved in the production, processing and distribution of 
a closely related set of commodities. Historically, this approach was mainly used to study 
agricultural commodities, describing and evaluating he economic networks through which 
they are transformed and distributed to their ultima e consumers. Based on a framework 
premised on the industrial organisation theory (Holtzman, 2002), the sub-sector analysis 
places emphasis on how a commodity sub-sector is organized (structure), how the structure 
influences the behaviour of sub-sector participants (conduct), and ultimately how the sub-
sector performs in the aggregate (performance). As a dynamic approach, the sub-sector 
analysis examines how markets and industries respond to changes in the form of shifting 
international supply and demand for a commodity, technological change in the food/fibre 
system, and new knowledge of organisational or management techniques (Staatz, 1997). 
This approach is also capable of identifying blockages and possible intervention strategies 
in the transformation and distribution of commodities (Buckley, 1997). Despite its 
usefulness across various fields, some researchers argue that the sub-sector approach is not 
suited to address most problems of sector-industry linkages. For instance, Staatz (1997) 
contends that it is not designed to analyse constrai ts within the firm to improve 
performance. It also tends to neglect the importance of commodity fungibility and 
diversification, and is less suitable to analyse activities that cut across several vertical 
production-distribution systems (Buckley, 1997; Staatz, 1997). 
 
In the 1970s, Hopkins and Wallerstein pioneered the concept of commodity chains that is 
embedded in the world systems theory. This concept onsiders an ultimate consumable 
item and traces it back to the set of inputs used in its production, including prior 
transformations, the raw materials, transportation mechanisms, labour input into each of 
the material processes and food consumed by the labourers. Hopkins and Wallernstein’s 
(1977) conviction is that by studying the processes constituting a particular commodity 
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chain, it is possible to analyse the ‘complex and concrete determinations of the global 
economy’. The commodity chain concept categorises all countries into three economic 
regions: (i) core regions, (ii) semi-periphery regions, and (iii) periphery regions. The 
general hypothesis is that core regions benefit most fr m the capitalist world economy 
compared to other regions. Therefore, stable governm nts, high wages, and a high import 
share of raw materials characterise core regions, whereas countries in the periphery regions 
lack strong stable governments, export merely labour-intensive raw materials, and have 
wages near subsistence level (Hopkins and Wallernstin, 1977). Although widely 
recognised and used by numerous scholars, the commodity chain approach has received its 
fair share of criticism. For instance, Dougherty (2008) argues that the commodity chain 
concept under-theorises the price mechanism, misses ues of terms of trade, ignores the 
key role of state policy in influencing commodity trajectories, and fails to fully 
accommodate non-physical commodities such as services and knowledge. 
 
The value chain analysis emerged in the mid 1980’s, having been popularised by Porter 
(1985) as an instrument for identifying the value of each step in an organisation’s 
production process. It is utilised as a conceptual framework by organisations to detect their 
actual and potential areas of competitive advantage. Porter (1985) argues that in attempting 
to highlight such areas, the firm should be disaggre ated into a series of activities. He 
identifies (i) primary activities, which directly contribute to add value to the production of 
goods and services, and (ii) support activities, which have an indirect effect on the final 
value of the product. The primary activities include internal logistics and operations, 
marketing and sales, whereas the support activities nclude strategic planning, human 
resource management, and technology development. The goal of all these activities is to 
offer the consumer a level of value that exceeds the cost of the activities; hence, resulting 
in a profit margin for the organisation (Roduner, 2004). With the value chain concept, 
Porter was able to emphasise that the profitability of a firm depends on how effectively it 
manages the various activities that create added value. Porter’s approach is, however, 
restricted to the firm level, neglecting the analysis of upstream or downstream activities 
beyond the organisation. As such, his framework is largely regarded as a tool for assisting 





Another method, known as the Global Commodity Chain (GCC), was introduced to the 
literature in the mid-1990s by Gereffi and others. Founded on the world systems theory, 
GCC researchers utilise the value chain framework t examine ways in which firms and 
countries are globally integrated, and to assess the determinants of global income 
distribution. The GCC analysis entails the identificat on of actors involved in the 
production and distribution of a particular good or service and mapping the kinds of 
relationships that exist among them. The ultimate goal is to understand where, how, and by 
whom value is created and distributed along the chain (Appelbaum and Gereffi, 1994). 
Hence, more recently, Gereffi et al. (2001) updated the ‘Global Commodity Chain’ (GCC) 
terminology to ‘Global Value Chain’ (GVC), which is more inclusive as indicated in 
Section 2.2.1. The GVC approach is cemented on four pillars, namely (a) input-output 
structure, (b) territorial (international) structure, (c) institutional framework, and (d) 
governance structure. Among these structures, governance has received the most attention 
as it is where the key notions of barriers to value chain entry lie. The GVC emphasises the 
different ways in which activities along the chain re coordinated. It views governance as 
the process of specifying, communicating, and enforcing compliance with key product and 
process parameters along the chain (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004; Faβe et al., 2009). As 
such, special attention is paid to the most powerful or lead firms, which are also known as 
chain drivers, given their influence over other chain participants and their presumed 
importance as potential agents of upgrading and development (Bair, 2005). What 
distinguishes lead firms from their followers or subordinates is that they control access to 
major resources (e.g. product design, new technologies or brand names) that generate the 
most profitable returns in the value chain. 
 
The major hypothesis in GVC is that ccess to lead firms is a necessary condition for 
successful participation in global markets, particularly by exporters in developing 
countries (Gereffi et al., 2001). Lead firms do not only dictate terms of participaton to 
their immediate suppliers, but they also transmit these conditionalities along the chain, 
often as far as the primary producers. In relation t  possible forms of governance 
structures, global value chains can either be buyer-driven or producer-driven (Gereffi, 
1994; 1999). Producer-driven value chains are those in which large, usually transnational 
manufacturers play the central role of coordinating production networks. This is 
characteristic of capital and technology-intensive industries such as automobiles, aircrafts, 
and computers (Raikes et al., 2000). The automobile industry offers a classic illustration of 
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a producer-driven chain, with multi-layered production systems that involve a large 
number of firms (including parents, subsidiaries, and sub-contractors) (Gereffi, 2001). 
 
Buyer-driven value chains are mainly found in industrie  where large retailers and 
marketers do not make the branded products they trade in. Hence, they are ‘manufacturers 
without factories’ (Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003). These buyers play the pivotal role of 
setting up decentralised production networks in a number of developing countries that 
export the products. This pattern of trade-led industrialisation has become common in 
labour-intensive consumer goods industries such as garments, footwear, toys, housewares, 
consumer electronics, and a variety of handcrafts (Gereffi, 1999; 2013; Raikes et al., 
2000). Production is generally carried out by tiered networks of third world contractors 
producing finished goods for the international market. The specifications are supplied by 
the large retailers or marketers who order the goods. Buyer-driven commodity chains are 
also found in the high-value food industry, which is largely dominated by supermarket 
chains that primarily serve urban consumers (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). In these 
chains, the supermarket chain stores determine the conditions such as volume of 
procurement, quality and safety standards, packaging requirements, and consistency of 
supply in response to consumer demands (Bienabe et al., 2007). Other lead buyers have 
specifications of what type of product needs to be supplied, by whom, in what quantity, 
when, how it should be produced, and at what price (Bolwig et al., 2010). 
 
All the above-discussed analytical methods (from filière to GVC) make useful 
contributions to current value chain studies. Their different strengths and weaknesses make 
them complementary and indicate the potential usefuln ss of combining certain aspects 
from each. Drawing from the above discussion, the next sub-section presents the common 
dimensions that constitute value chain analysis in various fields. 
 
2.2.3 The dimensions of value chain analysis 
 
There are generally three main components explored in the value chain analysis 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001; Rich et al., 2011). The first component comprises the 
mapping of actors participating in the production ad marketing of commodities and 
services. This represents the entire input-output process that brings a product or service 
from initial conception to the consumer’s hands. The main segments in the chain vary 
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according to the industry, but typically include research and design, inputs, production, 
distribution and marketing, consumption, and in some cases the recycling of products after 
use. There is also the geographical component, which links value chain activities to the 
physical locations where these activities are carried out. Relevant geographies could be 
global, regional, national, or local (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). 
 
The second component relates to governance analysis, wh ch focuses on the structure of 
relationships and coordination mechanisms among the value chain actors. This component 
helps to better understand how the chain is controlled and coordinated, particularly when 
certain actors have more power than others (Gereffi et al., 2009). The control and 
coordination in the chain is not only restricted to g ods, but also includes capital, 
technology, standards, and brands, among other important elements. This dimension also 
involves the analysis of how the main inter-firm relationships in an industry are organised. 
Possible governance structures include markets (coordinated by price), hierarchies 
(coordinated through vertical integration) or networks (modular, relational or captive) 
(Gereffi et al., 2005). These structures are measured and determined by the complexity of 
information between actors in the chain, how production information is codified, and the 
level of supplier competence (see Sturgeon and Gereffi, 2008, for details). The governance 
structures can change as the industry evolves, and v ry from one level of the continuum to 
another (e.g. from markets to hierarchies). Recent studies (e.g. Gereffi et al., 2009) have 
also found that some value chains are characterised by multiple and interactive governance 
structures. 
 
The third component relates to the estimation of how benefits (in terms of income) are 
distributed among value chain actors. This type of analysis is central to understanding how 
the participation of marginalised actors (e.g. poorly-resourced producers) is affected by the 
operation of the chain, and how they may be affected by any future policy intervention. 
This can be achieved through the estimation of the net income for each actor, as a 
percentage of total added value (UNIDO, 2009b). 
 
Some researchers (e.g. Weber and Labaste, 2010; Torero, 2011) argue that value chain 
analysts often fail to consider the institutional environment in which value chain actors 
operate. As a consequence, the analysis fails to identify potential interventions for value 
chain performance and growth. Hence, the institutional environment can be considered as 
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an additional dimension in value chain analysis. All va ue chains operate in environments 
that are shaped by the macroeconomic landscape, policies and regulations, institutional 
elements, and facilitating services. This includes local and international standards, trade 
regulations, and market forces that typically shape the business environment (Ortmann, 
2000; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). The rules and regulations can be set up by actors 
within the chain or established by external actors like governments, NGOs, certification 
bodies and service providers (Ponte, 2009; Riisgaard, 2009). Institutional elements may 
fall into laws, finance, technologies, human development, standards, property rights, and 
research and development (UNIDO, 2009a). 
 
Research and development institutions are important in coming up with innovations in 
product development, and other processes that allow for better handling, storage and 
transportion of commodities, whereas financial institutions are conduits for capital loans 
and investments. Facilitating services, which mainly mprove operations within the value 
chain, include transport, storage, communications, and import and export services 
(UNIDO, 2009a). Transportation, for instance, becomes an important factor in the timely 
delivery of goods, which is vital in preserving product quality and value. An efficient 
transport system can translate to savings in delivery costs, quality deterioration, and 
wastage. Information and communications technology (ICT) is important in attaining 
responsiveness to consumers’ requirements and reliability in delivering the right kind of 
product and volume required by the market (Ortmann, 2000). Therefore, advances in ICT 
are likely to reduce costs and make relevant information more readily available to value 
chain actors, including consumers. 
 
The next section presents the economic importance of transaction costs in high-value 
agriculture. The discussion begins with the definitio  of the transaction cost concept. 
 
2.3 Transaction costs in high-value agriculture 
 
2.3.1 Transaction costs defined 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) falls under the realm of New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), a body of theory embraced within the frame of neo-classical economics. The NIE, 
however, offers new insights of reality in relation to certain restrictive market assumptions 
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that are central to neoclassical economics (see Harriss et al., 1995, for details). The NIE 
evolved from Old Institutionalists (e.g. Commons, 1934), who dispute the notion that 
economic systems evolve as a result of the rational-maximising self-seeking behaviour of 
individuals. Instead, they contend that economic systems evolve as a result of adjustments 
to existing institutions prompted by technological hange (Rutherford, 1994). 
 
TCE has developed over a considerable period of time, having gained prominence from 
Ronald Coase’s study on the ‘Nature of the Firm’, where he acknowledged that the price 
mechanism cannot on its own co-ordinate production as there are other costs of using the 
price mechanism, i.e. transaction costs (Coase, 1937; 1998). Transaction costs include 
costs of discovering what prices should be, and negotiating contracts for exchange. The 
transaction cost phenomenon was given impetus by Oliver Williamson whose considerable 
contribution was to integrate the developing concepts with information asymmetry and 
property rights to formulate a predictive theory about the choice of organisational structure 
in an industry, given the optimising behaviour of firms and the limited cognitive capacity 
of individuals (Williamson, 1975). A further exposition of transaction costs is provided by 
Eggertson (1990) who highlights the thin line between information costs and transaction 
costs. He contends that transaction costs are not identical to information costs. Instead, 
when information is costly to attain and interpret, various activities related to the exchange 
of property rights between economic agents give rise to transaction costs. 
 
Although perceived differently by scholars from various fields (see Allen, 1999), 
transaction costs are generally conceptualised as costs incurred for carrying out any 
exchange between firms in a market or a transfer of esources between stages in a 
vertically integrated firm, when the traditional neoclassical economic theory assumption of 
perfect and costless information is relaxed (Hobbs, 1996a; 1996b). In the field of 
marketing and trade, transaction costs relate to the costs incurred in searching for a partner 
with whom to exchange a product or service, screening potential trading partners to 
ascertain their credibility, bargaining with potential rading partners to reach an agreement, 
transferring the product or service, monitoring theagreement to ensure that its conditions 
are honoured, and enforcing the exchange agreement (Jaffee, 1995). These costs are 
classified in the literature based on whether they are incurred before (ex ante) or after (ex 
post) the actual exchange. They are further categorised into information costs, negotiation 
(bargaining) costs, and monitoring and enforcement cos s (Williamson, 1985). Information 
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costs, which arise x ante, include the costs incurred by economic agents in he search for 
information about products, prices, inputs, and trading partners (Key et al., 2000). 
Negotiation costs include the costs of negotiating and drawing exchange agreements. 
Monitoring and enforcement costs occur ex post and generally relate to the costs of 
ensuring that the pre-agreed terms of the transaction are fulfilled (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999). 
Examples could be monitoring the quality of goods from a supplier or monitoring the 
actions of a supplier or buyer, and the costs of seeking restitution in instances where 
contract terms have been flouted by either party. 
 
Others classify transaction costs according to whether they are tangible or intangible (e.g. 
Loader and Hobbs, 1996). Tangible costs are those t which monetary values can be 
attached with relative ease. Examples include transfer costs, communication costs and 
legal costs, whereas intangible transaction costs arise due to adverse selection and/or moral 
hazard (Loader and Hobbs, 1996). Adverse selection arises as a result of the potential for 
ex ante opportunism because private information is hidden by one party prior to a 
transaction (Arrow, 1984). This may happen, for insta ce, in agricultural credit schemes 
where potential borrowers, who are most likely to produce an undesirable (adverse) 
outcome (i.e. the bad credit risks), are those who most actively seek loans and stand a 
chance to be selected as lenders may not have the full information in relation to their 
creditworthiness (Swinnen and Gow, 1999). Because of the unobservability of such 
pertinent private information, the lender ends up with a set of clients in which the high risk 
segment of the population is over-represented. As a consequence of this adverse 
(borrower) selection, the lender could be forced to raise interest rates, leading to another 
version of adverse effects as the institution may become unattractive even to average risk 
groups (Douma and Schreuder, 1992). 
 
Moral hazard arises as a result of the potential for ex post opportunism because of 
information asymmetry or hidden actions of transacting parties (Douma and Schreuder, 
1992). The anticipation that such hidden actions are possible may also prevent the 
transaction altogether. When the actions of one party (e.g. the agent) cannot be observed 
by another (e.g. the principal), yet these actions have a direct bearing on the economic 
returns of both, the former has an incentive to act opportunistically in attempting to capture 
any gains possible. The principal may incur transaction costs in monitoring the actions of 
the agent and enforcing the terms of a pre-agreed contractual arrangement (Hobbs and 
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Kerr, 1999). An example is cited by Smith and Godwin (1996), where they found that 
insured farmers have a tendency to undertake riskie production options than do uninsured 
farmers. Once the insurance company (principal) provides cover for possible accidents, 
there is an incentive effect on the behaviour of clients (agent) who may act with less 
caution, and in some instances with malicious intent (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). For 
the insurance company, it becomes difficult and costly to investigate whether the damage 
was indeed caused by uncontrollable accidents or whether the behaviour of the insured had 
anything to do with the damage or loss. 
 
Transaction costs can also be categorised based on whether they are proportional or fixed. 
Proportional transaction costs change in accordance with how much the economic agent 
sells or buys (Key et al., 2000). An example could be transfer costs expressed on a per unit 
(of commodity) basis. Fixed transaction costs are independent of the quantities sold or 
bought, and examples include information, bargaining, and monitoring costs (Key et al., 
2000; Alene et al., 2008). Another category identified by North (1987) is referred to as 
‘non-market transaction costs’. This category includes resources spent in waiting, 
acquiring permits to engage in business, cutting through red tapes, and sometimes bribing 
officials while performing the exchange function. 
 
Given the above discussion, it could be inferred that TCE is underpinned by bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and information asymmetry, all of which become more apparent 
in the presence of uncertainty or complexity (Jaffee, 1995; Hobbs and Kerr, 1999). 
Bounded rationality postulates that while economic agents intend to make informed 
rational decisions, their ability to accurately evaluate alternative possible decisions is 
limited by their own cognitive powers (Williamson, 1985). Opportunism relates to 
economic agents seeking to exploit a situation to their own advantage in order to capture 
economic rents (Moschandreas, 1997). Worth indicating, however, is that TCE does not 
imply that all transactors always act opportunistically, rather, it acknowledges that the risk 
of opportunism is often present given the difficulty to distinguish ex ante honest actors 
from dishonest ones (Douma and Schreuder, 1992). In a world of perfect and costless 
information, the allocation of resources to enforce exchange agreements would be 
unnecessary. However, as observed by Stigler (1961), information is not costless, and 
because of the existence of information asymmetries, transaction costs arise either directly 
from these asymmetries or indirectly as a result of economic agents’ attempts to mitigate 
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them. The next sub-section identifies various socio-e nomic and institutional factors that 
give rise to transaction costs in the production and marketing of HVACs in developing 
countries. 
 
2.3.2 Sources of transaction costs in the production and marketing of high value 
agricultural commodities 
 
A large number of high-value agricultural programmes in developing countries promote 
the participation of smallholder producers as they are likely to generate substantial income 
from selling their commodities through remunerative supply chains (see McCullough et
al., 2008). Notwithstanding the likely benefits, producers’ attempts to participate in 
lucrative markets are often precluded by different types of transaction costs. In the 
international context, transaction costs alone could be a major barrier to trade for many 
individuals and firms. Most rural-based producers do not have a ‘good’ understanding of 
the market, for instance, how it works and why prices fluctuate, and have relatively less 
experience in performing or participating in market-related negotiations (Markelova et al., 
2009). Given the absence of market information system  (MIS) in most developing 
countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Shepherd, 2007), producers have 
little or no information on market conditions and prices. The lack of timely access to 
salient and accurate information on prices, locations f effective demand, preferred quality 
characteristics of high-value commodities, and alternative marketing channels places 
smallholder producers in a relatively weak bargaining position against traders. 
 
Other compounding problems relate to infrastructural constraints. Producers, food 
processors, and agricultural traders in SSA mostly endure substantial risks and incur 
considerable costs due to the inadequate, underdevelop d and sometimes dilapidated 
transport and communications infrastructure (Riverson et al., 1991). Such infrastructural 
problems constrain the physical movement of commodities and communication between 
economic agents (Jacoby, 2000; Seetanah, 2012). If commodities have to move within 
regions characterised by poor infrastructure, direct transactions between buyers and sellers 
could be difficult; hence, necessitating the involvement of middlemen who have their own 




Other institutional factors, such as lack of collective marketing also increase transaction 
costs between buyers and sellers, particularly if producers are sparsely located and supply 
small quantities inconsistently. However, acting collectively could enable producers not 
only to reduce costs of accessing inputs, but also improve their bargaining position with 
buyers and intermediaries, and share marketing information among members (Markelova 
et al., 2009; Tita et al., 2011). Collective marketing may also reduce their marketing costs 
as costs previously incurred by individuals could be shared by the entire membership (Fox, 
1979; Bosc et al., 2001; Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Transaction costs al o vary according to 
the nature of the product. Perishable products are usually associated with high transaction 
costs due to rapid transportation (from production t  consumption centres) and cool 
storage requirements (Pingali et al., 2005). Perishability also limits the period of time 
during which a product can be marketed as a fresh commodity or used as a raw material in 
processing. Where HVACs are used for processing, processors are usually subjected to 
high transaction costs as the product will be repeatedly screened and graded for quality at 
every respective stage in the value chain (Jaffee, 1995). In attempting to prolong the 
freshness and quality of perishable commodities, producers and market intermediaries are 
required to invest in highly specialised transport and storage facilities. However, poor (or 
lack of) rural electrification in some developing countries (Bernard, 2010) places 
constraints on where production and processing activities can be located. 
 
The identification of sources of transaction costs i , therefore, an important step towards 
informing the process of establishing institutions and strategies required to improve the 
participation of poorly-resourced producers and processors in remunerative value chains. 
While some countries have instituted various programmes aimed at reducing transaction 
cost-related barriers to market participation, the monitoring and evaluation of these 
interventions is hampered, in part, by the difficulty of quantifying such costs (see Pingali et 
al., 2005). The challenges encountered in measuring transaction costs are discussed in the 
next sub-section, which further highlights efforts that have been made by some scholars in 
attempting to attach monetary values. 
 
2.3.3 Measuring/quantifying transaction costs 
 
TCE has been widely criticised for the gap between theoretical developments and the 
paucity of results relating to the direct measurement of exchange-related costs (Hobbs and 
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Kerr, 1999; Royer, 2011). Researchers who attempt to measure transaction costs have to 
overcome various forms of difficulties. Among those noted in the literature is the absence 
of theoretical consensus over the precise definition of transaction costs (see Ramstad, 
1996; Allen, 1999; 2006). The many coexisting definitio s offer influential conceptual 
insights, but have not been translated into unified accepted operational standards. For some 
researchers, it is difficult to separate transaction from production, and other managerial 
costs (Benham and Benham, 2005). Another noted difficulty is that if transaction costs are 
very high, some transactions may not take place at all. However, if by any chance 
transactions take place, it may not be in an open market setting where there is monetary 
exchange; hence, making it difficult to attach monetary values (Royer, 2011). Williamson 
(1985) asserts that the difficulty in quantifying transaction costs could be mitigated by 
conducting comparative institutional assessments, whereby one mode of exchange is 
assessed against another. His contention is that “it is the difference rather than the absolute 
magnitude of transaction costs that matters” (Williamson, 1985:22). Given these 
challenges, not much literature is available on the quantitative analysis of transaction costs, 
particularly in the area of agricultural marketing. With very few exceptions (e.g. Gabre-
Madhin, 2001; Royer, 2011), notable empirical studies that have attempted to quantify 
transaction costs are mainly in the environmental and ecological economics field (e.g. 
Falconer, 2000; Falconer and Saunders, 2002; McCann et al., 2005; Mettepenningen et al., 
2009). These studies are generally focused on evaluating the magnitude of transaction 
costs associated with the conception and implementatio  of several public programmes 
and policies. 
 
Information required to measure transaction costs can be gathered through various means, 
including surveys and use of secondary data. However, such methods are likely to produce 
unreliable results and conclusions. For instance, researchers using surveys or interviews 
will rely on the mental ability of respondents to recall past activities (Mettepenningen t 
al., 2009), whereas the availability of quality records will determine the reliability of 
studies conducted using secondary data (Falconer, 2000; Falconer and Saunders, 2002). In 
attempting to counter such challenges, other studies have managed to measure transaction 
costs through the use of simulations, where the resarcher gets involved in all the activities 
of interest (Benham and Benham, 2005). Another approach used by Mettepenningen t al. 
(2009) to measure transaction costs incurred by farmers engaged in European agro-
environmental schemes, prompted the respondents to register the labour inputs and time 
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required to perform the activities of interest. This exercise was supplemented with data 
generated from a survey in the same regions to provide additional insight on the nature and 
extent of transaction costs. While this seemed a very costly procedure, Mettepenningen t 
al. (2009) contend that such data gathering practices ar  capable of producing a very 
informative and reliable dataset. However, despite using the ‘improved’ data gathering 
procedures, the major impediment arises when attemping to convert the time and labour 
inputs into monetary values. This is where some scholars (e.g. Smith, 1992; Wang, 2003) 
propose the use of opportunity cost measures to estimate transaction costs. In line with this 
proposal, Falconer and Saunders (2002) applied country standard hourly rates to estimate 
the amount a producer would have paid somebody to perf rm a similar task. 
 
Given the effects of transaction costs in high-value agricultural production and marketing, 
some researchers (e.g. Bienabe et al., 2004; Shephered, 2007; Jia and Huang, 2011), as 
indicated in Section 2.3.2, argue that changes in institutional arrangements such as the 
introduction of collective marketing can play an important role in addressing the varied 
problems highlighted in the preceding sections. Widely recognized for its role in the 
management of common pool resources, collective action was introduced in Sub-Saharan 
African agriculture during the colonial period through farmer cooperatives for the purpose 
of promoting production of cash crops by peasant farmers (Hussi et al., 1993). Of late, 
small-scale farmers have been found acting collectiv ly in the production and marketing of 
highly perishable and non-staple food commodities traded through modern supply chains 
(Narrod et al., 2009). The process leading to collective action among poorly-resourced 
smallholders in developing countries is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Collective action in smallholder agriculture 
 
2.4.1 The process leading to collective action in smallholder agriculture 
 
A schematic visualisation of the process leading to collective action in the production and 
marketing of HVACs is presented in Figure 2.1. The fundamental step towards collective 
action is for members to acknowledge that as individuals they do not have all the required 
information, resources, and competency to address a particular problem (Wondolleck and 
Yaffee, 2000; Mostert et al., 2007). As indicated in Figure 2.1, the problem is usually 






















Figure 2.1: The process of collective action towards improving small-scale producers’ 
participation in modern value chains  
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One example is the failure by individual producers to access high-value markets, 
characterised by quality standards, demands for consiste cy, and reliability in supply. The 
conditions which trigger collective action in HVA are usually influenced by external 
drivers (e.g. lead actors in the value chain), who control access to major resources that 
generate the most profitable returns in the value chain. As noted in section 2.2.2, lead firms 
will not only dictate terms of participation to their immediate suppliers, but through 
globalisation, they are also capable of transmitting hese demands along the entire value 
chain, even as far as primary producers in developing countries (Gereffi et al., 2001). 
 
Given that efforts to conform to lead actors’ demands come with financial implications 
that are often beyond individuals’ means, producers a e likely to act collectively, 
especially if they have a certain level of interconnectedness, motivation, and the 
willingness to work as a group (McCarthy et al., 2004). Figure 2.1 shows that in 
attempting to address such problems, producers engag  one another, sharing diverse 
viewpoints and experiences to develop a common framework of understanding and the 
basis for joint action. Through this form of engagement, known as social learning, 
producers will be able to define the problem together, search for and implement solutions, 
and assess the costs and benefits of a solution for a specific practice (Koelen and Das, 
2002). 
 
The concept of social learning, which has a long varied history traced to Bandura (1971), 
entails the shift by individuals from being separate cognitive agents with multiple 
perspectives to a group with shared attributes and values, and ready to address social 
challenges collectively (Koelen and Das, 2002). A number of scholars (e.g. Olson, 1965; 
Coleman, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 1992; D’Silva and Pai, 2003; Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2004; Oh et al., 2004; Upton, 2008) attribute the success of colletiv  action to the strength 
of social capital, amongst other factors. Social capital, a broadly defined concept in 
economics, is considered as the norms, trust, and social networks that exist between 
individuals (Putnam, 1993). The presence and assurance of trust among individuals 
facilitates the potential for reciprocity and emergence of cooperative behaviour (White and 
Runge, 1995). It follows, therefore, that interventio s which enhance trust among members 
are likely to contribute to successful collective action. Figure 2.1 indicates that the regular 
interactions that take place within the group also feed back into the social learning process, 
strengthening the nature of social capital over time (Kruijssen et al., 2009). In addition, the 
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participatory process used by members to set their own goals, set and enforce their own 
rules, enables the members to have ownership of the problems and solutions, an attribute 
that can possibly enhance the group’s sustainability (Vollan, 2012). 
 
In their quest to participate in HVA, producers areexpected to decide on the appropriate 
form of collective action. While the choice of organisational form is likely to be influenced 
by the ease of establishment, Kruijssen et al. (2009) suggest that producers should be 
considerate of the organisational form’s adaptability and responsiveness to the market 
environment, which is mostly influenced by consumers’ changing demands. Another 
important point to note is that the viability of some farmer organisations in SSA has 
largely been undermined by internal disputes arising from misappropriation of funds, 
corruption, and lack of accountability to members (Chirwa et al., 2005). Therefore, in 
attempting to curb opportunistic behaviour, particularly from the group’s leadership or 
certain members who may be more enlightened than the majority, producers should 
consider organisational forms that are permissible within the laws of the country. This 
could create room for independent and transparent sys ems of auditing, and quick 
investigation and resolution of corruption cases, which may sometimes fail to be settled 
through the groups’ internally developed rules and regulations (Shiferaw et al., 2011). 
However, some analysts (e.g. Fuller, 1981) contend hat legal rules and interventions of the 
government courts are sometimes ineffective in resolving collective action problems, and 
are likely to undermine the strength of self-governed organisations. Without denying the 
validity of this point, Ostrom and Ahn (2009) posit that the country’s legal system and 
regulatory framework should not be ignored as they pla  a vital role in sustaining social 
cooperation. They contend that the broad understanding of existing formal laws can 
influence members’ views and contributions in crafting their own rules meant to curtail 
opportunistic behaviour or solve collective action problems. 
 
In relation to market participation, the decision process for the preferred form of 
organisation requires the use of certain indicators. For this purpose, Kruijssen et al. (2009) 
propose the use of the ‘structure, conduct and performance’ (SCP) analysis, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. The SCP concept was enunciated by Bain (1951) and has been applied in 
various fields, including the study of marketing chains (see Scarborough and Kydd, 1992; 
Sexton, 2000). The basic premise of the SCP model is that the structure of the market 
determines the conduct of sellers and buyers, which, in turn, influences the performance of 
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the market (Scarborough and Kydd, 1992). The structu e describes the market chain 
environment, considering in particular factors such as the number of buyers and sellers 
operating in a chain, relative ease of participants to enter and exit the market, extent of 
product characteristics (perishability, differentiation, and quality requirements), and the 
vertical coordination mechanisms used. Conduct refers to the coordination between actors 
or the patterns of behaviour that market participants dopt to adjust to the market in which 
they trade. Examples of conduct include price-setting behaviour, product development and 
promotion policies, buying and selling practices, and behaviour towards rivals (Sexton, 
2000). Anything other than competitive behaviour or c nduct among firms can lead to 
undesirable performance outcomes. Regarding conduct, the analysis typically focuses on 
any evidence of collusive behaviour among firms, anti-competitive pricing (oligopoly 
pricing or below-cost pricing designed to eliminate w aker competitors), and any collusive 
market-sharing agreements of firms that decide not to compete (Holtzman, 2002). 
 
Typical SCP analysis tends to assess market performance in terms of whether marketing 
margins are consistent with costs and value added by the respective value chain actors, and 
whether the degree of market concentration is low enough to allow competition, which is, 
in turn, assumed to drive down costs incurred by various actors (Scarborough and Kydd, 
1992). Regarding collective marketing, performance can be viewed in accordance with the 
extent to which the market results in outcomes thatare preferred by the farmer group 
(Holtzman, 1986). As indicated in Figure 2.1, the groups’ concern in the market may be 
measured in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and equity (Kruijssen et al., 2009). 
Effectiveness relates to the matching of supply anddemand at each stage of the value 
chain, and can be measured by the stability of supply, the maintenance of product quality, 
the duration of the delivery process, and the product variety and assortment. Efficiency 
refers to the optimal use of resources such that they create the most benefit, and prices are 
in line with costs. Where markets are ‘efficient’, supply and demand interact without 
impediment or distortion, and prices move quickly to reflect changes in the demand or 
supply of commodities. Given that markets are rarely efficient, Jasdanwalla (1977) posits 
that a marketing structure could be said to be relativ ly efficient if it offers commodities at 
prices that reflect realistically the demand and supply situation. In an equitable value chain, 
another condition that is difficult to achieve in reality, margins and bargaining power are 
expected to be distributed among the value chain actors proportinately with the levels of 
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investment made or total value added (Marion, 1976; Kruijssen et al., 2009; UNIDO, 
2009b; IFAD, 2010). 
 
While collective action has the potential to overcome many of the production and 
marketing problems faced by smallholders in developing countries, its existence and 
functioning is not without difficulties, as indicated in Figure 2.1. In some instances, even if 
farmers show the willingness to collaborate and investment capital is available, collective 
action may still not be successful or sustainable (Singleton, 1999; Stockbridge t al., 
2003). The factors underlying the above conditions are discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
2.4.2 Factors that affect the likelihood of successful collective action 
 
The relative costs and benefits of producers’ participation in collective action are likely to 
differ across members. This may depend on a number of structural factors, including 
member attributes (age, education, gender, location, production capacity, asset endowment, 
education, and previous collaborating experience), characteristics of the common 
commodity or economic activity, and the external environment (Araral, 2009; Ostrom, 
2010). 
 
Farmers’ participation in collective initiatives has lso been found to be affected by their 
socio-cultural and economic heterogeneity. Economic heteregeneity refers to the 
differences in wealth, income, and access to credit, among other attributes, whereas socio-
cultural heterogeneity refers to differences in ethnicity, religion, and cultural perception of 
the common resource or economic activity (La Ferrara, 2002; Ruttan, 2008). The effect of 
social heterogeneity on collective action can either be positive or negative. Ruttan (2006) 
contends that social heterogeneity could have negative effects resulting from different 
social norms, which make creating and enforcing decisions more costly. Socio-cultural 
homogeneity, however, could lead to a stagnation of ideas and may foster institutional 
inertia, thereby resulting in lower overall instituonal capacity as opposed to communities 
with greater socio-cultural diversity (McCarthy et al., 2004; Katungi et al., 2007). 
Regarding the wealth status of members, Wade (1988) posits that wealth heterogeneity 
makes finding agreements that are mutually beneficial to all more difficult as wealthy 
members find it in their interest to assume leadership and benefactor roles within the 
group. In Kenya, wealthy members among livestock keeping communities were found not 
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to be in favour of collective initiatives given tha their opportunity cost of time were higher 
than that of relatively poor members (Ouma and Abdulai, 2009). On the contrary, 
Chakrabarti et al. (2001) in Poteete and Ostrom (2004) found higher levels of collective 
action in Indian communities characterised by greater heterogeneity in wealth, among 
other factors. 
 
The extent to which households or group members depend upon a common commodity or 
economic activity for their livelihoods is another important condition that facilitates 
collective action (Wade, 1988; Gabremedhin et al., 2004; Mushtaq et al., 2007; Araral, 
2009). Dependency captures the level at which the household needs the commodity or 
economic activity for its subsistence (Naidu, 2009). Dietz et al. (2003) contend that the 
commodity (or economic activity) must be salient enough to the members for them to 
decide to invest their resources towards its sustainable management. Therefore, in 
communities characterised by a relatively high number of alternative livelihood options, 
chances of members working together on a particular activity are likely to be less as such 
exit options can weaken social cohesion, making it difficult to make and enforce collective 
decisions (Bardhan, 1993). 
 
Some collective initiatives face various challenges in establishing the rules on which their 
organisations are based. They also face considerable difficulties in monitoring and 
enforcing compliance, and to secure commitments from group members to abide by 
collectively agreed rules (Stockbridge et al., 2003). Other groups experience the problem 
of having free-riders, whereby individuals benefit wi h limited or no investment in the 
generation and maintenance of the organisation (Stroebe and Frey, 1982; Albanes and van 
Fleet, 1985; Ostrom, 1990). Drawing from the rational choice theory, Olson (1965) argues 
that an individual member’s decision to engage in colle tive action depends on the 
comparison of expected benefits and costs. Therefore, rational and self-interested 
individuals will act to achieve their personal rather than group interests, and will have an 
incentive to free-ride whenever an opportunity arises. 
 
The conventional belief is that free-riders will beeasily noticed in small groups, and 
members of small groups are likely to believe that their contributions will make a 
difference; hence, inducing contributions from others (Olson, 1965). However, in large 
groups member contributions are difficult to trace nd there is less information about each 
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member to verify individual behaviour (Hardin, 1982). Therefore, an increase in group size 
will increase the costs of reaching internal agreemnts about coordinated strategies, and 
monitoring members’ participation in collective activities (Sandler, 1992; Ostrom, 2010). 
Worth noting is that the effect of group size in collective action remains contentious, as 
some studies could not find a significant relationship between group size and free-riding 
(e.g. Marwell and Ames, 1979; Lipford, 1985), while others (e.g. Agrawal, 2000) posit a 
curvilinear relationship between group size and colle tive action. Agrawal (2000) contends 
that large groups are likely to have high occurrences of conflicts and monitoring costs, 
whereas with small groups it may be difficult to generate the resources needed to engage 
effectively in collective action. The free-rider problem may also arise outside the group. 
For instance, when individual producers refuse to become members of bargaining farmer 
groups, but capture the benefits of the negotiated terms of trade (Cook, 1995). Other 
institutional problems normally encountered by farme  organisations, particularly 
traditional cooperatives, emanate largely from ill-defined property rights. These include 
the horizon problem, portfolio problem, control problem, and influence cost-related 
problems (see Cook, 1995; Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999; Ortmann and King, 2007, for 
details). 
 
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) indicate that most difficulties and failures associated with 
group-based development initiatives arise as a result of less attention being accorded to 
understanding how collective action arises to deal with different issues, and how it can 
possibly be sustained. Therefore, it is important to understand where collective action is 
likely (or unlikely) to emerge and/or persist. With reference to the production and 
marketing of HVACs, Hellin et al. (2009) caution that a better understanding of high-value 
markets could enable producers to make rational decisions on when to act collectively and 
also recognise when it is not worthwhile. In support, Kaganzi et al. (2009) argue that it 
would be illogical for farmers producing undifferentiated commodities with no price 
premium for quality to organize as the transaction c sts associated with market access 
would be relatively low. Instead, they (Hellin et al., 2009; Kaganzi et al., 2009) posit that 
collective production and marketing would be justified if there are relatively few traders 
for the commodity, if high investment costs are required to enter a specific remunerative 
supply chain, when there are limited services (e.g. finance, transport, etc.) in the area, 
when buyers can offer some form of support (perhaps through contracts with attractive 
arrangements in terms of price and continuity of purchase), and if farmers can access lower 
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cost inputs through bulk purchases. Shiferaw et al. (2011) add that collective action would 
be justified if the above expected benefits are likly to outweigh the associated costs of 




This chapter highlights the institutional concepts that are empirically examined in the 
ensuing chapters of the thesis. Among the important points drawn from this chapter is that 
while most early work on value chains centred on improving competitiveness of different 
supply channels, recent efforts have instead focused on increasing the competitive and 
profitable participation of poor producers in remunerative modern value chains within a 
globalised setting. This chapter also highlights that if the costs of organising transactions 
are high, traded volumes will be reduced and resource efficient production patterns will 
fail to develop, leading to low distributional efficiency. In the absence of proper 
institutions meant to reduce transaction costs, smallholder producers, in particular, could 
find themselves excluded from participating in remunerative value chains. Using lessons 
drawn from the management of common pool natural resources, the literature indicates that 
through collective action, farmers will be more able to obtain the necessary market 
information, achieve quality standards and produce on a larger scale when they combine 
their resources, enabling them to penetrate markets tha  would otherwise be out of reach 
for individual producers. Collective action also facilitates the provision and coordination of 
other important services (e.g. training, extension, and credit), which would otherwise be 
more costly to offer to a large number of sparsely located individual farmers. By providing 
an enabling environment for farmer groups to thrive, d veloping countries can advance 
agricultural commercialization, enabling rural dwellers to improve their income-generating 
capacity; hence, assuming a position to address pressing challenges such as poverty and 
household food insecurity. 
 
The following chapters (three to six) comprise empirical methods and research results 
presented in accordance with the four specific objectiv s of the study. The next chapter 
discusses the factors that influence households’ decisions to participate in mushroom 





CHAPTER 3  
DETERMINANTS OF FARMERS’ PARTICIPATION IN OYSTER 
MUSHROOM PRODUCTION IN SWAZILAND: IMPLICATIONS 




3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the empirical methods, results and discussion of the factors that 
influence farmers’ decisions on whether or not to participate in oyster mushroom 
production. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the 
methodology, which constitutes the conceptual and empirical model, and data collection 
procedures. Section 3.3 presents the empirical results, while section 3.4 concludes the 




3.2.1 Conceptual and empirical model 
 
Previous studies (e.g. Damianos and Skuras, 1996; Barlas et al., 2001) provide a natural 
setting within which farmers’ decisions to produce non-conventional agricultural products 
can be analysed. Assume household agricultural enterpris s are denoted by j, where j = 1 
for the inclusion of the mushroom enterprise to existing enterprises and j = 0 for the 
current crop and livestock enterprise(s). The non-observable underlying utility function 
that ranks the preference of the ith farmer is given by U. Although the utility function is 
unobserved, the relation between the utility derivable from a jth enterprise is postulated to 
be a function of the following factors: 
ijijijijijij PICDFU ε+= ),,,(       j = 1, 0; i = 1,…..,n 
ijijij VU ε+=                 (3.1) 
where Uij is the unobserved or latent utility level attained by the i
th farmer, Vij is the 
explainable part of the latent utility that depends on demographic attributes (Dij), farm 
                                                 
6 This chapter gave rise to the following publication: Mabuza, M.L., Ortmann, G.F. and Wale, E. 2012. 
Determinants of farmers’ participation in oyster mushroom production in Swaziland: Implications for 
promoting a non-conventional agricultural enterprise. Agrekon 51(4):19–40. 
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characteristics (Cij), institutional factors (I ij), farmers’ perceptions (Pij), and the random 
error term (εij). Following the random utility framework, the i
th farmer’s choice for adding 
the mushroom enterprise to existing agricultural enterprises (M) as opposed to remaining 
without mushrooms (O) is assumed to depend on the additional utility derived from 
mushrooms relative to that derived from existing enterprises, which is denoted in this case 
by iy . Therefore, iy  is specified as: 
)()()()( OiMiOiMiOiOiMiMii VVVVy −+−=+−+= εεεε            (3.2) 
Hence, a typical farmer in Swaziland will decide to incorporate the mushroom enterprise to 
his current enterprises if: 
)()( OiOiMiMi VV εε +>+  
0>− OiMi UU                 (3.3)  
 
To implement the model empirically, it is assumed that there is an unobserved or latent 
variable, y* that generates the observed variable y, which represents a farmer’s decision of 
whether or not to produce mushrooms. When y* > 0, the farmer produces mushrooms and 
y = 1 is observed. When the farmer does not produce mushrooms, then y = 0 is observed. 
For the ith farmer, the latent variable*iy  is assumed to be related to observed factors that 
include demographic attributes (D) such as household labour endowment (X1), gender (X2) 
and age (X3 and X3
2); farm characteristics (C), which include the level of crop enterprise 
diversification (X4) and livestock enterprise diversification (X5); institutional factors (I ), 
including affiliation to community development groups (X6), information sources, 
segmented into extension officers (X7), radio (X8), newspapers (X9), other mushroom 
producers (X10) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (X11). Other institutional 
factors include being informed about the nutritional and therapeutical attributes of 
mushrooms (X13) and receiving training in basic oyster mushroom production (X14). 
Farmers’ decisions may also be influenced by the proximity to markets for inputs and 
products (X12) and their perceptions (P) towards mushrooms (X15). The measurement and 
full discussion of these variables is provided in section 3.2.2. Otherwise, the structural 















where the X′s represent explanatory variables, β′s and δ represent coefficients to be 



















y  y ,               (3.5) 
implying that the production of mushrooms is a dichotomous decision; hence, equation 
(3.4) can either be estimated using a Logit or Probit model. The probability that iy = 1 is 
expressed as: 
Pr[ iy = 1] = Pr[
*
iy > 0] = Pr[ ii eX +
'β > 0] = Pr[ ii Xe
'β−> ] = Pr[ ie ≤ iX'β ] = F( iX'β )    (3.6) 
where Pr[·] is a probability function and F(·) is the cumulative distribution function (Long, 
1997). Assuming ie  follows the standard normal distribution, the above probabilistic 
model yields the Probit model (Green, 2003). However, in view of the possible reciprocal 
causality between the dependent variable and farmers’ p ceptions, as noted by Negatu and 
Parikh (1999), simultaneous equations were used for estimation. Given that the decision to 
produce iy is discrete (see equation 3.5), while the variable of perceptions (X15) is 
continuous (see section 3.2.2), a two-stage model was considered, where equation (3.7) 
represented the decision model, whereas equation (3.8) represented an OLS function for 






















   (3.8) 
where the X′s and iy (in equation 3.8) are independent variables, α′ β′s, δ, and ξ′s are 
parameters to be estimated, while e1 and e2 are error terms. In order to identify equation 
(3.7), and by extension the whole system of equations, an exogenous variable for 
household education (X16) was added in equation (3.8). The reduced-form equations were 
subsequently expressed as: 
116161212554411 υ+Π+Π+Π+Π+Π= XXXXXyi           (3.9) 
21616121255441115 υγγγγγ +++++= XXXXXX                   (3.10) 
where the X′s are predetermined variables, Π ′s and γ′s are reduced-form coefficients, 
while υ1 and υ2 are error terms. 
 
The Two-stage Probit Least Squares (2SPLS) model was used to estimate equation (3.8), 
while equation (3.7) was estimated using the Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood 
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(2SCML) model. Following Maddala (1983) and Alvarez and Glasgow (1999), the 2SPLS 
was implemented by first estimating the reduced functio  (3.9) using the Probit model. 
The parameters generated were used to compute a predicted value for iŷ , which was 
consequently substituted for the endogenous variable iy  as it appears on the right-hand 
side (RHS) of equation (3.8). Equation (3.8) was re-estimated with iŷ serving as an 
instrument in the equation. The disadvantage of the 2SPLS is that it produces biased 
standard errors (Alvarez and Glasgow, 1999). However, this was corrected following 
Mooney (1996) and Hassan and Birungi (2011) by producing consistent parameter 
estimates along with bootstrapped standard errors. Unfortunately, there is no simple 
correction for the standard errors when the second stage estimation involves a binary 
choice equation, such as the Probit (Alvarez and Glasgow, 1999). It was for this reason 
that equation (3.7) was estimated using the 2SCML, developed by Rivers and Vuong 
(1988). The 2SCML has an advantage in that besides producing consistent and efficient 
estimates, it mitigates the problem of incorrect standard errors while providing a practical 
means of testing the hypothesis of exogeneity using a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test (Rivers 
and Vuong, 1988). However, what could be considered as its main limitation is that it 
assumes interest in only the structural parameters of the Probit equation. The 2SCML 
estimation was implemented by first estimating the reduced function (3.10) using OLS and 
obtaining residuals, which were labelled asp̂ . p̂  was then added to the Probit function (3.7) 
on the RHS as a substitute for the endogenous variable (X15). In order to apply the LR test 
for exogeneity, equation (3.7) was estimated twice; firstly, without p̂  and, secondly, with 
p̂  (Smith, 1987). The LR test function is computed as: 
λ = -2(ln RL̂ – ln UL̂ )                      (3.11) 
where ln RL̂ is the log of the likelihood for the Probit model estimated without p̂  , whereas 
ln UL̂ is the log of the likelihood for the Probit model estimated with p̂ . λ has a chi-square 
distribution with R (df), where R is the number of endogenous variables in the Probit 
equation (Rivers and Vuong, 1988). From equation (3.6), the marginal effects for 
continuous variables in the Probit model were estimated as (Green, 2003): 
∂Pr[ iy = 1]/ ∂Xi = Φ( X'β ) β                      (3.12) 
where Φ(t) is the standard normal density function, while thmarginal effects for a binary 
variable (say d), were estimated as: 
Prob[ iy = 1| )(dx , d = 1] – Prob [ iy = 1| )(dx , d = 0]                  (3.13) 
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where )(dx , denotes the means of all the other variables in the model. The next sub-section 
presents the dependent and independent variables used in the empirical model. 
 
3.2.2 Dependent and independent variables 
 
Three farmer categories were identified from the survey. The first category comprised 
mushroom producers, whereas the second category comprised farmers who, at the time of 
the survey, were found not producing mushrooms but were in the process of making 
preparatory measures to embark on production. The last category comprised farmers who 
were found not producing mushrooms and had no intentions to participate in the industry. 
None of the interviewed farmers indicated to have produced mushrooms previously and 
stopped at some point, and similarly, none of the current mushroom producers indicated an 
intention to cease production in the near future. The three categories were accordingly 
identified as: 
0 = not producing and completely unwilling to produce mushrooms 
1 = not currently producing but willing to produce mushrooms 
2 = currently producing and willing to continue producing mushrooms 
Given the above setting, the model could be estimated intuitively with an ordered 
dependent variable, with the assumption that: 
iy  = 0 if 
*y  ≤ 0 
iy  = 1 if 0 < 
*y  ≤ µ 
iy  = 2 if 
*y  ≥ µ                      (3.14) 
where µ is some threshold value between the three categories. To check whether the above 
assumption is true in this case, equation (3.7) wasestimated using an ordered Probit 
model, where a test of parallel regressions was conducted (Long, 1997). With the results 
showing a significant (p<0.01) chi-square value of 112.517 (16df), the use of an ordered 
dependent variable was consequently discarded in favour of a dichotomous variable 
comprised of producers (a combination of category one and two) and non-producers 
(category zero). Nichola (1996) also argues that despit  respondents not producing the 
crop of interest during the survey period, respondents in category one should be merged 
with those in category two to form one category of producers. Based on field observations 




Demographic attributes: Demographic attributes are reported by Abadi Ghadim and 
Pannell (1999) to have a significant influence on farmers’ decision-making processes. The 
relationship between the decision to produce mushrooms and the age of household head is 
expected to be negative. This is based on the notion that younger farmers are relatively 
progressive, more receptive to new ideas and better understand the benefits of non-
conventional agricultural enterprises (Abadi Ghadim and Pannell, 1999). Although older 
farmers have greater experience and skills than younger ones, in some instances, older 
farmers are less energetic (Damianos and Skuras, 1996) and have a strong emotional 
connection with producing conventional products as they are often more risk averse (Abadi 
Ghadim and Pannell, 1999). With regard to gender, the general belief is that African 
women play a prominent role in agriculture; hence, th y are relatively more receptive to 
innovations than men (Chipande, 1987). However, Doss and Morris (2001) have found 
that farmers’ production decisions depend primarily on access to resources rather than on 
gender per se. If, for instance, producing mushrooms depends solely on knowledge gained 
through training, and if in a particular community only women are permitted to undergo 
training, then in that context mushroom production will not benefit men and women 
equally. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of indigenous knowledg  in agriculture, the level of 
formal education attained is used as an indicator for a respondent’s ability to acquire, 
process and effectively use information about mushrooms. The assumption is that 
education facilitates learning, which, in turn, is presumed to instil favourable perceptions 
towards the socio-economic benefits of mushroom production (Singh, 2000). However, as 
observed by Lapar et al. (2003), the expectation may be reversed when there are 
competing and relatively more remunerative employment opportunities in other sectors 
requiring skills that are enhanced by advanced formal education. Considering the general 
level of education in the sample, the variable for education was captured using the 
proportion of household members who have gone beyond primary education. The 
inclusion of other household members in this case was based on the notion that despite 
having the household head making the final decision of whether or not to produce 
mushrooms, the views and contributions of other members are likely to have an influence 
on the direction of the decision. On account of the above debate, no a priori prediction was 




Labour is an important requirement in mushroom production; hence, households with a 
relatively high labour endowment are more likely to c pe with the requirements of the 
enterprise. Considering members who were identified to participate in household 
agricultural activities, household labour endowment was measured following Langyintuo 
and Mungoma (2008) in man-equivalents as: members less than 9 years = 0; 9 – 15 = 0.7; 
16 – 49 years = 1; and above 49 years = 0.7. The concept of man-equivalents was adopted 
to account for labour contribution differences among household members. The inclusion of 
all categories (even school-attending children) is ba ed on the fact that school-attending 
children normally participate in household agricultural activities, especially outside school-
attending hours including weekends and holidays. 
 
Farmer’s perceptions towards mushrooms: Considering that mushrooms are not plants but 
fungi, it is not easy to differentiate between poisonous and edible ones, while some 
species, in spite of being edible, are known to induce respiratory allergy in humans during 
production (Helbling et al., 1998). Hashemi and Damalas (2011) posit that given such 
circumstances farmers are bound to have perceptions owards the enterprise and these 
perceptions are likely to have an influence on its acceptability. Perceptions can either 
develop from gaining information or from one’s experience with mushrooms (Negatu and 
Parikh, 1999). Farmers’ perceptions were captured using numeric responses to 11 
questions, which covered a broad spectrum of contextual issues related to mushrooms (see 
Table 3.3). Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was then applied to extract a composite 
measure of perceptions from the responses, which was subsequently used as an 
explanatory variable (X15) in equation (3.4). PCA results are also reported in Table 3.3. 
 
Horizontal crop and livestock diversification index: Given that mushroom production is 
considered as a ‘new enterprise’ in the context of his study, it would be beneficial to 
establish the type of farmers (in terms of agricultural enterprise diversity) that are likely to 
produce mushrooms as an additional enterprise. With the assumption that the level of 
diversification is influenced by the intention to minimise agricultural income variability, 
highly diversified households are likely to participate in mushroom production, depending 
on how well mushrooms complement existing agricultura  enterprises (Anosike and 
Coughenour, 1990). However, it is also important to note that while the mushroom 
enterprise could be less complex and perhaps complement existing enterprises, some 
farmers could be sceptical about trying out a relatively new enterprise without knowing the 
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associated risks. Therefore, the coefficient for diversification may either be positive or 
negative. A crop diversification index (CDI) was used to capture the allocation of arable 








21  i = 1, 2,…..,n (number of crop enterprises)                (3.15) 
where CDI is the crop diversification index and Pi is the proportionate area of the i
th crop. 
The index ranges from zero to one, with one indicating he highest diversification. In the 
absence of a common denominator (e.g. hectares for crops) or market values of the 
different livestock enterprises, the CDI, which may also be used in the form of a Simpson 
Index of Diversity (SID) to measure livestock diversification (Joshi et al., 2004), could not 
be used in this case. Instead, livestock diversificat on (LD) was computed using the 
authors’ simple computation, which considered the total number of enterprises in the 
sample and the number of livestock enterprises owned by each household. Accordingly, 






= =1LD   i = 1, 2,…..,n (number of livestock enterprises)               (3.16) 
where LD is the livestock diversification index, Di denotes the livestock enterprises owned 
by the household and N is the total number of livestock enterprises in the sample. In order 
to avoid the effects of outliers, for a household to qualify as an owner of a livestock 
enterprise, the number of animals owned had to be equal to or greater than the sample 
mean of that particular livestock enterprise. LD ranges between zero and one, with one 
indicating the highest diversification. 
 
Source of information: The effectiveness of providing information on a new subject to 
farmers depends largely on the source. If information is obtained through sources trusted 
by the recipient, there is a high likelihood that positive perceptions will develop (Adegbola 
and Gardebroek, 2007). With a farmer to mushroom extension officer ratio of 271:14 in 
Swaziland (MDU, 2010), other possible channels normally used to provide information on 
mushrooms, particularly raising awareness, include ra io, print media and, to some extent, 
other producers. Each information source was represnt d by a dummy variable, assuming 




Training in mushroom production and awareness of nutritional attributes of mushrooms: 
Training reduces the perceived complexity of an innovation among farmers and enhances 
the observability and adaptability to their own environment (Foster and Rosenzweig, 
1995). Training in basic mushroom production is currently offered by the Mushroom 
Development Unit (MDU), while aspects related to food preparation, processing and 
nutrition fall under the mandate of the Food Science and Technology Unit, which 
collaborates with the Home Economics Section and several NGOs. The two variables are 
expected to have a positive relationship with the decision to produce mushrooms. Both 
variables were captured using dummies, where one was allocated to respondents who have 
been trained in basic oyster mushroom production or inf rmed about the nutritional and 
therapeutical attributes of mushrooms and zero for those not exposed to these 
interventions. 
 
Membership in organisations: The study hypothesises a positive relationship betwe n 
associational membership and mushroom production. While profitability is a key 
ingredient in starting up an enterprise, the effect of social capital, in the form of 
associational membership and regular exchange of inf rmation is likely to have a positive 
influence on decisions by members to diversify their agricultural enterprises (Munasib and 
Jordan, 2011). Membership in a community organisation provides an opportunity for 
members to obtain either information or informal training from others who may have 
already started producing mushrooms. Some extension providers have also 
institutionalised the group approach for delivering extension services. This variable was 
captured using a dummy where one was allocated to members of community organisations 
and zero to non-members. 
 
Proximity to markets: Although mushrooms can be sold at the farm gate to community 
members, preliminary investigations indicate that besides offering comparatively better 
exchange prices, retail outlets (mainly comprising supermarkets) provide a reliable market 
as selling through the farm gate subjects producers to rely on unpredictable consumer 
turnout. However, as established by Staal et al. (2002), given that mushrooms are highly 
perishable, households located further from towns/cities (where markets are located) could 
be subjected to high marketing and transaction costs and consequently find it more 
difficult to take up the enterprise. Similarly, it could be difficult to acquire some 
production inputs (e.g. wheat bran) and packaging supplies for use after harvesting. 
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Distance to the nearest town/city was captured as: 1= less than 1km; 2 = 1 − 2km; 3 = 2.1 − 
3km; 4 = 3.1 − 4; 5 = 4.1 − 5; 6 = 5.1 − 10km; and 7 = above 10km. The next sub-section 
presents the sampling and data collection procedures. 
 
3.2.3 Data collection 
 
Contrary to the 39 total number of mushroom producers r ported in 2008 (see Section 1.1), 
the MDU records indicated that as at November 2010 the number of producers had 
increased to 271 (MDU, 2010). This increase was attribu ed to the mushroom training 
programme implemented by the MDU, which covered more constituencies in 2009 than in 
previous years. For reasons provided in chapter one, all these producers currently 
specialise in oyster mushrooms. From the 271 mushroom producers, a representative 
sample of 159 was drawn, following the Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) procedure. 
Producers were then stratified according to location and the number of respondents per 
location was determined with probability proportional to population size. Given that the 
analysis in this study required a reliable representation of both producers and non-
producers, some areas with relatively less number of pr ducers who still constitute the 
original 159 sample of producers, were excluded in th s case. Hence, the data that were 
used were gathered from areas purposively selected on the basis of having relatively more 
households involved in mushroom production. These areas are identified in Table 3.1 as; 
Ncandweni, Sinceni, Ngcina, Mangweni, Ka Shoba, Mbangweni, and Zombodze. 
 




























Ncandweni  49 16 33 9 18 
Sinceni  57 16 41 9 22 
Ngcina  71 35 36 21 20 
Ka Shoba  84 21 63 12 35 
Mangweni  136 81 55 48 30 
Mbangweni  73 38 35 22 19 
Zombodze  81 25 56 15 31 
Total 551 232 319 136 175 
Notes:  a Areas with relatively few producers were purposively excluded; b [D] = [B] - [C] 




Besides having a relatively large number of mushroom producers, these areas are also a 
representation of diverse agro-ecological and livelihood zones. Non-producers were drawn 
from the same regions using enumeration areas to determine the number of households per 
location. These enumeration areas are normally used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
to conduct agricultural censuses. Upon establishing the total number of households within 
each location, the Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) procedure was again applied to determine 
the sample size for each location where the resulting number of respondents was less 
(minus) the households already identified as mushroom producers. Interviews with 
respondents were conducted between December 2010 and January 2011, and the number 
of interviewed households per location is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
The following sub-section presents the empirical results. It begins with an overview of the 
descriptive statistics of variables used in the analytic l model, followed by a discussion of 
the PCA results. The sub-section concludes with a discussion of the significant factors 
influencing farmers’ decisions of whether (or not) to participate in mushroom production. 
All estimations in this chapter were carried out using STATA 11 (StataCorp, 2009). 
 
3.3 Empirical results and discussions 
 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the Two-Stage Conditional 
Maximum Likelihood and Two-Stage Probit Least Squares regression models 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression models are summarised in 
Table 3.2. The average age of household heads was 52 years, and the majority (53 percent) 
were women of whom about 61 percent were involved in mushroom production. The 
respondents were engaged in diversified crop enterpris s, including cotton, cereals, 
legumes and tubers. Apart from the common cattle and goat enterprises, respondents were 
found raising indigenous and commercial pigs, broile s and indigenous chickens. About 56 
percent of the respondents reported to have some knowledge about the nutritional 
attributes of mushrooms and how they are prepared/cooked. However, among the 56 
percent, only 63 percent produce mushrooms while the rest have decided not to produce. 
Sources of information about mushrooms that were mentioned include NGOs (38 percent), 
other mushroom producers (24 percent), radio (four pe cent), government extension 
officers (nine percent) and newspapers (nine percent). 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of variables used to determine farmers’ participation 













% of [C] 
from 
 Cat. 0† 
(N=124) 
[E] 
% of [C] 
from 
      Cat. 1† 
      (N=187) 
[F] 
χ2-value 
Gender of household head 
(GENDER) 
Male 46.6 41.4 58.6 0.258 
Female 53.4 38.6 61.4 
Community organisation membership 
(COMM_ORG) 
Member 45 37.1 62.9 0.791 
Non- member  55 42.1 57.9 
Source of information – Extension officer 
(EXT_OFFICER) 
Yes 8.7 18.5 81.5 5.623**  
No 91.3 41.9 58.1 
Source of information – Radio 
(RADIO) 
Yes 3.5 27.3 72.7 0.755 
No 96.5 40.3 59.7 
Source of information – Newspaper 
(NEWSPAPER) 
Yes 8.7 48.1 51.9 0.845 
No 91.3 39.1 60.9 
Source of information – Other mushroom 
producers (OTHER_PROD) 
Yes 24.1 48 52 2.724* 
No 75.9 37.3 62.7 
Source of information – NGO 
(NGO) 
Yes 37.6 31.6 68.4 5.322**  
No 62.4 44.8 55.2 
Knowledge about nutritional attributes of 
mushrooms (NUTRITION) 
Yes 55.9 36.8 63.2 1.573 
No 44.1 43.8 56.2 
Training in oyster mushroom production 
(TRAIN_PRODN) 
Yes 20.6 17.2 82.8 17.296***  
No 79.4 45.7 54.3 
Continuous variables 













Age of household head (AGE) Years 52 50 53 1.579 
Household size (MAN_EQUIV) Man-equiv. 4.4 4.6 4.74 0.494 
Hhld. members above primary education 
(HHLD_EDUC) 
Number 2 3 2 -3.982***  
Crop diversification (CROP_DIVERS) Index (CDI) 0.44 0.43 0.45 -0.032 
Livestock diversification (LIVST_DIVERS) Index (LD) 0.2 0.18 0.21 2.132**  
Perceptions (X15) PC -0.11 -0.25 0.17 4.100
***  
Ordered variables 













Distance to town/city (DIST_TOWN) km♠ 7 7 7 5.830 
Notes: †0 = non producers; and 1 = producers 
♠1= less than 1km; 2 = 1 − 2km; 3 = 2.1 − 3km; 4 = 3.1 − 4; 5 = 4.1 − 5; 6 = 5.1 − 10km; and 7 = above 
10km 
*, **, ***  represent 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively 




The results in Table 3.2 indicate that about 45 percent of the respondents were affiliated to 
community organisations of whom 63 percent are engaged in mushroom production. From 
the 21 percent of respondents who reported to have rec ived basic training in mushroom 
production, 83 percent produce mushrooms, while 17 percent do not produce mushrooms 
and have no intention to do so. Table 3.2 also indicates that mushroom producers and non-
producers have significantly different perceptions towards cultivated mushrooms. These 
perceptions, as indicated earlier, were computed using PCA and the results are presented in 
the next sub-section. 
 
3.3.2 Farmers’ perceptions towards mushroom production 
 
Farmers’ perception scores towards cultivated mushrooms were first tested for reliability 
using Cronbach’s alpha, which was 0.78, implying that t e responses were related enough 
to constitute a reliable composite measure (Cronbach, 1951). In order to avoid the problem 
of assigning a greater weight to variables with larger variances, PCA was conducted using 
a correlation matrix (Krzanowski, 1987), and the results are presented in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Principal component analysis of farmers’ perceptions towards cultivated 
mushrooms in Swaziland, 2011 
 Principal components 
 1 2 3 4 
Eigenvalues      3.50   1.84       1.14   1.02 
% of variance explained    32.10 16.69 10.35   9.27 
Cumulative % of variance explained    32.10 48.78 59.14 68.40 
Variables Component loadings 
Mushroom production can reduce unemployment c 0.745 -0.394 -0.346 -0.134 
Mushroom production can improve household income c 0.730 -0.322 -0.375 -0.152 
Compared to other common enterprises, mushroom producti n has high 
financial returns c 
0.694 -0.363 -0.018 0.100 
Large quantities of mushrooms can be produced from structures 
occupying small portions of land c 
0.691 -0.325 0.051 0.003 
Mushrooms are tasty and enjoyable c 0.519 0.451 -0.079 0.422 
Mushroom production is an enterprise suited to women d 0.570 0.576 -0.006 -0.225 
Mushroom production is an enterprise more suitable for the poor d 0.512 0.548 0.084 -0.281 
Mushroom production is an enterprise that does not depend on rainfall c 0.365 -0.206 0.674 0.230 
Mushroom production is an enterprise that requires less capital 
investment c 
0.490 -0.188 0.563 0.057 
Mushrooms are a good source of nutrients c 0.389 0.490 -0.211 0.607 
Mushrooms are poisonous and can cause health problems d 0.322 0.432 0.217 -0.486 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = 0.709;  Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 = 1123.875 (p<0.01) 
Notes:    c: 5=strongly agree; 4 = agree 3 = neutral; 2 = disagree; and 1 = strongly disagree 
d: 1=strongly agree; 2 = agree 3 = neutral; 4 = disagree; and 5 = strongly disagree 
Component loadings greater than │0.30│ are highlighted in bold print. 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
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The use of PCA was appropriate to provide significant reductions in dimensionality as 
evidenced by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s e t of sphericity results (Tobias and 
Carlson, 1969). Using the Kaiser criterion of retaining PCs with eigenvalues greater than 
one (Kaiser, 1960), four PCs were retained, which colle tively account for 68% of total 
variation of the original variables. Applying the rule of thumb proposed by Koutsoyiannis 
(1992) for observations above 50, PC loadings greate  than |0.30| are considered to indicate 
a strong association between perception scores and the PCs. These loadings are highlighted 
in Table 3.3 in bold print. In view of the above, PC1 was identified as a reliable measure of 
perceptions as it not only accounted for a larger share of the variation in the original 
variables, but had all estimated coefficients above |0.30|. Hence, PC1 was retained and 
subsequently used as a proxy variable for perceptions (X15) in the 2SPLS and 2SCML 
estimations. The next sub-section presents the empirical results and discussion of the 
factors influencing farmers’ decisions of whether (o not) to participate in mushroom 
production. 
 
3.3.3 Determinants of farmers’ participation in oyster mushroom production 
 
Having detected no significant multicollinearity among the independent variables, the 
2SPLS and 2SCML models were subsequently estimated, nd the second stage results are 
presented in Table 3.4. Both models are significant [Wald χ2 (p<0.01)], indicating a high 
explanatory power of the joint association of factors influencing perceptions and farmers’ 
decisions of whether or not to produce mushrooms. The Likelihood Ratio test for the 
2SCML model yields a significant (p<0.1) chi-square value of 3.288 (1df), suggesting the 
presence of endogeneity between perceptions and the ecision to produce mushrooms. 
Hence, the use of two-stage estimation procedures is justified. The following discussion 






Table 3.4: Estimates of the second-stage equations of 2SPLS and 2SCML explaining the determinants of farmers’ participation in 























MAN_EQUIV    -0.007 -0.003 0.012 -0.23 -0.007 -0.003 0.012 -0.23 
GENDER 0.141 0.1238 1.14 -0.105 -0.040 0.059 -0.68 -0.128 -0.049 0.059 -0.83 
AGE 0.010 0.0221 0.46 0.025 0.010 0.012 0.81 0.023 0.009 0.012 0.73 
AGE2 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.43 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.65 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.57 
CROP_DIVERS    0.220 0.084 0.095 0.88 0.239 0.091 0.095 0.96 
LIVST_DIVERS    0.765 0.292 0.156 1.87* 0.791 0.302 0.155 1.94* 
COMM_ORG -0.014 0.0956 -0.14 0.055 0.021 0.059 0.36 0.056 0.022 0.059 0.37 
EXT_OFFICER 0.276 0.1998 1.38 0.674 0.225 0.093 2.42**  0.642 0.216 0.096 2.25**  
RADIO 0.359 0.1773 2.02**  0.553 0.187 0.119 1.57 0.512 0.175 0.123 1.42 
NEWSPAPER -0.051 0.2818 -0.18 0.015 0.006 0.114 0.05 0.030 0.011 0.114 0.10 
OTHER_PROD -0.246 0.1917 -1.28 -0.042 -0.016 0.084 -0.19 -0.007 -0.003 0.085 -0.03 
NGO 0.269 0.1579 1.70* 0.425 0.158 0.073 2.17**  0.391 0.146 0.074 1.96**  
HHLD_EDUC -0.666 0.6430 -1.04         
DIST_TOWN    -0.116 -0.044 0.027 -1.65* -0.119 -0.045 0.027 -1.70* 
NUTRITION 0.217 0.0970 2.24**  0.108 0.041 0.060 0.69 0.077 0.030 0.060 0.49 
TRAIN_PRODN 0.026 0.0844 0.31 0.797 0.271 0.062 4.34***  0.799 0.271 0.062 4.37***  
p̂         0.141 0.054 0.031 1.73* 
iŷ  0.268 0.6633 0.40         
Constant -0.474 0.6016 -0.79 -0.337    -0.240    
Observations 311   311    311    
Wald χ2    51.53***    35.54***     40.15***     
R2     0.097           
Pseudo R2    0.1017    0.1097    
Predicted probability    65%    66%    
Log likelihood    -187.866    -186.222    
LR test for exogeneity (1df)         3.288*    
Note: *, **, ***  represent 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
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In contrast to Hashemi and Damalas (2011), no significa t relationship was established 
between coefficients for perceptions and demographic attributes. Instead, estimates from 
the OLS regression model indicate that farmers’ perceptions towards cultivated 
mushrooms are positively influenced by information received through radio and NGOs, 
and farmers’ knowledge about nutritional and theraputical attributes of cultivated 
mushrooms. As one of the popular and easily accessibl  media channels, radio is used by 
development agencies to engage citizens on various development initiatives, which among 
other areas focus on smallholder agriculture, and food and nutrition programmes. As 
reflected in Table 3.4, the nutrition attribute of mushrooms seems to have a comparatively 
stronger effect on improving people’s perceptions towards the mushroom enterprise. This 
could be attributed to the promotion of healthy diets among citizens who, with the 
knowledge gained, are now consuming cultivated mushrooms as part of their diets. In view 
of the high demand for cultivated mushrooms, those who produce them can either sell (to 
improve availability) or consume at household level. 
 
Results from the unrestricted Probit model indicate that farmers who receive information 
about cultivated mushrooms from the government and NGOs have a significantly higher 
likelihood of making a decision to participate in the enterprise. The key message drawn 
from the results is that while other sources are being utilised by farmers, they are not 
perhaps competent enough to relate the technical aspects of how to effectively manage a 
mushroom enterprise. Hence, besides developing positive perceptions towards mushrooms, 
the farmers’ ultimate decision of whether or not to pr duce mushrooms will largely be 
influenced by the effectiveness of the information source. The importance of extension 
officers in this regards is consistent with previous findings by Adegbola and Gardebroek 
(2007). Farmers who have undergone training in basic mushroom production have a 
significantly higher likelihood of eventually producing mushrooms compared to those who 
have not been trained. Those who have positive perce tions towards cultivated mushrooms 
are also more likely to take up the enterprise. The coefficients for enterprise diversification 
are both positive; however, only the estimated coeffici nt for livestock enterprise 
diversification is significant. In contrast to Barls et al. (2001), the results suggest that 
diversified households are more likely to participate in a non-conventional enterprise, 
particularly if it complements existing agricultural enterprises and enhances prospects of 
reducing household income variability. 
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Farmers who are located further from markets are less ikely to produce mushrooms, 
perhaps because it would be difficult to procure some inputs and access the retail market 
after harvesting. By virtue of being a perishable commodity, if mushrooms are transported 
over long distances without proper storage, producers ould be compelled to either sell at a 




The main objective of this chapter was to identify the determinants of farmers’ 
participation in mushroom production using cross-sectional data from rural Swaziland. The 
empirical results indicate that farmers who receive nformation related to cultivated 
mushrooms from government extension officers and NGO’s, and have undergone training 
in basic oyster mushroom production, are likely to participate in mushroom production. 
Other farmers who are likely to produce mushrooms are those who practice diversified 
agriculture and have positive perceptions towards cultivated mushrooms. Farmers’ positive 
perceptions towards mushrooms were found to be mainly influenced by the knowledge 
gained on mushrooms’ nutritional and therapeutical properties. The results also indicated 
that it is generally difficult for farmers located in remote places to participate in the 
mushroom industry. Although some of these farmers could have different substrate 
materials available in abundance in their areas, the proximity to the nearest town/city could 
inflate the cost of accessing other production inputs. Such farmers could be faced with the 
same challenge after harvesting as they would be required to transport their mushrooms 
over a long distance; hence, exposing the mushrooms t  unfavourable conditions, which 
may eventually result in loss of value. Given these findings, it seems that with the 
exception of perceptions and the level of diversification, farmers’ decisions to participate 
in the mushroom enterprise are largely influenced by institutional rather than household 
and farm-related factors. 
 
Key policy interventions that can possibly improve th uptake of the mushroom enterprise 
include strengthening of the farmer training programme and improving the number of 
extension personnel. The dissemination of information on the nutritional and therapeutical 
properties of mushrooms is also important in changing prospective producers’ perceptions 
towards cultivated mushrooms. Evidence drawn from this study also suggests that policy 
interventions aimed at creating an enabling environme t for the enterprise may remain 
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ineffective unless they are paralleled by improvements in rural infrastructure and access to 
sources of inputs and product markets. The next chapter discusses the socio-economic and 



































SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
CONSTRAINING PARTICIPATION OF SWAZILAND’S 
MUSHROOM PRODUCERS IN MAINSTREAM MARKETS: AN 




This chapter presents the empirical findings of the value chain analysis used to identify the 
underlying factors constraining local mushroom production and producers’ participation in 
mainstream markets. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: The next section 
outlines the data collection procedure. Results are presented in section 4.3 in a format that 
follows the mushroom value chain, highlighting the main activities and related constraints 
encountered in every stage. Section 4.4 concludes th  chapter with a summary of the 
results. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
 
A snowball method (Goodman, 1961) was used to collet data from different value chain 
actors. Initially, data were collected from mushroom producers who identified input 
sources and mushroom buyers. Interviews with input suppliers and market intermediaries 
also identified other actors and institutions influencing the value chain. Using information 
from the Mushroom Development Unit (MDU) under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
producers in Swaziland as at December 2011 comprised 11 farmer groups, whose 
respective members are located in more or less the ame communities, and 74 individuals 
found in various locations. As highlighted in chapter one, farmer groups operate in 
predominantly two models identified as A and B (see ction 1.2, for details). Considering 
that the results of this chapter were expected to inf rm the analytical framework used in 
chapter five, which has a component that requires household variables to study mushroom 
producers’ choices of marketing channels, it was found reasonable to use data generated 
from individual producers and members affiliated to gr ups that operate using model B. 
Among the 11 groups, only two (Mbangweni and Zombodze) were found using model B. 
                                                 
7 This chapter gave rise to the following publication: Mabuza, M.L., Ortmann, G.F. and Wale, E. 2013. 
Socio-economic and institutional factors constraining participation of Swaziland’s mushroom producers in 
mainstream markets: An application of the value chain approach. Agrekon 52(4):89–112. 
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From a total of 38 members from Mbangweni and 25 from Zombodze, interviews were 
conducted with 36 members from Mbangweni and 24 from Zombodze, respectively. From 
the list of 74 registered individual producers, 43 owned production structures but had not 
started producing at the time the interviews were conducted. Therefore, 31 producers from 
this category were interviewed, bringing the number of interviewed producers to 91. The 
full description of these producers is provided in chapter five. Data from producers were 
gathered between December 2011 and January 2012, whereas interviews with other value 
chain actors were conducted between June and July 2012. Questions for the latter survey 
were structured such that the data and information provided were in harmony with the 
period when producers were interviewed. 
 
Given the very low number of identified input suppliers and other value chain actors (see 
Appendix A), it was not necessary to generate samples. Therefore, interviews were 
conducted with representatives from all stakeholders identified in Appendix A. Additional 
information came from site visits where activities related to mushroom production and 
marketing were directly observed. The next section presents the study results in a format 
that follows the mushroom value chain, highlighting the main activities and constraints 
encountered in every stage. 
 
4.3 Empirical results and discussions 
 
The first two sub-sections discuss of the activities and related constraints encountered in 
the production and marketing processes. Major institutional factors constraining mushroom 
production, marketing, and value-addition are also discussed. The section concludes with 
an outline of proposed interventions meant to enhance market access and facilitate the 
movement of mushrooms within the value chain. 
 
4.3.1 Production phase 
 
a) Input supply (spawn and substrate) 
 
The first activity in mushroom production relates to spawn (seed) development, which 
since 2001 has been done by the government through the MDU, located in Malkerns 
(central Swaziland). Government’s justification forhaving one spawn supplier is that, as 
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the industry is relatively new, consumers need to be protected from poisonous types of 
mushrooms, and producers from unscrupulous suppliers who may provide them with a low 
quality product. The spawn is sold in 350 ml bottles at a cost of six Emalangeni (E6) each. 
These bottles are collected by MDU field staff from bars and restaurants after being 
discarded as waste material, whereas substrate bags from which the mushrooms are grown, 
are donated by the government of Thailand and distributed by the MDU to producers for 
free. 
 
Different combinations of growing substrates that hve been tried and recommended for 
oyster mushrooms in Swaziland include: (i) 90 percent sugarcane bagasse and 10 percent 
wheat bran, (ii) 90 percent grass straw (Panicum maximum) and 10 percent wheat bran, 
and (iii) 45 percent grass straw, 45 percent maize cobs and 10 percent wheat bran (MDU, 
2009b). However, sugarcane bagasse is no longer available to local farmers as sugar mills 
use it to produce ethanol. As such, most (95 percent) producers have resorted to using 
grass straw and wheat bran, whereas the rest use a combination of grass straw, maize cobs 
and wheat bran. Although grass straw is abundantly available in most rural areas, 
producers prefer to buy than to spend time cutting grass from the wild. The major supplier 
of grass straw is Mabhuda farm in Siteki (north-east rn Swaziland) where a bale costs 
between E250 and E350 per 250kg, depending on the season. However, because of 
Mabhuda farm’s location, the MDU buys the grass in bulk for onward sale to farmers at 
E200 per 90kg. Wheat bran is obtained from agricultura  retail outlets, whereas maize cobs 
are generally collected for free after maize has been shelled. Before the spawn is 
inoculated (planted), the substrate material has to be cut into smaller pieces and 
pasteurised. Cutting grass or maize cobs into the requi ed sizes and mixing with water and 
wheat bran are a labour-intensive activity. The technology used for this purpose, also 
donated by the government of Thailand, is available in only four areas countrywide and 
producers have to make arrangements to access the service at a cost of E20 per bale of 
90kg. After inoculation, the bags are kept in an incubation room for about three to four 
weeks and will thereafter be ready to produce mushrooms. The incubation room is only 
available in Malkerns and can only accommodate 3 200 bags at a time. After this period, 
the bags are withdrawn and transported by the MDU to the producers’ growing houses. 
Currently, producers are not charged for transportati n of inoculated bags. While some 
producers have managed to construct their own incubation houses, their plans to increase 
production capacities are constrained by the limited number of access points for spawn and 
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substrate preparation technology. It was found that t e relatively more active and 
progressive farmers produce at most two (instead of the possible three) cycles in one 
growing house per year, leading to low and inconsistent supplies to the market. 
 
b) Management of mushroom growing house 
 
Producers raise their own capital to erect production houses and purchase inputs, except for 
substrate bags as indicated earlier. They use different forms of low-cost growing houses 
constructed from locally available material. In line with the training offered, over 75 
percent of producers have growing houses measuring 3m by 4m by 3m. Despite that these 
houses can take up to 2 000 substrate bags at a time (FAO, 2001), respondents, however, 
were found producing below capacity as the houses carried between 400 and 1 000 
substrate bags (15cm diameter and 30cm long). 
 
Standard practice also dictates that a growing house should have, among other items, a 
thermometer and hygrometer for regulating temperature and humidity, respectively. 
However, none of these items was used by the interviewed producers, who instead 
indicated that they regulate the conditions using their intuition, especially after spotting 
certain anomalies from the mushrooms. This kind of subjective practice, also favoured by 
some (e.g. Gwanama et al., 2011), often leads to erroneous decisions that are p rtly 
responsible for low production volumes. Even though the industry is currently dominated 
by small-scale producers, in attempting to commercialise mushroom production, producers 
should be trained on how to use these instruments and encouraged to use them as part of 
the daily growing house management practice. The following sub-section discusses the 
mushroom marketing process. It presents the major mushroom marketing channels, 
showing the distribution of gross margins among the diff rent market participants. 
 
4.3.2 Marketing of oyster mushrooms 
 
Mushrooms are highly perishable commodities, and as such their marketing is invariably 
associated with high transaction costs. As opposed to other food commodities that have a 
longer shelf life (e.g. grains), mushrooms require rapid and refrigerated transportation to 
consumption centres or immediate processing into less perishable forms. In contrast to 
other countries, where similar mushroom programmes ar  implemented with a marketing 
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component (see Zamil and Cadilhon, 2009), producers in Swaziland do not have this 
privilege as they have to make their own marketing arrangements. Currently, no cultivated 
mushrooms are exported from Swaziland and producers have not yet engaged in any form 
of mushroom processing (Mamba, 2010; NAMBoard, 2012). Instead, from what they 
harvest, it was found that about six to ten percent is consumed at household level and the 
remainder sold through four channels identified as: (i) the farm gate; (ii) retail market 
(supermarkets); (iii) middlemen; and (iv) food services industry (restaurants/hotels). The 
marketing channels can be depicted as follows: 
 
Channel I (Farm gate): Producers  Consumers; 
Channel II (Retail market): Producers  Supermarket  Consumers; 
Channel III (Middlemen): Producers  Middlemen  Supermarket Consumers; and 
Channel IV (Food services industry): Producers  Restaurant/hotel Consumers. 
 
About 528kg of fresh oyster mushrooms were traded by the respondents between 
November 2011 and January 2012 through the identifid channels. Further analysis 
indicated that 42 percent was sold through the farm gate, 52 percent through the retail 
market, whereas two percent and four percent, respectively, were sold through middlemen 
and the food services industry. Buyers at the farm gate generally comprise locally based 
community members, whereas in the retail market and foo  services industry they include 
mainly the urban working class, tourists and customers with special diet preferences. 
Middlemen consist of a very few “entrepreneurial” mushroom producers who are able to 
negotiate with some retail outlets. These producers buy already-packed mushrooms from 
their counterparts at the farm gate price for onward sale at a better price; hence, benefitting 
from the margin. Although some producers who sell to such middlemen are aware of the 
price differences, in most cases they are compelled by lack of skills and confidence to 
negotiate with retailers. For others it is the lack of refrigerators that compels them not to 
rely on unpredictable buyer turnout from community members. A summarised flow of 





Figure 4.1: Product flow map for cultivated oyster mushrooms in Swaziland 
Source: Authors’ presentation (2011/12) 
 
Due to the very low volume of locally produced mushrooms, supermarket chain stores, the 
major mushroom traders, often source a large proporti n of their mushroom stock through 
their South African-based distribution centres. Compared with other Southern African 
countries, South Africa has a much advanced and better coordinated mushroom industry, 
which is dominated by large-scale producers and processors; hence, they are able to export 
fresh and processed cultivated mushrooms to different parts of the world, including several 
African countries (see NAMC, 2011). As shown in Figure 4.1, together with restaurants 
and hotels, supermarkets also buy from local fruit and vegetable traders who import 
mushrooms from South African fresh produce markets. In the absence of stock from 
private traders, restaurants and hotels buy imported mushrooms from local supermarkets. 
Unfortunately, details on imports from supermarkets and fruit and vegetable traders could 
not be obtained due to the sensitivity of such proprietary information. However, 
information gathered from both market intermediaries indicates that the button mushroom 
(Agaricus spp), currently not produced in Swaziland, has a comparatively higher consumer 
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demand than the oyster mushroom. In conformity with previous findings (e.g. Mayett et 
al., 2006), consumers’ preference of the button is mainly attributed to its flavour and 
appearance. Even though mushroom buyers appreciate the initiative taken by local 
producers to venture into such an industry, they are particularly concerned about 
producers’ lack of capacity to supply the required volumes of different types of 
mushrooms, maintaining supply consistency and, to some extent, the inability to meet the 
required standards. The next sub-section discusses the distribution of gross margins among 
the identified participants in different mushroom marketing channels. 
 
4.3.3 Distribution of gross margins along alternative mushroom marketing channels 
 
Following Hardesty and Leff (2009), the variable costs and returns summarised in Table 
4.1 were estimated using value chain actors’ description of the chronology of activities 
performed from the period when mushrooms are cultivated to the point when they are 
finally sold to consumers. Computations were made on a per unit basis (kg of fresh 
mushrooms) for a producer who manages an enterprise of 400 substrate bags, the minimum 
enterprise size for interviewed producers, assuming he/she supplies an equal amount of 
mushrooms to the identified alternative marketing channels. One production cycle takes 
about three to four months, and within this period, mushrooms are harvested regularly, 
with the quantity produced declining gradually over time. A full production cycle will have 
about four peak harvests, also known as flushes (Gwanama et al., 2011). Even though 
producers do not use hired labour, their labour costs were estimated based on the average 
time taken to perform each activity and the official minimum wage rate for agricultural 
general labourers (GoS, 2007). In channel I for insta ce, after the production stage labour 
is required for harvesting, weighing and packaging, and selling mushrooms to community 
members. Selling at the farm gate has no transportation cost as consumers buy the 
mushrooms from where they are produced at an average price of E41/kg. Considering the 
cost of packaging material and opportunity cost of labour, the farm gate’s variable 








Table 4.1: Estimated gross margins for market participants in different mushroom 






Production and marketing costs E/kg Ratio of gross 







Variable production cost (VPC) 8.99  
64% (Producer) Variable marketing costs (VMC) 5.71 
Consumer price (CP) 41.00 









Variable production cost (VPC) 8.99  
50% (Producer) Variable marketing costs (VMC) 10.34 
Selling price to retailer (SP) 51.80 




Purchase price (PP) 51.80  
 
17% (Retailer) 
Variable marketing costs (VMC) 1.59 
Consumer price (CP) 64.53 
Marketing margin (MM) = CP - PP 12.73 













Variable production cost (VPC) 8.99  
42% (Producer) Variable marketing costs (VMC) 5.09 
Selling price to middlemen (SP) 41.00 




Purchase price (PP) 41.00  
 
1% (Middleman) 
Variable marketing costs (VMC) 10.21 
Selling price to retailer (SP) 51.80 
Marketing margin (MM) = SP - PP 10.80 




Purchase price (PP) 51.80  
 
17% (Retailer) 
Variable marketing costs (VMC) 1.59 
Consumer price (CP) 64.53 
Marketing margin (MM) = CP - PP 12.73 
Gross margin (GM) = MM - VMC 11.14 
Notes: 
†Channel I:  Producers  Consumers; 
 Channel II: Producers  Supermarkets  Consumers; and 
 Channel III: Producers  Middlemen  SupermarketsConsumers. 
 Channel IV is not included in Table 5.1 for reasons explained in the text. 
♣The ratio of gross margin to consumer price measures how much out of every E1 of sales to consumers a 
market participant earns in the respective channels. 
Source: Survey data (2011/12) 
 
In channel II the average producer price for the retail market is E51.80/kg. Upon receiving 
the already-packed mushrooms, supermarkets screen them for quality using their own 
procedures, which are mainly based on visual inspection for browning, weight loss and 
microbial spoilage. Producers who sell to the retail market travel distances of at least 10 
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km, with about 64 percent required to travel over 30 km. Most (84 percent) of these 
farmers rely on public transport, which exposes themushrooms to unfavourable 
conditions. Given that mushrooms emerge in flushes, as indicated earlier, the number of 
trips to the market is dictated by the quantity harvested. On average, producers make ten 
return trips per cycle, each covering about 70 km using public transport. Transport cost 
was estimated at E4.63/kg, labour cost at E3.79/kg, and the remainder (E1.92/kg) being the 
cost of packaging material. The average consumer price from supermarkets is E64.53/kg 
with variable marketing costs averaging E1.59/kg. Variable marketing costs for retailers 
consist mainly of labour costs for receiving, screening, weighing, pricing and packaging. 
The cost of labour was estimated using the average time taken to perform the afore-listed 
activities and the official minimum wage rate for the retail and distribution sector (GoS, 
2011b). In supermarkets, mushrooms are displayed in refrigerators and generally sold out 
within a day. Even though data on the price of electricity was gathered (E0.99/KWh), the 
analysis did not incorporate storage costs as the refrigerators are used to display other types 
of food items at the same time. In channel III, middlemen buy the already-packed 
mushrooms from producers at E41/kg and transport them using their own vehicles to 
retailers where they are sold at an average price of E51.80/kg. Estimations indicate that 
middlemen spend an average of E9.26/kg on transport and E0.95/kg on labour. 
 
Another category of buyers identified in sub-section 4.3.2 is the food services industry 
(restaurants and hotels), which adds value by cooking the mushrooms as part of different 
recipes. Given that mushrooms are rarely cooked alone, but in combination with various 
food products and ingredients, costing the value added by the food services industry 
proved to be an insurmountable challenge. Hence, th value chain analysis does not 
include channel IV. Under the current programme, where farmers are supported with free 
substrate bags and transportation of inoculated bags, the variable cost of producing oyster 
mushrooms is about E8.99/kg. Without this kind of support, the enterprise would still be 
profitable even though variable production costs would increase by approximately 
E3.57/kg. Table 4.1 indicates that producers currently enjoy higher gross margins (in 
absolute value (E/kg) and as a proportion of the consumer price) compared with other 
participants in alternative marketing channels. The proportion, however, reduces with an 
increase in the marketing channel’s number of participants. The estimations indicate that 
producers currently earn relative gross margins of ab ut 64 percent from selling at the farm 
gate, 42 percent from selling through middlemen, and 50 percent from selling directly to 
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retailers. Although the gross margins are lower from selling directly to the retail market, 
mainly as a result of transportation costs, a large quantity (52 percent) of the mushrooms 
was traded through this channel as supermarkets offer a comparatively higher producer 
price and a relatively more dependable market. Besides the absence of written marketing 
contracts and having less bargaining power in setting exchange prices, producers who sell 
through the retail channel do not have to rely on unpredictable buyer turnout as is the case 
with the farm gate option. While the middlemen provide an important link between some 
producers and retailers, a very small quantity of mushrooms was traded through channel 
III. Worth noting as well is that the benefits attained by middlemen are far less attractive 
compared with those of other market participants in the value chain. This is largely 
attributed to the fact that middlemen hardly add any value from what they buy from their 
counterparts. Hence, retailers have no incentive to buy their supplies at prices different 
from those offered to other producers. 
 
Producing at full capacity (2000 spawn-impregnated bags) from the small growing houses 
(3m by 4m by 3m) can generate returns over variable costs of about E11,498.00 in a period 
of three to four months. This amount is not negligib e for rural dwellers in Swaziland, most 
of whom are unemployed and have limited livelihood options. The mushroom enterprise 
provides an alternative economic activity, particularly for households located in drought-
stricken areas where rain-fed agriculture has been almost impossible since the early 2000s. 
Producers, though, can still increase income and improve consistency in market supply by 
establishing their own incubation rooms, improving management practices and staggering 
production schedules. The major institutional factors constraining mushroom production 
and value-addition are discussed in the following sub- ection. 
 
4.3.4 Institutional environment 
 
Certain organisations, because of their internal policies or regulations, make decisions and 
undertake various programmes that have important implications for value chain activities. 
Although not directly involved in the production and distribution of products and services 
in the industry, these organisations are likely to influence the institutional environment, 
and consequently, the performance of certain activities by other value chain actors 
(Webber and Labaste, 2010; Trienekens, 2011). Four such organisations were identified in 
the study as the MDU, Food Science and Technology Unit (FSTU), National Agricultural 
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Marketing Board (NAMBoard) and the supermarket chain stores. Besides producing and 
selling spawn, the MDU is responsible for training farmers in mushroom production, 
importation of substrate bags, and act as a link betwe n the government and stakeholders 
in the mushroom industry. Since 2009, the MDU has tr ined over 970 people in basic 
oyster mushroom production and only about a third of this number are currently engaged in 
mushroom production. However, as one of the industry’s lead actors, the MDU has not 
convened a single stakeholders’ consultative forum since 2001. Such forums could enable 
value chain actors to establish networks and allow the MDU to receive feedback on areas 
that require improvement. The FSTU, also under the Ministry of Agriculture, is mandated 
to offer training services in food processing and value addition. However, this unit does not 
have the capacity to impart the skills required by producers to venture into mushroom 
processing and value-addition. Despite the various forms of mushroom processing 
opportunities (see Rai and Arumuganathan, 2008), not a single local farmer has received 
training in this field since 2001. Worth highlighting though is that substantial investment in 
commercial processing and value-addition is also constrained by Swaziland’s unfavourable 
regulatory framework. For instance, Swaziland’s Canning Control Act (GoS, 1961) gives 
the power for controlling the development of food processing to the Minister of 
Agriculture through issuing of licences. This Act, which also gives the Minister the 
prerogative to issue an exclusive licence to “any person for such period as he may deem 
fit”, hinders the participation of prospective investors. Therefore, attempts to improve the 
general food processing environment in Swaziland would require a comprehensive revision 
of such counterproductive legislation. 
 
NAMBoard is a government parastatal responsible for the overall coordination of 
agricultural marketing and trade, and issuance of permits to traders willing to import 
agricultural products. It was gathered that when the mushroom programme was incepted in 
2001, a formal market was established with NAMBoard, which collected mushrooms from 
producers using refrigerated transport. However, because of the limited production 
capacity and inconsistent supply, NAMBoard withdrew its support, leaving producers to 
establish their own marketing arrangements. Worth highlighting is that mushrooms are 
listed under NAMBoard’s scheduled products, implying that for every import of 
mushrooms, the parastatal receives an import levy equivalent to 7.5 percent of the total 
value. While the collected levies are meant to protect he local industry, government’s 
regulations dictate that NAMBoard should use the generated revenue to develop local 
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capacity to produce the same commodity (GoS, 2011c). Despite Swaziland importing over 
240 tons of locally consumed cultivated mushrooms valued at about E2.4 million annually 
(NAMBoard, 2012), no tangible investment has been made by NAMBoard in the 
mushroom industry thus far. 
 
By virtue of being the most preferred selling point for local mushroom producers, and the 
convenient source of supply for consumers, supermarkets’ procurement policies may not 
only have consequences on the inclusion and exclusion of certain actors in the value chain, 
but also long-term prospects for the entire mushroom industry in Swaziland. Given their 
leverage, some supermarkets have gone to the extent of negotiating with local producers to 
supply them with button mushrooms instead of the oyster, as the latter has a comparatively 
less consumer demand. By so doing, supermarkets have sent a signal that even though the 
oyster mushrooms could be relatively easier and less costly to produce, in order for 
producers (and other actors) to participate competitiv ly and sustainably in the value chain, 
they should consider diversifying towards other types of mushrooms in response to 
consumer demand. 
 
In view of the possible increase in market supply (as a result of diversification, improved 
production capacity, and staggered production schedules), parallel plans are required to 
establish an integrated value chain governance system to coordinate the movement of 
mushrooms from initial producers to ultimate consumers. Drawing from the identified 
constraints, the next section presents possible options hat could be considered in fulfilling 
the above expectations. 
 
4.4 Possible interventions for upgrading the mushroom value chain governance 
and coordination system 
 
Even though the current programme prioritises the oyster mushroom, this chapter 
highlights the existence of a broad market for other types of mushrooms, especially the 
button. This is an opportunity for producers to diversify within the industry, a decision that 
may not be difficult to make, given the knowledge and experience gained thus far. 
However, the same cannot be said about aspiring farmers who have not been trained as 
they cannot seize the available opportunity. The major constraint in this case is that the 
MDU is the only organisation with the capacity to provide such expertise. Considering 
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their low staff complement, it would take a while to train a substantial number of aspiring 
producers. This calls for the government to either increase its staff complement and 
facilities or alternatively establish strong alliances with NGOs to complement their training 
and extension programmes. Another option would be to train and identify lead farmers in 
strategic locations and, thereafter, facilitate farme -farmer interactions to impart similar 
skills to other aspiring producers. Otherwise, opportunities to engage the private sector 
could also be explored. However, caution should be ex rcised to ensure that farmers are 
offered quality training and are not charged exorbitant fees. 
 
As farmers diversify to incorporate other types of mushrooms, a demand for more 
production inputs will be created. Substrate availabil ty should not be a major challenge 
given the abundance of agricultural and industrial waste in Swaziland. However, 
considering that spawn production and the technology used for substrate preparation are 
currently centralised and only offered by the MDU, it would benefit the entire industry if 
the government could privatise some of the services and allow the MDU to assume a 
monitoring role. As one of the lead actors in the industry, the MDU could also take the 
initiative to launch consultative forums with stakeholders in an attempt to establish 
networks and synergies among value chain actors, and possibly forge strategic public-
private partnerships (PPPs). Central to this approach is the identification of a common 
interest space, within which activities may emerge f om objectives shared by both partners. 
It is through such networks that prospective investors could be identified to take up 
opportunities, particularly in areas where Swaziland currently relies on imports (and 
donations) even for simple technologies (e.g. substrate cutting and mixing machinery) that 
could be manufactured and supplied by local entrepreneurs. Through the establishment of 
collaboration structures, stakeholders could also devise strategies for influencing the 
removal of counterproductive legislation currently stifling value-addition. 
 
The lack of a prescribed quality management and tracing system for traded mushrooms is 
another area worth looking into. While buyers did not identify quality as their major 
concern, the absence of easily measurable quality standards subjects producers to having 
their mushrooms bought at lower prices or even reject d without informed justifications. 
Furthermore, as the industry expands, a parallel trade in wild mushrooms is likely to 
emerge. In the absence of mushroom food safety regulations, this kind of trade could 
compromise the lives of consumers and the industry’s reputation as desperation for income 
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could lead to opportunists selling even the poisonous type of mushrooms to unsuspecting 
consumers. These issues could also be addressed through the proposed stakeholder forums. 
 
With the current lack of coordination in mushroom marketing, major buyers are not spared 
from encountering transaction costs, given the small-sc le exchanges they engage in with 
individual producers. However, changes that could allow the same volume of business to 
be concentrated in a smaller number of relatively larger and more secure transactions 
would benefit buyers and producers alike. This can be made possible by promoting 
collective marketing through the existing farmer groups. Collective marketing would also 
enable producers to strengthen their bargaining position, share, and reduce marketing and 
transaction costs related to the search for buyers, monitoring transactions and 
transportation of mushrooms to distant markets. In view of the sparse distribution of 
producers, marketing and transaction costs could also be reduced by establishing collection 
centres (fitted with temperature-controlled storage facilities) in strategic areas, and using 
refrigerated transport to convey mushrooms from these centres to mainstream markets. 
These assets would be important in preserving product q ality and freshness. While 
mushroom producing groups could raise the capital requi ed to fund such investments from 
their own resources, it would take them a while to do so considering their economic status. 
Alternative funding could be sourced from state-owned Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs) such as Swazibank, Swaziland Industrial Development Company (SIDC), and 
Swaziland Development Finance Corporation (FINCORP), which were established with a 
mandate to finance small and large-scale local enterpris s, including agribusinesses (Msibi, 
2009). Building on a successful model used since the early 1990’s to finance sugarcane 
production by previously inexperienced farmers on customary SNL, these DFIs have 
recently expanded their portfolios to finance even commercial horticultural and livestock 
enterprises on both Individual Tenure Farms (ITFs) and customary SNL. In contrast to 
commercial banks, which require collateral and are generally not keen to finance small-
scale agribusinesses, local DFIs have adopted a pro-poor financial innovation that uses 
contracts between producers and buyers as a collatera  substitute. A tripartite agreement is 
then entered into by the producers, financier and buyer to facilitate repayment, which the 
financier reclaims directly from the buyer (Msibi, 2009). 
 
However, given that current mushroom producers generally have limited agribusiness 
exposure, some form of outside assistance would be required to improve their 
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competitiveness in the value chain. Engaging a facilit tor who would, among other 
expectations, provide information and technical assistance could enhance producers’ 
prospects to even venture into export markets. While a number of agencies, such as NGOs 
(Fischer and Qaim, 2012), could be considered, NAMBoard would be better suited for this 
role. Despite its subdued performance since its establi hment in 1985, some positive 
lessons could be drawn from NAMBoard’s recent experience in linking local vegetable 
producers with export markets and the attainment of Gl bal Good Agricultural Practice 
(GLOBALG.A.P) certification. Hence, an option that could be viable under the current 
environment, would be to use the revenue generated from mushroom import levies to fund 
the establishment of collection centres and purchase of refrigerated means of transport, 
which would initially operate under the joint management of NAMBoard and mushroom 
producing groups. NAMBoard, working jointly with farmer groups, would assume the 
responsibility to find remunerative markets. As conditions improve and producers graduate 
to a position where they can manage the processes on their own, government may then 
consider withdrawing its support gradually. In order to sustain the groups’ activities and 
cover collection centres’ operational expenses, a sm ll fee per kg of mushrooms sold could 
be deducted from individual sales and deposited into a working capital fund. Group 
members can also be responsible for providing security to avoid misuse and theft of the 
investment. Similar strategies have been successfully implemented towards assisting 
Kenyan small-scale milk and banana producers (see Staal et al., 1997; Fischer and Qaim, 
2012). However, coordination in the milk sub-sector was later affected by politically-
related factors (Staal et al., 1997), an unfortunate incident that other developing countries 




This chapter applied the value chain approach to ident fy the underlying factors 
constraining mushroom production and producers’ participation in mainstream markets in 
Swaziland. Among the important findings in this chapter is that producers’ plans to expand 
production capacities are hampered by the difficulty to access key inputs such as spawn, 
substrate preparation technology, and incubation services, which are centralised and fully 
controlled by the government. Most farmers produce below capacity in relatively small, 
low-cost structures, which are also not well equipped. As such, they apply relatively 
primitive methods to regulate the temperature and humidity in the growing houses. These 
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constraints are partly responsible for the extremely low locally produced volumes and 
inconsistent market supply, prompting local mushroom traders to rely on imports. Other 
constraints relate to the lack of diversification as f rmers currently produce only the oyster 
mushroom, yet buyers are mostly interested in the button mushroom, which is favoured by 
consumers for its appearance and taste. 
 
Currently, no cultivated mushrooms are exported from Swaziland and producers have not 
yet engaged in any form of mushroom processing. Producers trade their mushrooms 
through four channels identified as: (i) the farm gate; (ii) retail market (supermarkets); (iii) 
middlemen; and (iv) food services industry (restaurants/hotels). Among these four 
channels, the retail market is currently the most favoured because it offers a stable market 
and a relatively high producer price. Although producers currently attain higher gross 
margins in absolute value and as a proportion of consumer price compared to other 
participants in alternative marketing channels, more benefits could be realised if certain 
services currently offered by the government (e.g. training, spawn production and 
distribution) could be privatised, allowing public institutions (e.g. MDU) to assume a 
monitoring role. 
 
In view of the possible increase in market supply (as a result of diversification, improved 
production capacity, and staggered production schedules), Swaziland would benefit from 
establishing an integrated value chain governance system to improve market access and 
facilitate the movement of mushrooms from producers to ultimate consumers. Having 
identified the predominant mushroom marketing channels, the next chapter presents the 
empirical results and discussion of how transaction c sts affect producers’ selection of 














EFFECTS OF TRANSACTION COSTS ON MUSHROOM 
PRODUCERS’ CHOICE OF MARKETING CHANNELS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS 




This chapter presents the empirical methods, results and discussion of the effects of 
transaction costs on producers’ choice of marketing channels and the quantity of 
mushrooms supplied. The rest of the chapter is structu ed as follows: Section 5.2 outlines 
the methodology, which constitutes the conceptual framework, empirical model, and data 
collection procedures. Section 5.3 discusses the empirical results, while section 5.4 




5.2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
In deciding where to sell a particular commodity, producers base their decisions not only 
on the price they expect to receive, but also on additional costs related to transacting in 
available markets (Jaffee, 1995). Considering that transaction costs alone could be a major 
barrier to market participation, farmers are more likely to choose to supply their 
commodities through a channel that has less transaction osts in their quest to maximise 
profit (Key et al., 2000). However, transaction costs have a large unobservable component; 
hence, they are difficult to quantify. As indicated in chapter two, such challenges have 
unsurprisingly resulted in the dearth of literature on the direct measurement of exchange-
related costs, particularly in the area of agricultural marketing (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999). 
Where attempts have been made previously, researchers (e.g. Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Royer, 
2011) have based their estimation on the opportunity costs of alternatives, which are also 
not easily identifiable or quantifiable. As such, aspects like market information search and 
bargaining procedures are rarely included in most studies and are unlikely to be 
comprehensive when included. Despite Collins and Fabozzi’s (1991) contention that no 
one approach of conceptualising and estimating transaction costs is best in all 
                                                 
8 This chapter gave rise to the following publication: Mabuza, M.L., Ortmann, G.F. and Wale, E. (in press). 
Effects of transaction costs on mushroom producers’ choice f marketing channels: Implications for 
agricultural market access in Swaziland. South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences. 
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circumstances, in attempting to address the above-indicated inherent challenges, this study 
borrows from the framework postulated by Vakis et al. (2003), which provides a 
dependable setting for studying producers’ channel choices and quantity supplied as a 
function of commodity prices and two broad categories of proportional and fixed 
transaction costs. 
 
Following Vakis et al. (2003), if there exist J available markets where a certain quantity of 
mushrooms qi can possibly be sold, the producer’s marketing strategy is conceptualised to 
be influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, selling in market J for a given transaction i 
could be associated with proportional transaction csts pijTC that may arise due to various 
factors including the distanceijd and time ijm to reach marketij , and other individual-




ij zmdTCTC = .               (5.1) 
Secondly, the producer considers the expected priceij likely to be received from 
alternative markets. The price is decomposed into: 
),( biijij zqBpp ±=                (5.2) 
where jp is a market specific price and ),(
b
ii zqB is the potential price mark-up that the 
producer expects to receive. The mark-up depends on the quantity of mushrooms sold 
iq and other bargaining-related attributes such as product quality
b
iz . Finally, selling in 
market ij could also be associated with fixed transaction costs )(
f
ij
f zTC that are invariable 
with the quantity sold and include costs like searching for potential buyers and obtaining 
information about prices, markets, or types of possible contractual arrangements. 
 
Based on the above, and for a given transaction i, a producer chooses to selliq in the 
ij market that yields the highest net profit among the k = 1,…, J alternative markets. This 
can be expressed as: 
{ }JkzTCzmdTCzqBpqj fikfpikikikpikbiiikiik
k
i ,...,1),()],,(),([(max =−−±⋅=Π= .        (5.3) 
So, assuming there are two alternative markets (1j  and 2j ), a producer will choose to sell 
to 1j if 
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{ })()],,(),([( 111111111 fkfpkkkpkbkk zTCzmdTCzqBpq −−±⋅=Π > 
{ })()],,(),([( 222222222 fkfpkkkpkbkk zTCzmdTCzqBpq −−±⋅=Π .          (5.4) 
However, he/she will sell to 2j  if k2Π > k1Π , and will be indifferent if k2Π = k1Π . The 
empirical model used to study the effects of transaction costs on producers’ choice of 
marketing channels is discussed in the following sub- ection. 
 
5.2.2 The empirical model 
 
Upon realising some marketable surplus, producers usually make two types of decisions in 
relation to their marketing strategy. The first decision relates to the choice of a marketing 
channel, and the second on the quantity of the produce to supply through the selected 
channel. With very few exceptions (e.g. Shiimi et al., 2012), most previous related studies 
(e.g. Hobbs, 1997; Gong et al., 2007; Woldie and Nuppenau, 2011) have analysed th  
effects of transaction costs on these two choices using the Tobit model, implying that 
farmers make these decisions simultaneously. The broader inference of these studies is that 
farmers’ supply of commodities is price inelastic, an attribute which entails that farmers 
are less likely to adapt to changing market conditions, making them more susceptible to 
conditions set by buyers. Other researchers (e.g. Katchova and Miranda, 2004), however, 
contend that such marketing decisions are made sequentially, suggesting that producers 
pay attention to market conditions, and with the information gathered, they first decide 
whether or not to participate in a particular channel prior to making the decision on the 
proportion of the commodity to sell through the selected channel. Sequential decisions are 
analysed using two-step approaches such as the Cragg’s model, also known as the double-
hurdle model (Green, 2003). 
 
Within a simultaneous decision-making framework, the dependent variable is captured as 
the proportion of the commodity sold through the prfe red channel. Given that producers 
who do not participate in this channel will record zero percent of the commodity sold, the 
dependent variable becomes censored at a threshold of zero, necessitating the use of a 
Tobit model (Green, 2003). The principal underlying assumption of the Tobit is that the 
probability of channel choice also increases the avrage quantity of the commodity 
supplied; hence, the effect of a particular variable will be the same on the choice of 
marketing channel and the proportion of quantity supplied (Burke, 2009). It is against such 
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attributes of the Tobit that Cragg (1971) proposed the more flexible double-hurdle model, 
which allows the outcomes to be determined by separate stochastic processes. Following 
Green (2003), Cragg’s model is specified as follows: 
 
Channel choice equation 
[ ]=> 0Pr *iy Φ ),( 'γix   iz  = 1 if 0* >iy  
[ ]=≤ 0Pr *iy 1− Φ ),( 'γix  iz = 0 if 0* ≤iy           (5.5) 
 
Quantity decision 
E[ iy | iz  = 1] = iix σλβ +
'              (5.6) 
 
whereγ andβ are coefficients to be estimated,y is the observed use of the preferred 
marketing channel, andx represents the factors hypothesised to affect the producers’ 
marketing behaviour. Cragg’s model is a combination of the Probit in equation 5.5 (choice 
of marketing channel) and a Truncated regression model in equation 5.6 (quantity sold), 
which can be estimated independently. If iz  = ix and γ = σβ , Cragg’s model reduces to 
the Tobit model, causing the variables to influence th  channel choice decision and 
quantity supplied in the same manner. In attempting o get an indication of whether 
marketing decisions by mushroom producers in Swaziland are made simultaneously or 
sequentially, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is conducted wherein the Tobit is tested against 
Cragg’s model by respectively estimating the Tobit, Probit and Truncated regression 
models using the same variables, and thereafter computing a Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
statistic as follows (Green, 2003): 
 
[ ])ln(lnln2 TRPT LLL +−−=λ              (5.7) 
 
where ln LT = log of the likelihood for the Tobit model; ln LP = log of the likelihood for the 
Probit model; and ln LTR = log of the likelihood for the Truncated regression model. λ has a 
χ
2 distribution with R (df), where R is the number of independent variables plus the 
constant. The Tobit model is rejected in favour of Cragg’s model if λ exceeds the 
appropriate χ2 critical value. The next sub-section discusses the dependent and explanatory 
variables used in the empirical model. 
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5.2.3 Dependent and explanatory variables 
 
a) Dependent variable 
 
As indicated in chapter four, no cultivated mushrooms are currently exported from 
Swaziland and producers have not yet engaged in any form of mushroom processing. 
Instead, from what they harvest, about six to ten prcent is consumed at household level 
and the remainder is sold through four channels identifi d as: (i) the farm gate; (ii) retail 
market (supermarkets); (iii) middlemen; and (iv) food services industry 
(restaurants/hotels). Some producers reported to have sold mushrooms through different 
channels, indicating that the options are not mutually exclusive. On account of these 
observations, and for ease of analysis, producers who sold to more than one outlet 
(j1,….,j4) were adjudged to prefer selling through j1 if a greater proportion of their 
marketable surplus was sold through j1 compared to what they sold to other j outlets. 
Subsequent to the re-classification according to preference, two marketing channels were 
found prominent, and these were supermarkets (or retail outlets) used by 53 percent of the 
respondents and the farm gate used by 47 percent. Co sidering the above observations, the 
dependent variable was formulated around the retail m rket option; hence, a value of one 
was assigned if the producer sold through the retail m rket channel and zero if the produce 
was sold at the farm gate. For the quantity model, the dependent variable was the 
proportion of mushrooms sold through the retail channel, ranging between 0 and 100 
percent. 
 
b) Explanatory variables 
 
Transaction cost variables were measured by ranking producers’ responses to a list of 
questions related to the constraints they encounter i  marketing their mushrooms. The set 
of questions were classified into three components, amely (i) information and search 
costs; (ii) negotiation, bargaining, and transfer costs; and (iii) monitoring and enforcement 
costs. The adopted measurement criterion works on the premise that transaction costs are 
assumed to be observable if, ceteris paribus, a particular type of transaction cost is higher 
in channel (j1) than in channel (j2), and different producers consistently specify the same 
ranking whenever the two situations are considered (Cheung, 1998). The explanatory 
variables are discussed below and summarised in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Variables included in the Tobit and Crag ’s regression models 
 
Dependant variables 
Variable Description Measurement 
Marketing channel through 
which mushrooms are sold 
Selling at the farm gate or retail 
market?  
1= retail market; 0 = farm gate 
Proportion of mushrooms sold  % of total mushrooms sold  0 – 100 
Household characteristics 
Variable Description Measurement Expected 
sign 
1. Education level of producer Category last attended 1= Illiterate; 2= Adult education; 
3= Primary; 4= Secondary; 




2. Household labour 
endowment 
Man-equivalents Less than 9 yrs=0; 9-15=0.7; 
16-49=1; above 49=0.7 
+ 
Production 
3. Size of production Spawn-impregnated bagsa Number + 
4. Ownership of refrigerator Does the household own a refrigerator? 1=yes; 0=no + 
5. Group membership Is the producer a member of a 
mushroom producing group? 
1=yes; 0=no + 
Information and search costs 
6. Knowledge of prices in 
alternative markets 
Was the price in alternative markets 
known before selling the mushrooms? 
1= yes; 0 = no -/+ 
7. Difficulty in accessing price 
information 
How difficult is it to access price 
information? 
1=not an issue of concern; 2=very 
easy; 3=easy; 4=difficult; 5=very 
difficult 
- 
Negotiation, bargaining and transfer costs 
8. Search for trading partner How difficult is it to locate exchange 
partners/buyers? 
1=not an issue of concern; 2=very 
easy; 3=easy; 4=difficult; 5=very 
difficult 
- 
9. Transportation difficulty How difficult is it to transport your 
produce to the market? 
1=not an issue of concern; 2=very 
easy; 3=easy; 4=difficult; 5=very 
difficult 
- 
10. Bargaining power Who sets the exchange price? 1=producer; 0= buyer or both + 
Monitoring and enforcement costs 
11. Quality uncertainty Is there uncertainty that your 
mushrooms will not meet the expected 
quality of preferred buyer? 
1=yes; 0= no - 
Note: a‘Spawn-impregnated bags’ are substrate bags that have been inoculated with the mushroom seed, 
known as spawn (Gwanama et al., 2011). 
 
Information and search costs 
 
Prior to making any exchange, producers will, among ther expectations, be required to 
establish who to sell their mushrooms to and the prices at which to sell them. By so doing, 
they will incur information costs whose magnitude depends on the time taken to conduct 
the search. Going into production without the knowledge of current prices in alternative 
markets creates some uncertainty in that despite making their own price expectations, 
producers will have no guarantee that they will eventually receive that price unless they 
know in advance which price the buyer will agree to buy at (Hobbs, 1997). Similar to 
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Woldie and Nuppenau (2011), information cost due to such price uncertainty was 
measured by considering whether farmers knew the pric  in alternative markets ahead of 
transacting, while the search for price information and trading partner(s) were measured by 
taking into account the difficulty with which the two were accomplished, respectively. 
 
Negotiation, bargaining and transfer costs 
 
Smallholder farmers are generally price takers and the level of transaction costs is likely to 
increase if they need to travel long distances to reach their point(s) of sale (Pingali et al., 
2005). While transportation costs may not be considere  by some researchers as a 
transaction cost component, the inclusion of transport-related variables in this study was 
meant to account for the opportunity cost of producers’ time spent in organising transport 
to convey their mushrooms to distant markets. Farmers’ bargaining position was 
considered as a measure of their influence on exchange greements, particularly in the 
setting of exchange prices. Gong et al. (2007) and Woldie and Nuppenau (2011) found that 
farmers who produce in bulk tend to enjoy relatively more bargaining power and are likely 
to influence buying terms. Therefore, it is expected hat producers would be inclined to 
supply a greater proportion of their commodity through a channel where they have a better 
bargaining position. 
 
Monitoring and enforcement costs 
 
One of the key monitoring costs considered in the sudy is quality uncertainty. While there 
are currently no formal quality standards for traded mushrooms in Swaziland, 
supermarkets, the major buyers, generally screen deliver d mushrooms for quality based 
on visual inspection for browning, weight loss and microbial spoilage. Producers’ returns 
are likely to be lower than anticipated if mushrooms do not meet the buyers’ expected 
quality standards. Mushrooms are highly perishable products and, as observed by Fraser 
(1995), if the producer faces some uncertainty about selling his/her mushrooms due to 
quality considerations, perishability could be of grave concern as he/she may either sell at 
a reduced price (due to shrinkage) or not sell at al due to advanced spoilage. The inclusion 
of this variable was based on evidence provided by Hobbs (1997) and Gong et al. (2007) 
who found that high levels of quality uncertainty are more likely to result in producers 
selling their mushrooms through a channel with no stringent quality requirements. No 
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variable was included in the model to capture enforcement costs as none of the farmers had 
valid contracts of any form with their buyers, except verbal agreements for those supplying 
retail outlets. Furthermore, no conflicts were reported that perhaps warranted follow-up 
visits or calls from producers as a result of delayd or defaulted payments. 
 
Household and production attributes 
 
While it is generally believed that transaction costs reflect the character of the market, 
others (e.g. Pingali et al., 2005) posit that transaction costs are mainly entrenched in the 
characteristics of individual producers and the enviro ment they live in. In particular, 
Pingali et al. (2005) argue that the time taken to search, process and act on market 
information decreases with better education. Others ( .g. Fafchamps and Hill, 2005) have 
found that farmers who produce in large quantities are more likely to travel to the market 
in search for relatively higher exchange prices. These two factors were, respectively, 
analysed by considering producers’ level of education  and the number of spawn-
impregnated bags they manage. In addition, given th perishability of mushrooms and the 
amount of work required in the enterprise, it was found prudent to include other variables 
to account for ownership of cooling facilities (refrigerators) and household labour 
endowment, respectively. Considering members who were identified to participate in 
household agricultural activities, household labour endowment was measured following 
Langyintuo and Mungoma (2008) in man-equivalents (see Table 5.1). The identified 
members include even school-attending children who also participate in household 
agricultural activities, especially outside school-attending hours including weekends and 
holidays. The following sub-section presents the data collection procedure. 
 
5.2.4 Data collection 
 
The analysis for this chapter relied on the same dataset of 91 producers used in chapter 
four, whose descriptive statistics are presented in sub-section 5.3.1. The next sub-section 
presents the study’s empirical results. It begins with an overview of the descriptive 
statistics of variables used in the analytical model, followed by a discussion of the 
significant factors affecting producers’ channel choi e decisions and quantity of 




5.3 Empirical results and discussions 
 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the Tobit and Cragg’s models 
 
The descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 5.2 below. 
 

























Gender of producer Female 74.7 55.9 44.1 1.061 
Male 25.3 43.5 56.5 
Membership in mushroom producing 
group 
Member 65.9 53.3 46.7 0.024 
Non- member  34.1 51.6 48.4 
Ownership of refrigerator Yes 58.2 64.2 35.8 6.622***  
No 41.8 36.8 63.2 
Knowledge of producer price in 
alternative markets 
Yes 37.4 55.9  44.1 1.622 
No 62.6 42.1  57.9 
Bargaining power (who sets the producer 
price?) 
Producer 64.8 28.8 71.2 38.560***  
Buyer or both  35.2 96.9 3.1 
Quality uncertainty Yes 36.3 75.8 24.2 10.999***  
No 63.7 39.7 60.3 
Type of transport 
usedb  
Own vehicle Percentage 13.2 91.7 8.3 63.705***  
Public transport Percentage 48.4 84.1 15.9 
By foot Percentage 11 0 100 
No need to travel Percentage 27.5 0 100 
Continuous variables 











Age of producer Years 50 50 49 -0.588 
Labour endowment Man-equiv. † 4.8 4.6 4.8 -0.356 
Number of spawn-impregnated bags Bags 502 401 581 -2.462**  
Producer priceb  E/kg3  51.80 41.00 -3.505***  
Ordered variables 











Difficulty in accessing price information Modal score† 3 4 3 14.500***  
Difficulty in locating trading partner Modal score † 3 3 3 5.931 
Difficulty in accessing transport Modal score † 1 1 1 5.032 
Producer’s education level Modal score † 4 4 3 12.144**  
Distance to marketb Modal score ♠ 0 7 0 79.021***  
Notes: 
b indicates variables not included in the regression m del 
†Refer to Table 6.1 for measurement of variables 
♠ 0=no need to travel; 1=less than 1km; 2=1-2km; 3=2.1-3km; 4=3.1-4; 5=4.1-5; 6=5.1-10km; 7=above 10km 




Table 5.2 indicates that the average age of interviewed producers is 50 years, and the 
majority (75 percent) are women. Almost 58 percent own refrigerators, of whom 36 
percent sell at the farm gate, while the rest supply the retail market. The producers have a 
relatively low level of education as slightly over 65 percent did not go beyond secondary 
school. About 63 percent indicated that they do not have access to price information in 
alternative markets and 58 percent of producers in this category sell their mushrooms at the 
farm gate. Of the 65 percent who indicated to be selling at prices set by themselves, 71 
percent sell at the farm gate, while the remainder use either their own vehicles or public 
transport to convey mushrooms to the nearest retail outlets. Producers who sell at the farm 
gate have lower uncertainty about the quality of their mushrooms which they sell at 
relatively less producer prices. Due to poor customer turnout in some areas, only 11 
percent indicted to occasionally walk around the neighbourhood in search for buyers as a 
means to avoid losses resulting from spoilage. Farmers who are more inclined to sell to the 
retail market are those who manage a significantly  higher  number of spawn-impregnated 
bags. About 66 percent of the producers are affiliated to mushroom producing groups, of 
whom 53 percent prefer the retail market to the farm gate. Although retail suppliers appear 
to be significantly better educated, Table 5.2 indicates that these same producers face 
considerable difficulty in trying to access price information. These results are not 
surprising given that Swaziland does not have a Market Information System (MIS). The 
emperical results and discussion of the effects of transaction costs on producers’ channel 
choice decisions and the quantity of mushrooms supplied are presented in the next sub-
section. 
 
5.3.2 Factors affecting channel choice and quantity supplied 
 
Having detected no significant multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, the 
regression models were subsequently estimated, and the results are presented in Table 5.3. 
With a Likelihood Ratio (LR) of 99.63 at 12df (p<0.01), the Tobit model was rejected in 
favour of Cragg’s model, suggesting that mushroom producers are more likely to make 
their marketing decisions of channel choice and quantity supplied sequentially. Consistent 
with Fafchamps and Hill’s (2005) findings, the result  indicate that farmers who produce 
relatively more (in terms of the number of spawn-impregnated bags) have a high likelihood 
of selling their mushrooms to the retail market. Producers’ quest to supply the retail market 
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is also enhanced by ownership of refrigerators, which allows them to store the mushrooms 
for a couple of days before transporting them. 
 
Table 5.3: Regression results for factors influencing the choice of marketing channel 
and proportion of mushrooms sold by producers in Swaziland, 2012 
 
 Tobit Probit Truncated regression 
  









∂y/∂x z-value β 
 






  -1.031 
(1.460) 
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Log likelihood -231.544 -26.85 -154.881 
F-stat. 5.62***    
Prob. F-test p<0.01   
Pseudo R2  0.130 0.573  
Wald χ2 (11df)   47.09***  25.06***  
Prob. χ2 for Wald test  p<0.01 p<0.01 
Correct classification  84.6%  
LR test for Tobit vs 
Cragg’s model (λ)  
 99.63***  
Prob. χ2 for LR test   p<0.01 
Notes: *, **, ***  represent 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. Figures in brackets are robust 
standard errors. 




One of the unique attributes of oyster mushrooms is that although the harvested quantities 
decline over time, from the first flush they can be harvested continuously for a period of 
about three to four months, subject to prevailing conditions (Gwanama et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the advantage of owning a refrigerator is that a producer may harvest for a 
couple of days, store and thereafter make a single trip to the market. As indicated earlier, 
the mushroom enterprise is labour-demanding in almost all pre-production, production, 
harvesting, and post-harvest handling procedures. It i  not surprising, therefore, that a high 
labour endowment enables the household to produce and market relatively larger 
quantities, which they are able to transport to the retail market. 
 
The results in Table 5.3 also indicate that producers who are unaware of prevailing prices 
in alternative markets and have difficulty in accessing price information are more likely to 
sell their mushrooms at the farm gate. The negative, significant coefficient for bargaining 
power confirms Woldie and Nuppenau’s (2011) persuasion that the paucity of market 
information denies producers the leverage to bargain for exchange prices; hence, prices 
and exchange terms are dictated by the buyers. As a re ult, producers who cannot bargain 
at the retail market are more inclined to sell their mushrooms at the farm gate. Despite 
being price takers and often required to travel, farmers who sell their produce to retail 
outlets are presumably attracted by market reliability and a comparatively high producer 
price. Another important observation from the results is that producers who are affiliated to 
mushroom producing groups are more likely to sell to the retail market. While these 
producers do not sell collectively, it could be inferred that performing certain tasks as a 
group builds some social cohesion, which enables thm to share information beyond the 
joint activities. In any group setting characterized by mutual trust between members, there 
are possibilities for sharing skills and information as some members could be more 
experienced and knowledgeable than others. 
 
Only two factors were found to significantly influence the quantity of mushrooms sold. 
The first relates to the difficulty encountered in organising transport, which significantly 
influences farmers to sell their mushrooms at the farm gate. As noted earlier, producers 
who supply the retail market are required to travel, whereas a majority of those who sell at 
the farm gate rarely transport their mushrooms as buyers generally consist of locally-based 
community members. Accessing the retail market comes with an opportunity cost of time 
spent in organising transport and time spent during transportation. Given that most 
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producers rely on public transport to convey their mushrooms to the market, it is evident 
that they have no control on regulating transportati n periods. The second factor relates to 
producers’ quality uncertainty. Contrary to previous findings (e.g. Hobbs, 1997 and Gong 
et al., 2007), the coefficient for quality uncertainty was positively related to the quantity of 
mushrooms sold through the retail market. Generally, it would be expected that the more 
producers become concerned about meeting buyers’ quality requirements, the less of 
mushrooms they will supply to that particular channel. However, as observed by Staal et 
al. (1997), it could be inferred that while producers a e often uncertain about whether their 
mushrooms will meet the buyers’ expectations for quality, the market reliability and 
comparatively better exchange price offered by the retail market seem to outweigh the 
uncertainty about quality such that producers are willing to increase their supply in order to 




This chapter studied the effects of transaction costs n the choice of marketing channels 
and quantity of mushrooms sold by producers in Swaziland. Transaction costs were 
categorised into (i) information and search costs, (ii) negotiation, bargaining and transfer 
costs, and (iii) monitoring and enforcement costs. Among the four marketing channels, the 
retail market and farm gate were identified as the most preferred. Hence, the analysis was 
based on producers’ choices between the two. Buyers at the farm gate generally comprise 
locally-based community members, whereas in the retail market they include the urban 
working class, tourists and customers with special d et preferences. Cragg’s regression 
model results indicate that producers who are likely to supply the retail market are those 
who manage a relatively large number of spawn impregnated bags, have a relatively high 
labour endowment, own cold storage facilities, and re affiliated to mushroom producing 
groups. However, the difficulty in accessing market information and lack of bargaining 
power significantly constrains producers’ plans to upply the retail market; hence, they end 
up selling at the farmgate. These results highlight the importance of a Market Information 
System (MIS), which Swaziland is yet to establish despite numerous discussions that have 
taken several decades to conclude. Besides improving market transparency, full and easy 
access to reliable and up-to-date market information would strengthen producers’ 
bargaining position and competitiveness as they would be able to make timely and better 
informed production and marketing decisions. 
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Producers’ decisions on the quantity of mushrooms supplied through the retail market were 
found to be negatively affected by the difficulty in accessing transport and positively 
affected by producers’ uncertainty about the quality of the mushrooms. Even though the 
latter finding was against a priori expectations, this could be an indication that rega dless 
of the producers’ uncertainty of whether their mushrooms will meet the buyers’ 
expectations for quality, the market reliability and comparatively better exchange price 
offered by the retail market are more important. As such, producers are willing to increase 
their supply to the retail market in order to avoid the farm gate option, which relies mostly 
on unpredictable consumer turnout. 
 
In attempting to improve the marketing conditions for local producers, it is recommended 
that the government, in collaboration with the private sector and other development 
agencies, should establish the much needed MIS. The establishment of refrigerated 
collection centres in strategic locations countrywide would help reduce the marketing and 
transaction costs currently incurred by remotely located and poorly-resourced producers. 
Such facilities would also help to preserve the quality nd freshness of the mushrooms, 
particularly when considering that current producers have not yet ventured into mushroom 
processing. The next chapter examines the effects of organisational form on mushroom 



















DOES ORGANISATIONAL FORM OF FARMER GROUPS AFFECT 
PRODUCERS’ PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITIES? EVIDENCE FROM SMALLHOLDER 






This chapter presents the empirical methods, results  and discussion of the effects of 
organisational form on collective action. As indicated in chapter one, mushroom producing 
groups are constituted in predominantly two organistional forms, depicted as model A and 
B, respectively. In model A, besides establishing their own by-laws, members produce 
mushrooms in one production house where they share all pre-production, production, and 
marketing activities. In model B, members also establish their own by-laws and share all 
pre-production activities. However, instead of producing under one roof, each member 
manages his/her own production house and members ar at liberty to make their own 
marketing arrangements independently. This chapter, th efore, answers the question of 
whether the two predominant forms in which mushroom producing groups are organised 
(Model A and B) induce any effects on the producers’ participation in collective 
responsibilities. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 outlines the 
methodology, followed by a presentation of the empirical results in section 6.3. Section 6.4 




6.2.1 Analytical procedure 
 
a) Identifying collective action indicators 
 
The first task was to identify the key indicators of c llective action as perceived by the 
members themselves. Collective action is a dynamic process that relates to social 
relationships; hence, it is inherently difficult to measure directly. As a result, most 
                                                 
9 This chapter gave rise to the following article: Mabuza, M.L., Ortmann, G.F. and Wale, E. Does 
organisational form of farmer groups affect producers’ participation in collective responsibilities? Evidence 
from smallholder mushroom producers in Swaziland. Currently under review with the International Journal 
of Rural Management. 
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researchers (e.g. Fujiie et al., 2005; Araral, 2009) have resorted to use proxy indicators for 
its analysis, which, nonetheless, cannot be replicated cross different locations and study 
periods as the signs of collective action can vary over time and across communities 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). As suggested by various scholars (e.g. Collier, 2003; Ostrom 
and Ahn, 2009), the sustainability of collective action is premised on the strength of social 
capital. This is an attribute that promotes and facilit tes interaction among individuals, and 
as a result the trust generated through interaction reduces opportunistic behaviour, thereby 
developing a foundation for collective action. Therefo e, collective action indicators were 
extracted from cognitive and structural social capital-related variables (see Table 6.1), 
which were selected based on field observations and the related literature (e.g. Krishna and 
Uphoff, 2003; Mitchell and Bossert, 2007). 
 
Table 6.1: Variables used to develop collective action indicators for mushroom 
producing groups in Swaziland, 2011 
 
Label  Variables  Scale 
I have a strong personal confidence in each group memberd Confid  1 – 5a 
All group members are trustworthyd Trustworth  1 – 5a 
Level of member cooperation in executing joint manual activitiese Man_act  1 – 5b 
Level of member cooperation in joint planning and decision makinge Decmk  1 – 5b 
There are no demonstrated conflicts within the groupe Unity  1 – 5a 
I am willing to contribute towards group investments in futuree Inv_fut  1 – 5a 
There is extensive communication in the groupe Comm  1 – 5a 
Information is shared in a language and form understood by all 
memberse 
Info  1 – 5a 
Level of satisfaction with group performance towards achieving its 
objectivese 
Satisf  1 – 5c 
Notes: a 1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-neutral, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree 
b 1-very low, 2-low, 3-moderate, 4-high, 5-very high 
  c 1-very dissatisfied, 2-dissatisfied, 3-neutral, 4-satisfied, 5-very satisfied 
  d cognitive social capital-related variable 
e structural social capital-related variable 
 
The variables were measured from members’ perceptions, which as indicated in Table 6.1, 
were captured using a Likert-type scale. Prominent dimensions were then extracted from 
the nine variables using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a technique that reduces 
dimensionality by extracting the smallest number of principal components (PCs), which 
account for most of the variation in the original multivariate dataset and summarizes the 
data with little loss of information (Koutsoyiannis, 1992). The prominent PCs, which were 
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then used in the subsequent analysis as proxies for collective action, were identified by 
having eigenvalues greater than one (Kaiser, 1960). 
 
b) Analysing the effect of group form on collective action 
 
Given that no baseline data were available on the variables of interest, in order to analyse 
the effect of group form on collective action, the study used the Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) method, which can produce reliable results using cross-sectional data (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). In line with the discussion made in chapter one (section 1.2), 
participation in a group that operates using model B was regarded as a treatment, and the 
estimation of its effect on collective action indicators, as an evaluation of the average 
effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). The outcome variables representing collective 
action that are considered in the PSM method are the dominant indicators generated using 
PCA. The main idea of PSM was to construct a suitable comparison group with other 
mushroom growers who produce collectively and also share some comparable observed 
attributes with those affiliated to groups that operat  using model B (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). Given that mushroom producing groups in Swaziland only use two 
models (A and B), as highlighted in chapter one, th only available producers likely to 
fulfil the above ‘common support condition’ were those affiliated to groups that operate 
using model A. The use of model A group members as a counterfactual was also in 
conformity with another essential pre-condition of the PSM method, which indicates that 
members from both groups should be facing the same economic incentives that drive their 
decision to participate in the mushroom industry and do so through collective action 
(Heckman et al., 1997). 
 
The PSM was implemented in two stages. In the firststage, propensity scores p(X) were 
generated from the Logit model, which provided an indication of the probability of a 
farmer to be a member of a group that operates using either model A or B. The variables 
included in the Logit model are summarised in Table 6.4. A pre-condition of the Logit 
model used to generate propensity scores is that the covariates should be predetermined 
and unaffected by the outcome variables, in this case the proxy variables for collective 
action (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Producers affili ted to groups that operate using 
model B (treated) were then matched with their counterparts belonging to groups that use 
model A (untreated) according to their propensity scores. Members belonging to groups 
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that use model B, whose appropriate match could not be found, as well as members 
belonging to groups that use model A that were not used as matches, were dropped from 
further analysis. This is one way of fulfilling the common support condition (Heckman et 
al., 1997). The PSM method can be implemented through various procedures, namely 
nearest neighbour matching, kernel matching, stratific tion, and radius matching (see 
Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008, for details). Worth noti g is that all these methods have 
their advantages and respective drawbacks, and none is superior to the other (Becker and 
Ichino, 2002). However, asymptotically, all matching methods should yield similar results. 
The nearest neighbour and kernel matching methods were used in this study. After 
matching, the results were checked for consistency through an assessment of the matching 
quality and the attainment of the common support condition. The common support 
condition was assessed through a visual inspection of the density distribution of the 
propensity scores in the treated and control groups. However, for matching quality, a 
balancing test was used to ascertain whether the diff rences in the covariates of the two 
groups in the matched sample were eliminated. A preferred estimator produces statistically 
identical covariate means for both groups, provides a low pseudo R2 value, and a 
statistically insignificant Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of all regressors after matching 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
 
In the second stage, the average effect of membership in groups that use model B (ATT) 
on the outcome variable Y (collective action) was estimated using matched observations of 
treated and untreated respondents. The ATT was estimated as (Caliendo and Kopeining, 
2008): ATT = E{ Y1 - Y0| D = 1} 
  = E[E{ Y1 - Y0| D = 1, p(X)}] 
  = E[E{ Y1| D = 1, p(X)}- E{ Y0| D = 0, p(X)}|D=1]         (6.1) 
where E(.) represents the average or expected value, Y1 and Y0  are the outcomes for the 
treated with treatment (model B group membership) and control farmers without treatment, 
respectively. D = 1 indicates treated farmers, D = 0 indicates control farmers, p is the 
propensity score, and X is a vector of predetermined characteristics. All the estimations in 
this chapter were carried out using STATA 11 (StataCorp, 2009), and the results are 






6.2.2 Data collection 
 
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter used part of the dataset that was used in chapter 
three. However, the dataset in this case excluded th  non-mushroom producers, and 
individual producers who had no group affiliation. I  addition, the producers who were 
purposively excluded in chapter three for being affili ted to relatively smaller groups, were 
included in this case. Therefore, the analysis in th s chapter included all the 11 groups 
identified in November 2010, and the number of respondents per group were estimated 
based on the probability proportional to group size (pl ase refer to chapter three, section 
3.2.3, for details). As indicated in the introduction section, the mushroom producing 
groups operate in predominantly two models (A and B), and among the 11 groups shown 
in Table 6.2, only two (Mbangweni and Zombodze) were found to operate using model B. 
 
Table 6.2: Mushroom producing groups in Swaziland, 2010/11 
 
Area Group size Sample size 
Ncandweni f  16 9 
Sinceni f 16 9 
Ngcina/Mpolonjeni f 35 21 
Vuvulane f 10 6 
Ka Shoba f 21 12 
Mangweni f 81 48 
Nkhaba f 4 2 
Mbangweni g 38 22 
Zombodze g 25 15 
Dumako f 5 3 
Matsanjeni f 4 2 
Total interviewed respondents 149 
Notes:  f Group produces using model A 
            g Group produces using model B 
Source: Mushroom Development Unit, Ministry of Agriculture (2010) 
 
The next section presents the empirical results and discussions. 
 
6.3 Empirical results and discussions 
 
This section commences with a presentation of colletiv  action indicators that were 
identified using PCA. Also discussed in this section are the variables used in the Logit 




6.3.1 Indicators of collective action 
 
The scores captured from the interviewees in response to the questions in Table 6.2 were 
first tested for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The result was 0.61, 
suggesting that the responses were related enough to constitute a reliable composite 
measure. In order to avoid the problem of assigning a reater weight to variables with 
larger variances in Table 6.1, PCA was conducted using a correlation matrix (Krzanowski, 
1987), and the results are presented in Table 6.3. The use of PCA was found appropriate to 
provide significant reductions in dimensionality as evidenced by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity results (Tobias and Carlson, 1969). Using the Kaiser 
criterion of retaining PCs with eigenvalues greater than one (Kaiser, 1960), four PCs (see 
Table 6.3), which together account for 75 percent of total variation in the original variables 
were retained and later used in the PSM. Applying the rule of thumb proposed by 
Koutsoyiannis (1992) for observations above 50, PC loadings greater than |0.30| were 
considered to indicate a strong association between the original scores and the PCs. These 
loadings are highlighted in Table 6.3 in bold print. 
 





1 2 3 4 
Trust  Communication Cooperation Commitment 
Confid 0.5813 0.1186 0.1844 0.1181 
Trustworth 0.5985 0.1353 0.1454 0.0864 
Man_Act -0.2352 0.2779 0.5881 0.1516 
Decmk -0.2814 0.3004 0.5326 0.1810 
Unity 0.3276 -0.2862 0.3456 -0.2767 
Inv_fut 0.0604 0.2938 0.3858 0.6333 
Comm 0.1765 0.5573 -0.0895 -0.0173 
Info 0.0795 0.4175 -0.0800 -0.5102 
Satisf 0.1449 -0.3835 -0.0810 0.4296 
Eigen value 2.374 1.852 1.500 1.007 
Variance explained 26% 21% 17% 11% 
Cumulative % of 
variance explained 
26% 47% 64% 75% 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 = 482.48*** 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = 0.60 
Note:  Component loadings greater than │0.30│ are highlighted in bold print 




The first PC explains 26 percent of the variation in the original variables and represents the 
trusting attitudes that each member has towards others. Dominant indicators of trust are 
Confid, Trustworth, and Unity. Trust is defined by Hansen et al. (2002:42) as “the extent 
to which one believes others will not act to exploit ne’s vulnerabilities for their own 
gains”. The results in this case suggest that trustis positively influenced by the level of 
confidence that members have in others’ abilities, the reliability of members, and lack of 
frequent conflicts within the group. The second PC,which explains 21 percent of the total 
variance, represents communication within the group. Dominant indicators for 
communication are Decmk, Comm, Info and Satisf. Theresults suggest that participation 
in decision making and unrestricted exchange of information within the group in a 
language that appeals to all members are important in maintaining collective action. As a 
managerial tool, communication facilitates information sharing, coordination of activities, 
reduces unnecessary managerial burdens, and improves organisational performance. If 
group members are well informed and up-to-date through effective communication, their 
incentive to engage themselves in the group activities will increase as they will own the 
process and the outcome. However, if members are not satisfied with the group’s overall 
performance, there is a high likelihood that the leve  of interaction will decline. 
 
The third PC, which explains 17 percent of the variation in the original variables, 
represents cooperation. Toumela (1993) defines cooperation as the joint action performed 
by members who share a ‘we attitude’ for joint intentions. Cooperation is explained by 
four dominant indicators, namely, Man_act, Decmk, Unity, and Inv_fut. The results 
suggest that collective action is likely to be enhanced, or at least maintained, if group 
members participate in the decision making process and fully participate in performing 
joint activities. Collective action will also be enhanced if the group is characterised by high 
levels of cohesion and members are willing to associate themselves with the groups’ long-
term plans. The fourth PC, which explains 11 percent of the variation in the original 
variables, represents members’ level of commitment in performing collective activities. 
Dominant indicators of commitment were Inv_fut, Info, and Satisf. The results indicate 
that if members are satisfied with the group’s performance they are more likely to remain 
committed and contribute towards the group’s future plans. However, this will be very 




The next sub-section discusses the variables used in the Logit model and PSM method. 
Apart from the indicators of collective action (PC1 - PC4), all the variables discussed in 
the next sub-section, and summarised in Table 6.4, were used in the Logit model to 
estimate propensity scores. 
 
6.3.2 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the Logit model and Propensity 
Score Matching method 
 
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for variables used to analyse the effects of group form 


















% of [C] 
from 
    Model B 
   (N=37) 
[F] 
χ2-value 
Gender of producer 
(GENDER) 
Male 24.2 83.3 16.7 1.70 
Female 75.8 72.6 27.4 
Is member affiliated to other 
community organisations? (ORGANS) 
Yes 47.6 73.2 26.8 0.27 
No  52.4 76.9 23.1 
Was member trained to produce 
mushrooms? (TRAIN) 
Yes 33.6 60 40 9.28***  
No 66.4 82.8 17.2 
WEALTH Not poor 16.1. 48.8 51.2 9.71***  
Poor 83.9 80 20 
Continuous variables 














Age of producer (AGE) Years 53 53 52 0.25 
Household size (MAN_EQUIV) Man-equiv. 4.6 4.4 5.2 3.38* 
Trust PC1 2.20e-09 0.09 -0.27 1.57 
Communication PC2 6.35e-09 -0.14 0.42 4.73**  
Cooperation PC3  2.64e-09 -0.32 0.98 40.02***  
Commitment PC4 -1.96e-09 -0.03 0.10 0.52 
Ordered variables 


















3 3 3 1.986 
Note:*, **, ***  represent 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively 
♠1= no education; 2 = adult education; 3= primary education; 4 = secondary education; 
 5 = high school; 6 = vocational/college; and 7 = university. 
۩Generated from one way ANOVA 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
91 
 
Given the dearth of literature on the effects of organisational or group form on collective 
action, the selection of these variables was primarily based on the broader organisational 
theory and practice, and the literature related to households’ participation in collective 
action (e.g. Olson, 1965; Napier and Gershenfeld, 1993; Wade, 1988; Cook et al., 2005; 
Ostrom, 2010). Despite the absence of a clear theoretical background, members’ 
demographic attributes are reported by Carpenter et al. (2004) and Cook et al. (2005) to 
have a significant influence on collective action. A review of related studies indicates that 
demographic characteristics may be used to describe different perceptions on collective 
action and members’ subsequent actions in certain organisations. These attributes include, 
among others, gender (Pandolfelli t al., 2008), age (Gachter t al., 2004; Diwakara, 2006), 
and level of education (Helliwell and Putnam, 2007). The descriptive statistics presented in 
Table 6.4 indicate that the average age of mushroom producers was 53 years, and the 
majority (76 percent) were women of whom about 73 percent were affiliated to groups that 
produce using model A. Gender, age, and the highest level of education attained did not 
differ significantly by group form. 
 
Labour endowment is an important requirement in mushroom production. It was gathered 
during interviews that members are free to delegate oth r family members to work on their 
behalf in the event they cannot avail themselves due to ill-health or engagement in other 
activities. Considering members who were identified to participate in household 
agricultural activities, labour endowment was measured following Langyintuo and 
Mungoma (2008) in man-equivalents as: members less than 9 years = 0; 9 – 15 = 0.7; 16 – 
49 years = 1; and above 49 years = 0.7. The concept of man-equivalents was adopted to 
account for labour contribution differences among household members. School-attending 
children also participate in household agricultural activities, especially outside school-
attending hours including weekends and holidays. The results in Table 6.4 indicate that 
members affiliated to groups that produce using model B had significantly higher man-
equivalents than their counterparts, suggesting that they would probably be in a better 
position to cope with the labour requirements of the enterprise. 
 
Over 47 percent of the respondents reported to be affiliated to other community 
organisations, besides being members of mushroom prducing groups. Past studies (e.g. 
Haddad and Maluccio, 2003) found that members who are affiliated to more than one 
community group are likely to have relatively high levels of social capital. This implies 
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that interacting with people from different backgrounds shapes members’ behaviour and 
generates the experience of working in group formations through trust. Therefore, multiple 
or diverse group affiliation enhances social interaction and improves trusting attitudes 
towards other people. Despite the expectation that producers with multiple group affiliation 
would perhaps opt to produce under groups that use Model A, the results in Table 6.4 
suggest that the respondents did not differ significantly in this regard. 
 
Being a non-conventional agricultural enterprise in Swaziland, farmers who have not 
received basic training in mushroom production will hardly participate in the mushroom 
industry. However, as indicated in Mabuza et al. (2012), despite not undergoing the 
required training, some farmers participate in the industry through group formations, an 
arrangement that enables them to learn from those who have been trained by the MDU. 
Given the different models used by various mushroom producing groups, it appears model 
A would be more conducive to those who have not been trained by the MDU. In 
conformity with these expectations, Table 6.4 indicates that about 34 percent of the 
producers received training from the MDU in basic oyster mushroom production, and over 
80 percent of those who were not trained produce in groups that use model A. 
 
In spite of the need to act collectively in the smallholder sub-sector, for reasons presented 
in chapter two, it has been found that collective action in most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries tends to exclude the poorest farmers in society mainly because they are unable to 
cope with the cash requirements of attaining full membership (see Chirwa et al., 2005; 
Bernard and Spielman, 2009). This was confirmed by Fischer and Qaim (2012), who found 
that while some farmer groups were generally inclusive of the poor, wealthy households 
have a significantly higher probability of attaining full membership in banana producing 
groups in Kenya. Given that model B requires members to develop and manage their own 
structures, it would be expected that members who are not wealthy would opt to produce in 
groups that operate using model A. This prospect was confirmed by the results in Table 
6.4, which indicate that members affiliated to groups that produce using model B had 
significantly higher levels of wealth. Following Fernando et al. (2003), wealth categories 
were identified based on household asset ownership using cluster analysis. Variables used 
to classify households were primary source of power for lighting, primary source of power 
93 
 
for cooking and primary source of domestic water10. Other variables included the number 
of usable valuable items owned such as cars, tractors, motorcycles, bicycles, television 
sets, radios and computers. 
 
Regarding the proxy variables for collective action, Table 6.4 indicates that members from 
both groups did not differ in their perceptions of trust and commitment. However, groups 
that operate using model B communicate significantly better, and their members have 
significantly higher levels of participation in the groups’ decision making process as well 
as in performing other collective responsibilities. The Logit results of factors that explain 
producers’ participation in either model A or B-groups are presented in the next sub-
section. 
 
6.3.3 Factors that influence members’ participation in different group forms 
 
Table 6.5 presents the Logit regression results used to stimate the propensity scores on the 
basis of which the matching was conducted. Prior to estimating the Logit model, the 
variables were tested for multicollinearity using a p irwise correlation matrix, which 
indicated that the variables were reasonably independent of one another. The estimated 
model correctly predicted over 79 percent of the producers’ preference of group form and 
the results showed a statistically significant (p<0.01) Wald χ2 of 21.48, suggesting that the 
explanatory variables explained variation in the choi e of group form by members 
reasonably well. The Logit regression results indicate that members who received training 
in mushroom production are more likely to participate in groups that allow them to 
individually manage their production houses and further make their own marketing 
arrangements (model B). Despite that group members have an opportunity to learn from 
their colleagues, the conditions may not be very conducive in model B groups, as members 
have less contact time than those affiliated to model A groups. The positive significant 
coefficients for EDUC and WEALTH suggest that the likelihood of producing under 
groups that operate using model B, as opposed to model A, increases with the members’ 
education level and wealth status, respectively. 
                                                 
10 The categorical variables used to develop wealth clusters were classified as follows: 
a) Energy for lighting: 6= electricity, 5=solar, 4=generator, 3=handigas, 2=paraffin and 1=candles.  
b) Energy for cooking: 6= electricity, 5=solar, 4=generator, 3=handigas, 2=paraffin and 1=wood.  
c) Source of domestic water: 7=own borehole, 6=standpipe within household, 5=harvested water 




Table 6.5: Logit estimates of factors that influence mushroom producers’ choice of 







Std. Error  z-value 
GENDER 0.222 0.036 0.083 0.43 
AGE -0.005 -0.0009 0.003 -0.34 
EDUC 0.384 0.064 0.032 2.02**  
ORGANS -0.527 -0.087 0.079 -1.09 
TRAIN 1.372 0.255 0.094 2.73***  
MANEQUIV 0.082 0.014 0.017 0.82 
WEALTH 1.380 0.284 0.119 2.36**  
Constant -3.159    
Observations 149 
LR χ2 (7df) 24.89***  
Wald χ2(7df)  21.48***  
Pseudo R2 0.1490 
Correct classification 79.8% 
Log pseudolikelihood -71.068 
Note: **  and ***  denote statistical significance at 5%, and 1% respectively 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
 
Despite the absence of theory linking education andorganisational form, the results 
suggest that educated producers are better positioned to perform certain functions on their 
own. Drawing from Schultz (1975) and Pingali et al. (2005) who posit that education is 
linked to information acquisition, interpretation, and use, these findings indicate that better 
educated producers are more capable of searching for exchange partners and negotiating 
marketing deals, a function that would certainly be a challenge to perform by their 
relatively less educated counterparts. What may also be inferred from these results is that 
even though the oyster mushroom growing houses are gen rally categorised as low-cost 
structures, wealthy households are more likely to pr vide the materials required to 
establish and manage a fully-fledged mushroom growing enterprise. The effects of group 
form on collective action are presented in the next sub-section. 
 
6.3.4 The effect of group form on collective action 
 
From the descriptive statistics presented in sub-section 6.3.2, some significant differences 
were noted in the underlying characteristics between model B and model A members. 
However, it is impossible to make informed connotati ns from the observed differences 
based on a simple comparison of means. This section, therefore, presents the empirical 
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results of the estimated effects of group form on clle tive action, where the latter is 
proxied by the PCs representing trust, communication, c operation, and commitment. The 
analysis commenced with an assessment of whether the common support condition was 
met after estimating the propensity scores for all the respondents. A visual inspection of 
Figure 6.1 indicates that there was substantial overlap in the distribution of the propensity 
scores for both groups; hence, the common support condition was satisfied. However, this 
was achieved after removing some observations from the treatment group with propensity 
scores lower than the minimum and higher than the maxi um in the control group from 
the sample (see Table 6.6). The matching procedure was consequently performed in the 
region of common support using the nearest neighbour and kernel methods, respectively, 
following Leuven and Sianesi’s (2003) procedure. 
 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of the propensity scores for model A (treated) and model B 
(control) participants 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
 
After matching, a balancing test was conducted as discussed in the methodology section. 
The balancing test results shown in Table 6.6 indicate that the mean bias reduced from 
about 34 percent before matching to about 10 percent and three percent after matching 
using the nearest neighbour and kernel methods, respectively. The levels achieved after 
matching are way below the critical 20 percent suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985). 
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Table 6.6: Matching quality indicators before and after matching 
 




















Untreated Treated Untreated Treated 
Nearest 
neighbour 




33.8 10.3 112 29 0 8 
Kernel 
 




33.8 3.3 112 28 0 9 
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
 
The pseudo R2 reduced from 0.149 before matching to a minimum of 0.003 after matching. 
The Likelihood Ratio also reduced from a significant value of 24.88 (p<0.01) to non-
significant values of 1.16 and 0.23 (p>0.1) for the nearest neighbour and kernel matching 
methods, respectively. In addition, Table 6.7 indicates that the covariate means were not 
significantly different for both groups after matching. These results jointly suggest that the 
specification of the propensity score was successful in balancing the distribution of 
covariates between the two groups. 
 





Unmatched samples Nearest-neighbour matching Kernel-based matching 
Mean Mean Mean 
Treated 
(Model B) 
N = 37 
Untreated 
(Model A) 





N = 29 
Untreated 
(Model A) 





N = 28 
Untreated 
(Model A) 
N = 112 
Diff 
p-value 
GENDER 0.838 0.732 0.195 0.793 0.862 0.496 0.786 0.760 0.823 
AGE 51.595 52.848 0.621 51.379 52.241 0.813 51.429 51.638 0.953 
EDUC 3.378 2.848 0.012 3.207 3.035 0.598 3.143 3.077 0.833 
ORGANS 0.514 0.464 0.606 0.517 0.586 0.605 0.536 0.535 0.997 
TRAIN 0.541 0.268 0.002 0.483 0.483 1.000 0.5 0.492 0.952 
MANEQUIV 5.249 4.430 0.068 4.762 4.693 0.914 4.643 4.675 0.960 
WEALTH 0.324 0.107 0.002 0.172 0.241 0.525 0.143 0.169 0.787 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
 
Table 6.8 reports the estimated results of the impact of group form on members’ 
perceptions of trust, communication, cooperation, ad commitment levels in their 
respective groups. Although the ATT figures and z-values are not the same, the nearest 
neighbour and kernel matching methods showed consiste t effects. The results indicate 
that groups that operate in model B induce a negative effect on trust and positive effect on 
communication, and commitment, respectively. However, all these effects are not 
statistically significant for both the nearest neighbour and kernel matching methods. 
Instead, Table 6.8 reveals that, after controlling for other factors, the two groups differ 
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significantly in the level of members’ cooperation i making joint decisions and 
performing shared labour-intensive activities. What could be inferred from these results is 
that while both models promote the procurement of inputs in bulk and performing all pre-
production activities as a group, thus enabling memb rs to reduce average input costs 
(including labour), model B seems to have an added advantage. By allowing members to 
manage their individual houses and market their mushrooms independently, model B 
groups help to curb the inherent problem of internal free-riding. 
 
Table 6.8: Effect of group form on trust, communication, cooperation and 

















-0.385 0.172 -0.558 0.430 -1.30 




0.336 -0.057 0.393 0.435 0.90 




0.987 -0.144 1.131 0.326 3.47***  




0.059 0.056 0.003 0.259 0.01 
Kernel 0.015 -0.034 0.049 0.207 0.24 
Note: ***  denotes statistical significance at 1% level of prbability 
Source: Survey data (2011) 
 
As noted by Olson (1965), in any collective initiatve, rational members will always have 
an incentive to free-ride if the opportunity arises. Therefore, groups that operate using 
model B reduce the likelihood of defecting as each member realises that whatever results 
they are likely to attain as individuals at the end, will depend largely on what they would 
have invested in the preliminary stages of the enterprise. It appears as well that this is one 
method which can possibly help improve individual members’ knowledge of the enterprise 
and management capacity. However, as indicated earlier, producers’ participation in model 
B groups is related to, among other factors, access to basic training in mushroom 
production. Therefore, creating an environment thatwould be conducive for farmers to 
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participate in model B groups would require the government to intensify the farmer 




This chapter sought to study the effect of organisation l form on producers’ participation 
in collective responsibilities. Based on a conceptual framework that uses dimensions of 
social capital to study collective action, trust, communication, cooperation, and 
commitment were identified through Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as the key 
elements responsible for maintaining close relationships between members of mushroom 
producing groups. Further analysis conducted using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
method indicates that the use of model B introduces a significant effect on members’ 
cooperation in making joint decisions and performing shared manual activities. These 
results are important for policy, given that if members do not participate in their own 
groups’ decision making process and the labour-intensiv  pre-production activities, the 
collective mushroom enterprise would simply be an unviable proposition. Producers who 
are likely to participate in model B groups are those who have been trained in mushroom 
production, are better educated, and relatively wealthy. 
 
In view of these results, it is recommended that groups engaged in mushroom production 
should consider using model B for the production phase of the enterprise, with some 
modifications when it comes to marketing. Some of the major benefits of adopting model 
B include buying inputs in bulk, preparing the substrate material and spawning substrate 
bags (planting) as a group, enabling members to reduce their average input costs. In 
addition, allowing members to manage their individual houses is more likely to improve 
their knowledge of the enterprise and management capacity, while at the same time it 
reduces the likelihood of internal free-riding. However, instead of marketing independently 
(which is what model B currently promotes), it is recommended that producers should 
consider the option of collective marketing, which could be coordinated similarly to their 
procurement of inputs and performance of pre-production activities. Marketing as a unit 





Having accounted for the four specific objectives of the study, the next chapter summarises 
all the empirical findings and highlights key policy recommendations. Areas for further 



































CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
 
7.1 Re-capping the purpose of the study 
 
Mushroom cultivation was introduced in Swaziland through a United Nations 
Development Programme-funded initiative in 2001 as a trategic economic activity that 
aims to generate nutritious food and quick financial returns for rural-based households. 
Swaziland has 75 percent of its one million population residing in the rural areas, of whom 
63 percent live below the US$2/day poverty line. Currently, the emphasis is on the oyster 
mushroom for the reason that it is comparatively the easiest and least expensive type of 
mushroom to grow. There is also a wide choice of oyster mushroom species available for 
cultivation under different climatic conditions using a range of substrate materials. In 
attempting to give the mushroom industry a prominent position, the government currently 
offers free training in basic mushroom production, extension services, high quality spawn 
(mushroom seed) at a very nominal fee, and free substrate bags. Swaziland is also one of 
the six countries supported by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to 
promote mushroom production in Southern Africa as an intervention that seeks to reduce 
rural poverty and improve the production of medicinal products through mushroom 
processing. The NEPAD iniative commenced in 2009 and Swaziland participates as a host 
for a regional mushroom gene bank. Considering the geographical suitability and the 
magnitude of public and private investment made towards the mushroom development 
programme, there is a need to understand why not many f rmers participate in the 
mushroom industry, and why Swaziland still imports more than 95 percent of locally 
consumed cultivated mushrooms. There has also been no research so far on the challenges 
and opportunities in producing, value adding, and marketing of mushrooms in Swaziland. 
This study was, therefore, an attempt to address these knowledge gaps. It also provided an 
opportunity to draw relevant policy and management implications to inform future 
strategies in the industry. 
 
The specific objectives were to: (i) identify and examine the factors that influence 
households’ decisions to participate in mushroom production; (ii) study the underlying 
mushroom production and market access constraints; (iii) examine the effects of 
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transaction cost factors that influence mushroom producers’ market channel choice 
decisions and the quantity of mushrooms sold in select d channels; and (iv) study the 
effects of organisational form on producers’ participation in collective responsibilities. 
These objectives were addressed by employing various c nceptual and empirical models. 
 
Firstly, the Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood and Two-Stage Probit Least 
Squares approaches were applied in chapter three to analyse the factors that influence 
households’ decisions to participate in mushroom production. These two models were 
adopted after detecting some endogeneity between the decision to produce (a dichotomous 
dependent variable) and producers’ perceptions towards mushrooms (a continous 
explanatory variable generated using Principal Component Analysis). Secondly, a value 
chain approach was used in chapter four to study the underlying mushroom production and 
market access constraints. The value chain approach w s found appropriate as it was able 
to reflect on the various activities from production to the delivery of mushrooms to final 
consumers. It also enabled the study to better identify unexploited opportunities and in 
response prioritise interventions that could improve operations at various stages of the 
entire chain. Thirdly, Cragg’s regression model was applied in chapter five to examine the 
effects of transaction cost factors that influence mushroom producers’ market channel 
choice decisions and the quantity of mushrooms sold in selected channels. This model was 
adopted after performing a Likelihood Ratio test whose results indicated that marketing 
decisions are made sequentially. These results sugge ted that producers pay attention to 
market conditions, and with the information gathered, they first decide whether or not to 
participate in a particular channel prior to making the decision on the quantity of 
mushrooms to sell through the selected channel. Finally, the Propensity Score Matching 
method was used in chapter six to study the effects of organisational form on producers’ 
participation in collective responsibilities. The findings in chapter six are very important 
for policy given that over 90 percent of mushroom producers in Swaziland currently 
participate in the mushroom industry through farmer groups that operate in predominantly 
two different organisational forms. 
 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to present the main findings of the study, policy 
implications, and areas for further research. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows: Section 7.2 provides a summary of conclusions drawn from the 
study’s key findings, whereas Section 7.3 presents the study’s key policy 
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recommendations, whose implementation could promote th  mushroom industry’s 
contribution towards advancing Swaziland’s priorities of rural poverty reduction and 
improving household food security. Section 7.4 describes the limitations of the study and 




7.2.1 Determinants of farmers’ participation in oyster mushroom production 
 
Using cross-sectional data generated from producers and non-producers, the empirical 
findings in chapter three indicate that farmers’ decisions of whether (or not) to produce 
mushrooms are influenced mainly by institutional factors. Such factors include access to 
information on mushrooms’ nutritional and therapeutical attributes, access to training in 
basic mushroom production methods, proximity to input sources and market outlets, and 
farmers’ perceptions towards cultivated mushrooms. It was found that farmers who receive 
information about mushrooms from government extension officers and NGOs have a 
significantly higher likelihood of participating inthe mushroom industry. The key message 
drawn from the results is that while other information sources are being utilised by 
farmers, they are not perhaps competent enough to relate the technical aspects of how to 
effectively manage a mushroom enterprise. 
 
By virtue of mushroom cultivation being a non-convetional agricultural enterprise in 
Swaziland, farmers are bound to have mixed perceptions regarding its potential 
contribution towards improving their livelihoods. In this regard, it was found that those 
who have positive perceptions towards mushrooms are more likely to take up the 
enterprise. Chapter three also found that with appro riate training and mentoring, farmers 
are likely to develop positive perceptions if they fully understand the circumstances 
associated with the production of oyster mushrooms. As a result, farmers will be able to 
compare the ‘new alternative’ with conventional agricultural enterprises as they become 
aware of niche opportunities in the mushroom industry. Additional results indicated that 
farmers who are located further from markets are less ikely to produce mushrooms given 
that it would be difficult to procure inputs and access the retail market after harvesting. By 
virtue of being a perishable commodity, if mushrooms are transported over long distances 
without proper storage, producers could be compelled to either sell at a reduced price (due 
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to shrinkage) or not sell at all due to advanced spoilage. Apart from the above institutional 
factors, it was also found that farmers engaged in diversified agricultural enterprises have a 
higher likelihood of participating in mushroom production. However, this is likely to 
happen if the mushroom enterprise complements existing agricultural enterprises and 
enhances the prospects of reducing household income variability. 
 
7.2.2 Factors constraining mushroom producers’ participation in mainstream 
markets 
 
The second specific objective was to identify the potential and underlying factors 
constraining mushroom production and producers’ participation in mainstream markets. 
This objective, as presented in chapter four, was addressed using the value chain approach. 
The major findings indicate that producers’ plans to expand production capacities are 
hampered by the difficulty to access key inputs andservices such as spawn, substrate 
preparation technology, and incubation services. Since the inception of the mushroom 
programme in 2001, the provision of these inputs and services has been centralised and 
fully controlled by the government through the Mushroom Development Unit (MDU). In 
addition, local farmers were also found to produce below capacity in relatively small low-
cost structures, which are also not well equipped. As a result, they apply relatively 
primitive management methods that eventually affect their productivity. These constraints 
are partly responsible for the extremely low locally produced volumes and inconsistent 
market supply, prompting major mushroom traders (e.g. supermarkets) to rely on imports. 
Other constraints relate to the lack of diversification as farmers currently produce only the 
oyster mushroom, yet consumers are mostly interested in the button mushroom, which is 
favoured for its appearance and taste. 
 
Although not directly involved in the production and distribution of products and services 
in the industry, some organisations are likely to influence the institutional environment 
and, consequently, the performance of certain activities by other value chain actors. Such 
organisations were identified in the study as the MDU, Food Science and Technology Unit 
(FSTU), and the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard). These 
organisations are, respectively, responsible for offering farmer training in mushroom 
production, training in mushroom processing and value addition, and the coordination of 
agricultural marketing and trade. The findings in chapter four indicated that while the 
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MDU continues to provide farmer training in mushroom production, because of their low 
staff complement they have not been able to intensify their training programme, and have 
failed to convene a stakeholders’ consultative forum since 2001. Such forums could enable 
value chain actors to establish networks and allow the MDU to receive feedback on areas 
that require improvement. The FSTU also lacks the capa ity to impart the skills required 
by producers to venture into mushroom processing and value-addition. As such, not a 
single local farmer has received training in this field since 2001. Processing and value 
addition in the mushroom industry is further contrai ed by Swaziland’s unfavourable 
regulatory framework. For instance, Swaziland’s Canning Control Act of 1961, which still 
subsists, gives the power for controlling the development of food processing to the 
Minister of Agriculture through issuing of licences. Mushrooms are also listed under 
NAMBoard’s scheduled products, implying that for every import of mushrooms, 
NAMBoard receives an import levy equivalent to 7.5 percent of the total value. 
Government’s regulations further dictate that NAMBoard should use the generated revenue 
to develop local capacity to produce the same commodity. However, despite Swaziland 
importing over 240 tons of locally consumed cultivated mushrooms valued at about E2.4 
million annually, no tangible investment has been made by NAMBoard in the mushroom 
industry thus far. 
 
7.2.3 Effects of transaction costs on mushroom producers’ choice of marketing 
channels 
 
In contrast to other countries, where similar mushroom programmes are implemented with 
a marketing component, producers in Swaziland do not have this privilege as they have to 
make their own marketing arrangements. Currently, no cultivated mushrooms are exported 
from Swaziland and producers have not yet engaged in any form of mushroom processing. 
Instead, from what they harvest, it was found that about six to 10 percent is consumed at 
household level and the remainder is sold through four channels identified as: (i) the farm 
gate; (ii) retail market (supermarkets); (iii) middlemen; and (iv) food services industry 
(restaurants/hotels). 
 
Although some producers reported to have sold mushrooms through different channels, 
indicating that the options are not mutually exclusive, two marketing channels were found 
to be prominent, and these were retail markets (supermarkets), which were used by 53 
105 
 
percent of the respondents, and the farm gate, which was used by 47 percent. Mushrooms 
are highly perishable agricultural commodities, and s such their marketing is invariably 
associated with high transaction costs. Using cross-sectional data obtained from mushroom 
producers, further analysis, as discussed in chapter five, was conducted to study the effects 
of transaction costs on producers’ choice of marketing channels and the quantity of 
mushrooms supplied. Cragg’s regression results reveal d that producers’ decisions of 
selling their mushrooms through the retail channel ar  positively and significantly affected 
by household labour endowment, production capacity, access to cooling facilities, and 
membership in mushroom producing groups. The results also indicated that producers who 
are unaware of prevailing prices in alternative markets and have difficulty in accessing 
price information, are more likely to sell their mushrooms at the farm gate. The negative, 
significant coefficient for bargaining power suggested that the paucity of market 
information denies producers the leverage to bargain for exchange prices in the retail 
market; hence, prices and exchange terms are dictated by the buyers. As a result, producers 
who cannot bargain at the retail market are more inclined to sell their mushrooms at the 
farm gate. 
 
Regarding the quantity of mushrooms sold, it was found that producers who normally 
encounter difficulties in organising transport end up selling a relatively large quantiy of 
their mushrooms at the farm gate. Accessing the retail market comes with an opportunity 
cost of time spent in organising transport and time sp nt during transportation. Given that 
most producers rely on public transport to convey their mushrooms to the market, it is 
evident that they have no control over regulating transportation periods. Contrary to a 
priori  expectations, the coefficient for quality uncertain y was positively related to the 
quantity of mushrooms sold through the retail market. Generally, it would be expected that 
the more producers become concerned about meeting buyers’ quality requirements, the less 
mushrooms they will supply to that particular channel. However, what could be inferred 
from the results is that while producers are often uncertain about whether their mushrooms 
will meet the buyers’ expectations for quality, the market reliability and comparatively 
better exchange price offered by the retail market se m to outweigh the uncertainty about 
quality. As such, producers are willing to increase th ir supply to the retail market in 





7.2.4 Effects of organisational form on collective action 
 
Over 90 percent of mushroom producers in Swaziland participate in the industry through 
producer groups. These groups operate in predominantly two forms, depicted as model A 
and model B. In model A, besides establishing their own by-laws, members produce 
mushrooms in one production house where they share all pre-production, production and 
marketing activities. In model B, members also establish their own by-laws and share all 
pre-production activities. However, instead of producing under one roof, each member 
manages his/her own production house and members ar at liberty to make their own 
marketing arrangements independently. The question that chapter six sought to address is 
whether organisational form, as depicted by the difference between the two forms of 
mushroom producing groups, induces any influence on members’ participation in 
collective responsibilities. 
 
Based on a conceptual framework that uses dimensions of social capital to study collective 
action, trust, communication, cooperation, and commit ent were identified through 
Principal Component Analysis as the key determinants of collective action. Hence, they are 
responsible for maintaining close relationships betwe n members of mushroom producing 
groups. Further analysis conducted using the Propensity Score Matching method indicated 
that the use of model B introduces a significant effect on members’ cooperation in making 
joint decisions and performing shared manual activities. Producers who are likely to 
participate in model B groups are those who have been trained in mushroom production, 
are better educated, and relatively wealthy. The positive significance of the variable on 
wealth suggests that wealthy households are perhaps in a better position to access the 
materials required to establish and manage a fully-ledged mushroom growing enterprise. 
Being educated gives such producers an edge as they are able to search for exchange 
partners and negotiate marketing deals, something tat would certainly be a challenge to 
non-educated producers. 
 
Based on the empirical findings in chapters three to six, it is evident that the mushroom 
industry in Swaziland is confronted with several challenges, as well as unexploited 
opportunities. Given the potential of the mushroom enterprise as an alternative for 
providing rural employment, reducing poverty, and improving household food security, 
efforts should be made towards assisting current and prospective producers to participate 
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more competitively in the industry. The specific forms of recommended interventions are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
7.3 Policy recommendations 
 
7.3.1 Intensification of farmer training and extension services 
 
The empirical findings made in chapter three suggest that in order to improve the uptake of 
the mushroom enterprise among local farmers, concerted efforts should be made to 
intensify training in mushroom production and provision of extension services. Currently, 
the MDU is the only organisation with the capacity to provide training expertise. 
Considering their location and low staff complement, it would take a while to impart the 
required skills to a substantial number of aspiring producers. In addition, with the value 
chain results in chapter four indicating a market dmand for other types of mushrooms 
(especially the button), it is recommended that the training should be diversified to include 
other types of mushrooms apart from the oyster. In responding to this challenge, 
government should consider increasing its staff comple ent and facilities or alternatively 
establish strong alliances with NGOs to complement its training and extension 
programmes. Another option would be to train and identify lead farmers in strategic 
locations and thereafter facilitate farmer-farmer interactions to impart similar skills to other 
aspiring producers. Opportunities should also be explored for engaging the private sector 
in this regard, with the MDU assuming a monitoring role to ensure that farmers are offered 
quality training and are not charged exorbitant fees. 
 
These same options can be explored in attempting to improve producers’ training in 
mushroom processing and value addition, given that t e FSTU has failed to achieve its 
mandate in this regard. Even though fresh mushrooms fetch a comparatively higher retail 
price than when in processed form, in view of their high perishability, preserving and 
processing could be an ideal option for farmers who do not have access to cooling 
facilities. This option would play a significant role in minimising post-harvest losses at 
farm level and also create an opportunity to establish rural-based cottage industries; hence, 





7.3.2 Improving producers’ access to key production inputs and services 
 
An increase in production capacity by local producers and possible diversification into 
other types of mushrooms (e.g. the button) will likely create a demand for more production 
inputs. Considering that most production inputs andservices (spawn, substrate preparation 
technology, and incubation services) are currently centralised and only offered by the 
MDU, it is recommended that the government should privatise these services. Besides 
improving producers’ access to these inputs, this move would open opportunities for local 
entrepreneurs to participate in the value chain and contribute towards employment creation 
in other economic sectors. Producers will also find t relatively feasible to expand 
production capacities and with staggered production schedules, they could reduce 
fluctuations in quantities supplied to the market. 
 
7.3.3 Coordination of mushroom production and marketing 
 
Given that producers are sparsely distributed and independently supply different volumes 
of mushrooms to the retail market, there is a need to introduce some form of vertical 
coordination in the value chain. External support in he form of a facilitator who would, 
among other expectations, provide information and technical assistance, is also required 
considering that most of the mushroom producers are less educated and lack agri-business 
exposure. NAMBoard would be better suited for this role as it is within its mandate to 
safeguard the interests of producers, market intermediaries and consumers. In view of the 
possible increase in the number of producers in future, it is further recommended that 
NAMBoard should revive the marketing support of 2001, which as provided for in the 
government’s regulations, could be funded from the levies collected from mushroom 
imports. The levies could also be used to establish collection points (fitted with cooling 
facilities) in strategic areas. Such facilities, as indicated in chapters four and five, can serve 
to reduce the marketing and transaction costs currently ncountered by producers as well 
as preserve the quality of the mushrooms. As conditi s improve and producers graduate 
to a position where they can manage to operate on their own, NAMBoard may then 
consider withdrawing its support gradually. As a complementary investment that responds 
to the empirical findings in chapter five, it is recommended that the government, in liaison 
with the private sector and other development partners, should establish an agricultural 
Market Information System (MIS) to aid in the provision of timely and reliable 
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information on prices, potential buyers, and exchange conditions. This investment will 
empower the producers with knowledge and enable them to assume a better negotiating 
position against exchange partners. Once operational, the MIS will not only serve the 
mushroom industry, but will improve information access for the entire agricultural sector. 
 
The involvement of NAMBoard or any other development partner would be more feasible 
if producers work collectively; hence, reducing operational costs and facilitating the 
exchange of pertinent information. Having found signif cant differences between the group 
forms in relation to producers’ cooperation in chapter six, it is recommended that 
mushroom producers should organise themselves into groups that operate using principles 
of model B. Besides that model B enables members to educe their average input costs, it 
also provides an enabling environment that improves members’ knowledge of the 
enterprise and management capacity, while reducing the likelihood of internal free-riding. 
However, instead of marketing independently (which is what model B currently promotes), 
it is recommended that producers should consider th option of collective marketing, 
which could be coordinated similarly to the procurement of inputs and performance of pre-
production activities. Marketing as a unit could be easily coordinated given that members 
commence the production cycle at the same time. Although being tied to collective 
marketing could reduce the individual producer’s leverage to make unilateral marketing 
decisions, the benefits due to individual members at the end will not be negatively 
impacted as the proceeds will be proportional to what each member trades through the 
organisation. As such, producers can still improve th ir rewards by improving their 
productivity. In the broader context, collective marketing will enhance farmers’ chances of 
achieving economies of scale, increase their bargaining power in the value chain, and 
possibly open up new remunerative markets. This arrangement will also benefit major 
buyers as they will be able to reduce the number of small-scale transactions they currently 
engage in with individual farmers, allowing the same volume of business to be 
concentrated in a smaller number of relatively larger and more secure transactions. 
 
7.3.4 Public-private partnerships in the mushroom industry 
 
Given the absence of a coordination mechanism in the mushroom industry’s 12 years of 
existence, it is imperative that the government, through the MDU, should take the initiative 
to bring all stakeholders on board in an attempt to advance the mushroom development 
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programme. This can be done through consultative forums proposed in chapter four, which 
are capable of establishing comprehensive networks among the value chain actors. Such 
forums could bring together prospective investors and enable them to identify unexploited 
opportunities within the value chain. The same forums could be used to influence the 
abstraction of counterproductive legislation (e.g. Swaziland’s Canning Control Act of 
1961), and further establish organs to oversee the implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of future strategic interventions introduced to instil growth and efficiency 
within the mushroom industry. This would also provide an ideal platform to engage the 
public and private sectors to establish harmonised measurable quality standards and 
mushroom food safety regulations whose promulgation c uld preclude possible trade in 
non-edible species. As indicated in chapter four, these standards should be in line with 
existing international ones in order to facilitate mushroom trade with other countries. Such 
interventions will not only work towards guaranteeing the protection of consumers’ lives, 
but also improve their attitudes towards the mushroom industry. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the study 
 
One major drawback of the study relates to the use of cross-sectional data, which provided 
limited information on the dynamics of the respondents’ behaviour. For instance, the 
analysis conducted in chapter three made a comparison between mushroom producers and 
non-producers, but did not have much information on the respondents before and after the 
introduction of the mushroom enterprise. As a result, the data set could not be used to 
study the impact of the mushroom enterprise on producers’ welfare, a fundamental area of 
interest for policy makers and development partners. 
 
Secondly, given that mushroom production is a relatively new and non-conventional 
agricultural enterprise in Swaziland, very few farme s currently participate in the industry. 
As such, despite that the conclusions drawn from this study emanate from empirical 
estimations, it is important to acknowledge that the analyses were conducted using data 







7.5 Recommendations for further research 
 
The results in chapter three indicate that farmers who participate in the mushroom industry 
are also engaged in other agricultural enterprises n different degrees. Therefore, in 
attempting to promote diversification towards the mushroom enterprise as an option to 
reduce farm income variability, it would be useful to conduct further research on possible 
enterprise combinations that can generate substantial i come at lower risk taking into 
account the various constraints faced by rural-based small-scale farmers. The mushroom 
enterprise, as pointed out in chapter one, introduces a different dimension to the farm 
compared to most of the conventional agricultural enterprises found on customary Swazi 
Nation Land. Among the important attributes is that mushrooms can be produced year-
round and have a relatively short gestation period. The waste materials generated from 
other agricultural enterprises can also be used as sub trates to grow mushrooms. 
 
Secondly, with the use of panel data, it would be beneficial in future to study the poverty 
and food security impacts of the commercial mushroom enterprise in Swaziland. Thirdly, 
as an enterprise primarily targeted to improve rural livelihoods, it would also be worthy to 
study the role of the mushroom enterprise towards advancing the empowerment of women. 
The general literature argues that regardless of their potential, women continue to face 
persistent obstacles and socio-economic constraints tha  preclude their full involvement in 
agriculture in most developing countries. Therefore, this particular dimension of the 
proposed research could provide evidence on how the mushroom enterprise enhances 
women’s economic contributions both within the household and outside. Given 
Swaziland’s very low Gender Empowerment Index (see for instance, Peter et al., 2008), 
and the available opportunity for local producers to diversify into other types of 
mushrooms, the findings from the proposed studies wll be very important in informing the 
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APPENDIX A: List of interviewed mushroom value chain actors, Swaziland, 2011/12 
 
Activity Value chain actor Location(s) in Swaziland 
1. Production inputs Arrow Feeds Matsapha 
Mabhuda farm Siteki 





3. Growing and 
management 
Producers 91 producers located countrywide 
4. Marketing inputs Matata Bigbend 
Newden Matsapha 
Foodlines Matsapha 
Cold room Mbabane 
Hyper packaging Mbabane 
Builders Hardware Nhlangano 
5. Product marketing 
outlets 
Spar supermarket Moneni, Nhlangano, Matata (Big Bend) 
Shoprite supermarket Mbabane, Manzini, Siteki 
Pick’n Pay supermarket Mbabane, Manzini, Ezulwini, Matsapha 
Wozani supermarket Nhlangano 
Tum’s George Hotel Manzini 
Calabash restaurant Ezulwini 
Lituba Lodge Ngcina 
Siteki Hotel Siteki 
Café Lingo restaurant Mbabane 
Mountain Inn Mbabane 
Happy Valley Hotel Ezulwini 
Debonairs Pizza Manzini 
6. Fruit and Vegetable 
traders 
Tetsembiso Investment Malkerns 
Vegworth Manzini 
7. Training MDU Malkerns 




























Section 1- 6: Household demographic characteristics - Crop production - Livestock production – Household 
 asset ownership - Livelihoods - Farmers’ attitudes towards mushroom production 
 
Note to interviewers: This questionnaire is targeted at all sampled households: Mushroom producers and non-producers 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 
and Environmental Sciences, P/BagX01, Scottsville 3209, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. E-mail: Ortmann@ukzn.ac.za, Tel: (+27) 33 260 
5492. 
 
Interviewer’s name :_          Date of interview :      
 
Administrative region: 1 = Hhohho   2 = Manzini   3= Lubombo  4 = Shiselweni 










SECTION 1: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS (start with household head) 
 
1.1 Total number of household members:    
 
   
   
   
   





























5= Grand child 
6 = Cousin 
7 = Father/Mother 
8 = Grand parent 
9 = One of in-laws 
10= Labourer 









2= Adult education 
3= Primary 
4= Secondary 







1= Wage employed 
2= Farmer 
3= Self employed11 [state] 
________________________ 
4= Contract labourer 
5= Pensioner 
6= Disabled & unemployable 
7= Unemployed  
8= Scholar/student 























1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
                                                 





SECTION 2: CROP PRODUCTION  
 
2.1 How much total arable land does the household manage _______Ha? 
2.2 How much of the total land was…..  
 
Allocated by the Chief to household? 
[Ha]  
left fallow in 2010? 
[Ha]  
leased in 2010? 
[Ha]  




   
 








1 = Summer 
2 = Winter 





1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Area planted 








1 = Family only 
2 = Hired (paid) only 

















1 = less than E100 
2 = E100 – E200 
3 = E201 – E400 
4 = E401 – E600 
5 = E601 – E800 
6 = E801 – E1000 
7 = E1001 – E1500 
8 = E1501 – E2000 
9 = Above E2000 
Maize        
Beans        
Cotton        
Sorghum        
Sweet 
Potato 
       
Potatoes        
Other        






SECTION 3: LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP and PRODUCTION  
 














































Number currently owned  
 
        
If you were to sell all the animals 
currently owned (according to type), 
what price would you charge? 
        
Number of animals and products sold in 
2010 
 
      (Eggs) 
Total income from animal and products 
sales in 2010 
 
1 = less than E100;      2 = E100 – E200 
3 = E201 – E400;        4 = E401 – E600 
5 = E601 – E800;        6 = E801 – E1000 
7 = E1001 – E1500;  8 = E1501 – E2000 
9 = Above E2000 
       (Eggs) 
Number of animals slaughtered for food 
in 2010 
 





















         
4.3 Main source of drinking water  
 1=River 
 2=Well 
 3=Community stand pipe 
 4=Stand pipe within household 
 5=Own borehole 
 6=Community dam 
 
4.4 Sanitary facility  
              1=Flush toilet 
              2=Pit latrine 
              3=None available  












4.2 What is the major source of energy used by the 
household?  
 
Energy for cooking 
1 = Wood 
2 = Paraffin 
3 = Electricity 
4 = Handigas 
5 = Solar 
6 = Generator 
7 = Other_____________ 
 
Energy for lighting 
1 = Paraffin 
2 = Electricity 
3 = Handigas 
4 = Solar 
5 = Candles 
6 = Generator 
7 = Other_____________ 
4.1 Which of the following assets does the household own? 




2= not usable 






Car – van    
Car – sedan    
Tractor    
Plough – tractor drawn    
Plough – ox drawn    
Planter – tractor drawn    
Planter – ox drawn    
Cultivator – tractor drawn    
Cultivator – ox drawn    
Scotch cart    
Trailer    
Truck    
Motorbike     
Bicycle    
Wheel barrow    
Television    
Radio    
Telephone – landline    
Cellphone    
Computer    
DVD/VCR (video player)    
Hammer mill    
Borehole    
Other___________________    





SECTION 5:  LIVELIHOODS 
 
 
5.1 What were the main sources of food for the household in 2010?   
[Please rank the items, with 1 being the most important source. Items that are not applicable to the household should be left blank] 
 
Source of food Rank 
Purchased food  
Own crop production  
Own livestock production  
Own produced mushrooms  
Food aid [source]____________________  
School feeding  
Labour exchange  
Others [state]________________________  
 
 
5.2 What were the main sources of income for the household in 2010?   
 [Please rank the items, with 1 being the most important source of income. Items that are not applicable to the household should be left blank] 
 
Source of income  Rank 
Wages earned by people living in homestead  
Money sent by people living away from homestead  
Crop sales [state]____________________________  
Livestock sales [state]________________________  
Mushroom sales  
Tractor hire service  
Oxen hire service  
Transport operator [circle] bus, kombi, taxi, for hire  
Traditional healing  
Brewing  
Hawking  
Block making  
Repairs and maintenance [circle] cars, appliances, 
others [state]___________________________ 
 
Retail shop  
Handcraft  
Social Grant  
Pension  






5.3 In which activity do you devote most of your time as a source of employment? 
 [Please rank the items, with 1 being the most important source of employment. Items that are not applicab e to the household should be left blank] 
 
Source of employment Rank No. of weeks 
in a year 
No. of days in 
a week 
No. of hrs in a 
day 
Permanent employment [state]_______________________     
Casual/Temporary employment 
[state]________________________ 
    
Own Crop production[state]________________________     
Own Livestock production [state]___________________      
Own Mushroom production     
Others [state]________________________     




5.4 What were the main expenditure items for the household in 2010?   
[Please rank the items, with 1 being the most important expenditure item. Items that are not applicable to the household should be left blank] 
 
Expenditure item Rank 
Staple food (maize)  
Non-staple food (other food items apart from maize)  
Crop production inputs  
Livestock production inputs  
Mushroom production inputs  
Clothes  
Transport  
Beverages and tobacco  
Medical expenses  
Burial expenses  
School fees  












SECTION 6: FARMERS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSHROOM PRODUCTION 
 






















































1. Mushrooms have a potential to improve household income       
2. Mushroom production can reduce the problem of rural nemployment      
3. Starting a mushroom enterprise is relatively cheap compared to other agricultural 
enterprises 
     
4. Mushrooms have relatively higher financial returns compared to other agricultural 
enterprises 
     
5. Mushrooms can be produced year-round and do not rely on rainfall      
















7. There is nothing unique about mushrooms compared to other agricultural enterprises      
8. Mushrooms are known to grow in the wild and cannot be cultivated       
9. People that do not consume mushrooms will have difficulty to cultivate them      
10. Cultivating mushrooms demands a lot of time and l bour      
11. Mushrooms can only be produced by people that have undergone some training       
12. Production and marketing of mushrooms has more risks compared to other enterprises      
















14. A mushroom is a fungus and one’s exposure to mushrooms can increase chances of 
disease infestations 
     
15. Mushroom production inputs are scarce and expensiv  for smallholder producers      
16. There is less market potential for mushrooms in Swaziland      
17. Mushroom production is an enterprise for poor households in society      
18. Mushroom production is an enterprise for women       
19. Mushrooms are poisonous and their consumption wll expose consumers to death       
20. Mushrooms grow from waste materials, therefore they are not good for the body      





























6.3 Do you produce mushrooms?  1 = Yes  2 = No  3 = Once produced, but stopped 
6.4 If Yes, when did you start growing mushrooms (Month/Year)? _________________ 
6.5  Under what formation do you produce? 1= Sole proprietor    2= Partnership  3= Association 4= Cooperative  5= Company 
6.6  If 2, 3, 4 or 5, name of entity (or Trade Name)___________________________________________ 
6.7 If producing under partnership, association, cooperative or company, how do you conduct your production activities? 
 1= Production houses are jointly managed by members 2= Production houses are managed separately by individual members 
 
6.8 If you are currently producing mushrooms, do you intend to stop any time soon? 1=Yes; 2=No. If yes, explain why? 
 
 
6.9 If not currently producing, do you intend to prduce mushrooms in future? 1=Yes; 2=No. If Yes, why are you not currently producing? 
 
 
6.10 If you once produced mushrooms and stopped at some point, what were the reasons? 
 
















22. Mushrooms are very tasty and enjoyable       
23. Mushrooms provide a good source of nutrients for the body      








Section 7-8: Institutional support & Collective action 
 
Note to interviewers: This questionnaire is targeted at mushroom producers only. 
 
Section 7 (Institutional support) will be answered by individual producers and members of mushroom producing groups. 
Section 8 (Social capital-related attributes) will be answered by members of mushroom producing groups only. 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 
and Environmental Sciences, P/BagX01, Scottsville 3209, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. E-mail: Ortmann@ukzn.ac.za, Tel: (+27) 33 260 
5492. 
 
Interviewer’s name :_          Date  of interview:      
 
Administrative region: 1 = Hhohho   2 = Manzini   3= Lubombo  4 = Shiselweni 
Name of area:_______________________________Government Enumeration Area. No:   Homestead No.:   











SECTION 7:  INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT  
 
These questions will be answered by mushroom producers (Individual producers and members of mushroom producing groups) 
 
7.1 From which source(s) would you say you received nformation that influenced your decision to venture into mushroom production, and what type of information was 
this? Tick in the relevant box(es). 
 









prices and profitable 
marketing channels) 
1. Government extension agent    
2. Mushroom Production specialist 
(Mushroom Development Unit) 
   
3. NGO    
4. University specialist    
5. Radio    
6. Television    
7. Internet    
8. Community meeting    
9. Magazine    
10. Newspaper    
11. Pamphlet    
12. Mushroom producer    
13. Relative    
14. Neighbour    
15. Friend    
16. Private consultant    
17. Other (specify)_____________    
 
 
7.2 How important is the following information for you in mushroom production? Tick in the relevant box 
 
Information Very important Important Not important 
Production    
Financial    






7.3 From which source(s) would you prefer to receive the following types of information related to mushroom production? Tick in the relevant box(es) and rank the top three 
sources. 


































































1. Government extension agent             
2. Mushroom Production specialist 
(Mushroom Development Unit) 
            
3. NGO             
4. University specialist             
5. Radio             
6. Television             
7. Internet             
8. Community meeting             
9. Magazine             
10. Newspaper             
11. Pamphlet             
12. Mushroom producer             
13. Other farmers              
14. Relative             
15.Neighbour             
16.Friend             
17.Private consultant             
18.Other (specify)_____________             
 
7.4 Is the following information available to you as  mushroom producer? 
Type of information 1= yes 
2= no 
If Yes,  
1=readily available 
2=need to search for it 
Name the information source(s) 
using numbers in 7.3 
Availability of spawn    
Price(s) of spawn    
Availability of substrate    
Price(s) of substrate    
Availability of substrate supplement    
Price(s) of substrate supplement    
Availability of product market    






7.5 Have you ever received any training in mushroom production?  
1= Yes    2= No 
 
7.6 Have you ever received any training in preparing mushroom dishes/recipes?  
1= Yes    2= No 
 
7.7. Do you have any knowledge of mushroom’s nutritional and therapeutical attributes? 
1= Yes    2= No 
 
7.8 Did you receive any extension service on mushroom production in 2010?   
1= Yes    2= No 
 
7.9 If yes, approximately, what was the frequency of visits by Extension officers in 2010? 
1 = once a week  2 = once in two weeks 3 = once a month  4 = as and when requested 5 = Other (specify)_________________ 
 
7.10 Did you find the extension service useful?              
1 = Yes              2 = No 
 
7.11 Have you ever attended any field days or demonstrations on mushroom production?   
1 = Yes   2 = No 
 
7.12 How far is your area of production from the following places? 
 
Location Name of area Kilometres 
0=no need to travel; 1=less 
than 1km; 2=1-2km; 
3=2.1-3km; 4=3.1-4; 
5=4.1-5; 6=5.1-10km; 
7=above 10km  
Nearest town/city   
Source of spawn   
Source of substrate   
Source of substrate supplement   
Mushroom Development Unit   
Major product market   
 
7.13 What is the distance between the production house and your homestead? [State in Km]____________ 
 







SECTION 8: COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
These questions relate only to members of mushroom producing groups.  To be answered by individual members. 
 
8.1 Are you a founding member of the group? 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
8.2 Who originally founded the group? 
1=Central Government 2=Regional Development Office 3=Community Leadership  4=Group members 
 
8.3 Are you a member of any other organisation besides this group? 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
8.4 If yes, what organisation(s) are these? [Name(s)]____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.5 Which religion do you follow?  
 1= Christian [state denomination]___________________    2= Muslim 3= Hindu 4 = Other [state]_____________ 
 
8.6 What was the main reason behind joining this group? Can have multiple answers 
1=Voluntary (after learning of the benefits of mushroom production) 
2=Was encouraged by other members 
3=After seeing some of my friends (or neighbours) join, I decided not to be left behind 
4=Wanted to gain experience from the group with the hope that I will start my own enterprise later on 
5= Producing mushrooms individually is more expensive 
6=Other (specify)___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.7 Did you have enough information about the group when you joined as a member? 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
8.8 Since joining this group, has membership in the group declined, remained the same or increased? 
1=Declined 2=Remained the same 3=Increased 
 










If number increased - Since becoming a member of the group what has been the impact of increasing 
group size on cooperation of group members 
   
If number decreased - Since becoming a member of the group what has been the impact of decreasing 
group size on cooperation of group members 






8.10 Have you been able to participate fully in all activities of the group during the past year? 
1=Yes  2=No 




[Tick]  Reasons for not participating 
1=Was not informed that I was expected to 
participate in this activity 
2=I am tired of working for other members 
that do not participate in group activities 
3= (specify)_________________ 
 
Group meetings   
Substrate gathering   
Substrate preparation   
Substrate mixing   
Substrate bagging   
Spawning and incubation   
Management of growing house   
Harvesting   
Packaging of products   
Marketing activities   
 




Major Moderate Little None 
Joining fee     
Annual subscription     
Development fund contribution     
Time of attending meetings     
Labour for enterprise activities     
Opportunity costs - Returns at the end of the day are less 
compared to what I would be getting if I was involved in other 
activities 
    
 
8.13 Do you serve in the Group Committee? 
1=Yes  2=No 
 






8.15 Do you feel that you are now putting less effort into the group than was the case when you joined? 
1=Yes  2=No 
8.16 Do you feel every member is putting maximum contribution in the group? 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
8.17 If No, what do you think has caused this anomaly? Can have multiple answers 
 
1=Other members not working hard enough 
2=Membership costs are too high 
3=There are very little individual benefits after all 
4=The group is too large 
5=There is often breakdown of communication 
6= Other (specify)______________________________________ 
 





Group meetings  
Substrate gathering  
Substrate preparation  
Substrate mixing  
Substrate bagging  
Spawning and incubation  
Management of growing house  
Harvesting  
Packaging products  





























There are no penalties    
Verbal warning    
Written warning    
Fine    
Suspension    
Reduced rewards    
Expulsion    




8.20 What are the benefits of being a group member, and how would you rank them? Tick the appropriate block 
 
Benefits of being a group member 
 
Major Moderate Little None 
Better access to mushroom production advice from experts     
Access to reliable markets     
Better prices for products     
Better access to inputs     
Sharing of ideas with members     
Learning and gaining from the strengths of other memb rs     
Other [specify]     




8.21 Please tick the most appropriate response to the following questions. 
Statement 
 
Always Frequently Sometimes Not at all 
How often do you disagree with decisions made by the group?     








8.22 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your working relationship with other group members? 





Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
I have a strong personal confidence in each group member      
All fellow group members are trustworthy      
I can always rely on any group member when it counts the most      
The confidence I have in group members will continue in the future      
I am willing to contribute towards group investments in the future      
There is extensive communication in the group      
Information is shared in a languate and form understood by all members      










Good Poor Very 
Poor 
Group’s effectiveness in reaching decisions on issue  affecting the group      
Group’s effectiveness in implementing decisions taken at meetings      
Group’s effectiveness in following the constitution (or by-laws) to the letter      
 




Very low Low Moderate High Very 
Higy 
Level of member cooperation in executing joint manual activities      
Level of member cooperation in joint planning and decision making      
 
8.25 Your level of satisfaction with group performance towards achieving its objectives 




















Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
The nomination and voting for committee members is well known and transparent      
I can vote and express myself freely during elections f committee members      
I can vote and express myself freely during group meetings      
I fully understand the constitution (or by-laws) of the group      
The committee shares with us everything about its operations      
Decisions in the group are taken by a few influential committee members      
The leadership structure needs to be improved      
Scheduling of group tasks needs to be revised      
All group members are involved in performing tasks as assigned      
 
8.27 Which of the following statements best describe the condition of your farmer organisation? Tick the appropriate number under each category.  
 
General meetings 
1 No general meetings called by committee  
2 General meetings held on insistence by members 
3 General meetings held without following constitution 
4 General meetings held according to constitution 
Comment 
 
Agenda for Group meetings 
1 No agenda is set for committee meetings 
2 Agenda set informally by some committee members and not circulated 
3 Agenda set in the meeting 
4 Agenda set and circulated in advance but not adhere  to during meetings 















Minutes of meetings 
1 No minutes are recorded during meetings 
2 Minutes are recorded, but not referred to in following meetings 
3 Minutes are recorded, but not circulated to members 
4 Minutes are recorded and circulated in the next meeting 




1 No financial records are kept by the group (cash book, income & expenditure, balance sheet, payment vouchers, invoices, receipts) 
2 Income and expenses are haphazardly recorded 




1 Accounts are not audited 
2 Accounts are only audited due to external pressure 




1 Group members are not updated on financial matters 
2 Group presents fragmented financial reports 
3 Group presents fragmented financial reports in response to external pressure 
4 Group presents delayed but comprehensive financial reports 













1 Group does not produce budgets 
2 Budgets are done by committee members only, excluding general membership 
3 Budgets are produced in consultation with entire membership 
4 Budgets are produced in consultation with entire membership but partially adhered to 




1 Committee makes all the decisions (dictates) 
2 Committee makes all decisions as a result of non-participation of members in meetings 
3 Committee makes all decisions as they are entrusted by group members 
4 Consensus on major decisions made at general meetings with the participation of members 
Comment 
 
Member monitoring system 
1 No member monitoring system in place 
2 Member monitoring system at developmental stage 
3 Member monitoring system in place but not functional 
4 Member monitoring system functional, but results not used 





Effectiveness of disciplinary measures for non-cooperative members 
1 General members disregard laid-down disciplinary measures 
2 Disciplinary measures in place but not enforced 
3 Disciplinary measures partially enforced 
4 Disciplinary measures well known and enforced 
Comment 
 










Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 





Name of area:_______________________________ 
Name of producer:________________________ Contact details (Cell No.):________________________ 
Date started producing mushrooms: Month______Year____ ___ 












SECTION 1: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS (start with owner of enterprise) 
 
1.2 Total number of household members:    
 
   
   
   
   
























*start with owner of 














5= Grand child 
6 = Cousin 
7 = Father/Mother 
8 = Grand parent 









2= Adult education 
3= Primary 
4= Secondary 






1= Wage employed 
2= Farmer 
3= Self employed12 [state] 
________________________ 
4= Contract labourer 
5= Pensioner 
6= Disabled & unemployable 
7= Unemployed  
8= Scholar/student 
9 = Infant (5 years and below) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
                                                 




















         
2.3 Main source of drinking water 
 1=River 
 2=Community dam 
3=Well 
 4=Community stand pipe 
 5=Harvested rain 
 6=Stand pipe within household 
 7=Own borehole 
  
 
2.4 Sanitary facility  
               1=None  
2=Pit latrine 







2.5 Describe the nature of your growing house(s) 
Dimensions of growing house  
(length x width x height in 
metres) 





2.2 What is the major source of energy used by the 
household?  
 
Energy for cooking 
1 = Wood 
2 = Paraffin 
3 = Generator 
4 = Handigas 
5 = Solar 
6 = Electricity 
 
Energy for lighting 
1 = Candles 
2 = Paraffin 
3 = Generator 
4 = Handigas 
5 = Solar 
6 = Electricity 
2.1 Which of the following assets does the household own? 




2= not usable 






Car – van    
Car – sedan    
Tractor    
Plough – tractor drawn    
Plough – ox drawn    
Planter – tractor drawn    
Planter – ox drawn    
Cultivator – tractor drawn    
Cultivator – ox drawn    
Scotch cart    
Trailer    
Truck    
Motorbike     
Bicycle    
Wheel barrow    
Television    
Radio    
Telephone – landline    
Cellphone    
Computer    
DVD/VCR (video player)    
Hammer mill    





SECTION 3: TRANSACTION COSTS 











3.1 Buyer identification How did you identify buyer(s)? 1=through Ext.officer; 2=conducted own 
marketing study; 3=through other producers; 
4=went into production without identifying 
buyer(s); 5= other means 
(indicate)_______________ 
  
3.2 Price uncertainty Was the price in alternative markets known before 
selling your mushrooms? 
 
1= yes; 0 = no 
  
3.3 Difficulty in getting 
       price information  
How difficult is it to get price information? 1=not an issue of concern; 2=very easy; 
3=easy; 4=difficulty; 5=very difficult 
  
3.4 Source of price 
      information 
Indicate the source of price information for the 
channel?  
1= Ext.officer; 2= other producers; 
3=newspaper; 4=radio; 5=buyer; 6=trader; 
7= indicate______________ 
  
3.5 Search for trading 
       partner 
How difficult is it to locate exchange partners/buyers? 1=not an issue of concern; 2=very easy; 
3=easy; 4=difficulty; 5=very difficult 
  
3.6 Transfer costs How long do you travel to sell your mushrooms? 0=no need to travel; 1=less than 1km; 2=1-2km 
3=2.1-3km; 4=3.1-4 5=4.1-5 6=5.1-10km; 
7=above 10km 
  
3.7 Transportation  How difficult is it to transport your products to the 
market? 
1=not an issue of concern; 2=very easy; 
3=easy; 4=difficulty; 5=very difficult 
  
3.8 Transport organiser Who organises transport for you  mushrooms? 1=buyer; 2=producer   
3.9 Type of transport If producer is responsible for transport, indicate mode. 1=own vehicle; 2=hired v hicle; 3=public 
transport 4=by foot 
  
3.10 Road condition What is the condition of the road? 1=all tar; 2=more tar than gravel; 
3= more gravel than tar; 4= all gravel 
  
3.11 Cost/trip How much does a return trip to the market cost you?  
E/trip________ 
  
3.12 Period of supply Does buyer decide when you shld deliver product? 1= yes; 0 = no   
3.13 Sorting/grading 
 
Do you grade your mushrooms? 1= yes; 0 = no   
3.14 Weighing 
 
Do you weigh the mushrooms? 1= yes; 0 = no   
3.15 Packaging Do you package your mushrooms before taking to 
market? 
1= yes; 0 = no   
3.16 Processing Any processing of mushrooms to a different form(s)? 1= yes; 0 = no. If (1), list the products.   
3.17 Time to complete 
         sale 
No. of days it normally takes to sell all mushrooms 
after harvest? 















3.18 Storage Do you store your mushrooms 
before selling? 
 
1= yes; 0 = no 
  
3.19 Storage facility Who owns the storage facility 
(fridge)? 
1= producer; 2= neighbour; 3=association   
3.20 Shrinkage loss Do you experience problems of 
weight loss during transportation of 
mushrooms? 
0=no; 1= sometimes; 2=often; 3=always   
3.21 Uncertainty of none sale  Is there uncertainty that you will 
not find buyers for your 
mushrooms? 
0=no; 1= sometimes; 2=often; 3=always   
3.22 Grade uncertainty Is there uncertainty that your 
mushrooms will not meet the 
expected grade/quality of buyers? 
0=no; 1= sometimes; 2=often; 3=always   
3.23 Quantity harvested From your last harvest, howmany 
bags/trays did you come up with? 
No. of bags/trays________ 
Each bag/tray weighing _____grams 
  
3.24 Consumption How much mushrooms did you 
consume? 
 
No. of bags/trays_________ 
  
3.25 Quantity sold How much did you sell through this
channel? 
 
No. of bags/trays_________ 
  
3.26 Producer price At what price did you sell your 
mushrooms? 
 
E/bag or tray_________ 
  
3.27 Bargaining power Who sets the marketing price? 1=producer; 2=buyer; 3=both   
3.28 Price uncertainty How difficult is it to agree with 
trading partner on exchange price? 
1=not an issue of concern; 2=very easy; 
3=easy; 4=difficulty; 5=very difficult 
  
3.29 Initial producer price When you started the production 
cycle, what producer price did you 
use for budgeting purposes? 
 
E/bag or tray_________ 
  
3.30 Quantity rejected In your last harvest, how much was 
rejected? 
 
No. of bags/trays_________ 
  
3.31 Frequency of sale From your last 4 harvests, how 
many times did you sell through 
this channel? 
 
Number of times_________ 
  
3.32 Contract/agreement  What form of contract do you have 
with your buyers? 
0 = no; 1=marketing; 2=resource providing; 
3= other (specify) 
If 1, 2 or 3, is contract verbal or written 
(underline) 
  
3.33 Quantity requirement Does the buyer require you t  
produce a certain quantity? 














3.34 Meet requirements 
 
Are you able to satisfy the quantity 
requirements? 
0=never 1= sometimes; 2=often; 3=always   
3.35 Payment arrangement How are you paid for your supplies?  
1= cash on delivery; 2= on a later date 
  
3.36 Payment delay  Do you experience any payment 
delays from your trading partner(s)? 
 
0=no 1= sometimes; 2=often; 3=always 
  
3.37 Length of payment 
        delay 
If 1, 2 or 3, on average, how many 
days does it take to receive your 
payment after delivery? 
 
No of days:________ 
  
3.38 Follow up on 
         unpaid balance 
Do you make reminders/follow up 
calls for unpaid bills? 
 
0=never 1= sometimes; 2=often; 3=always 
  
3.39 Legal intervention In connection to 3.38, have you used 
the legal route at some point? 
1=yes; 0=no   
3.40 Major risks and 
        challenges 
Which of the following do you 
consider as the major risks and 
challenges associated with your 
marketing channel(s)? 
Please rank the major five(5)  
 
□Lack of price information  
□Low sale volume 
□High labour requirements 
□Inability to provide consistent 
    quantity 
□Inability to provide consistent 
    quality 
□Competition from other producers 
□Unpredictable customer turnout 
□Low prices and profit 
□Price uncertainty 
□Delayed payments (buyer 
    unreliability) 
□Lack of transport  
□Lack of cooling facility 
□Other state)_______________ 
 
Please rank top five(5) 
 
□Lack of price information  
□Low sale volume 
□High labour requirements 
□Inability to provide consistent 
     quantity 
□Inability to provide consistent 
    quality 




□Low prices and profit 
□Price uncertainty 
□Delayed payments (buyer 
    unreliability) 
□Lack of transport  
□Lack of cooling facility 
□Other state)____________ 
Please rank top five(5) 
 
□Lack of price information  
□Low sale volume 
□High labour requirements 
□Inability to provide consistent 
     quantity 
□Inability to provide consistent 
    quality 




□Low prices and profit 
□Price uncertainty 
□Delayed payments (buyer 
    unreliability) 
□Lack of transport  
□Lack of cooling facility 
□Other state)____________ 










1. Questionnaire-Mushroom buyers (Supermarkets and Middlemen) 
 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 





Name of respondent:_______________________________ Organisation:________________________ 




















































done in your outlet 




























How would you 
rate the supply?  
 
 














Oyster       
 
    
Button       
 
    
Shiitake       
 
    
Enoki           
Shimeji           
*In brackets, quantity from local suppliers 
 
1.2. If any processing, what input(s) do you use? 
 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   








1.3. If mushrooms are cooked 
 























           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
1.4. If packaged? 
 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
1.5. What is your source of market and price information for mushrooms?_______________________________ 
 
1.6. What are the problems with market and price information for mushrooms? 
 
 












Mode of delivery 
 
1=Own collection 
2=Delivery by seller 
3=Use contractor 
If own collection, what is the average distance 
travelled 
 
1=less than 10km; 2=11 – 20km 
3=21 – 50km; 4=51-100km; 4=above 100km 
Oyster   
Button   
Shiitake   
Enoki   
Shimeji   
 
 
The following questions are specific to oyster mushrooms 
 
1.9. What requirements do you have for local oyster mushroom suppliers? 
 
Requirement Comment 
Amount of supply  
 
Frequency of supply    
 
Grade/quality of mushrooms    
 




Labeling of products  
 











1.11. Are you happy with the current marketing arrangement for local oyster mushrooms? If not, which areas would you want to see improved, and what 
proposals would you make? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 







Any improvement thus far? 
Low sale volume  
 
   




   




   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
 




1.13. What happens with the rejected produce? 
 
 
1.14. Do you have any idea who your buyers are and if they add any value to your product? 
 
Category of buyer Form of value addition 
(if known) 

















1.15. Have you received any requests/proposals from your customers in relation to oyster mushrooms? If yes, what were the major requests? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
Lack of form variety  
 
  















Poor taste compared 









   
 





1.17. Which national and/or international regulations (laws or policies) affect your trade in mushrooms? 
 
Regulation How regulation affects you? 
 






















2. Questionnaire-Mushroom buyers (Hotels and Restaurants) 
 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 





Name of respondent:_______________________________ Organisation:________________________ 























































done in your outlet 




























How would you 
rate the supply?  
 
 














Oyster       
 
    
Button       
 
    
Shiitake       
 
    
Enoki           
Shimeji           
*In brackets, quantity from local suppliers 
 
































2=Delivery by seller 
3=Use contractor 
If own collection, what is 
the average distance 
travelled 
 
1=less than 10km 
2=11 – 20km 
3=21 – 50km 
4=51-100km 
4=above 100km 
Oyster   
Button   
Shiitake   
Enoki   
Shimeji   
 
 
2.6. Method of food preparation 
 























           
           
           
           
           
           
           











2.7.  If packaging….. 
 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
The following questions are specific to oyster mushrooms 
 
2.8. What requirements do you have for local oyster mushroom suppliers? 
 
Requirement Comment 
Amount of supply  
 
Frequency of supply    
 
Grade/quality of mushrooms    
 

















2.10. Are you happy with the current marketing arrangement for local oyster mushrooms? If not, which areas would you want to see improved, and what 
proposals would you make? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Have you made these 
proposals before? 
Any improvement thus far? 
Low sale volume  
 
   




   




   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 




2.12. What happens with the rejected produce? 
 
 
2.13. Do you have any idea who your buyers are and if they add any value to your product? 
 
Category of buyer Form of value they add 
(if known) 















2.14. Have you received any requests/proposals from your customers related to oyster mushrooms? If yes, what were the major requests? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
Lack of form variety  
 
  















Poor taste compared 









   
 






2.16. Which national and/or international regulations (laws or policies) affect your trade in mushrooms? 
 
Regulation How regulation affects you? 
 






















3. Questionnaire-Mushroom Development Unit 
 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 





Name of respondent:_______________________________ Organisation:________________________ 








































3.6. Do you have any idea who your buyers are and if they add any value to your product? 
 
Category of buyer Form of value they add 
(if known) 
















3.7. Indicate the type, cost and source(s) of items used to produce spawn 
 
















2=Delivery by seller 
3=Use contractor 
If own collection, 
what is the average 
distance traveled 
 
1=less than 10km 
2=11 – 20km 





















       
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
3.8. Have you received any requests/proposals from your customers related to the supply of spawn? If yes, what were the major requests? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
Source is too centralised    
Inconsistent supply    
Low quality    
Not adaptable to certain areas    
Lack of species variety    
    









3.9. Does the MDU have plans of privatising spawn production? If yes, when and how? If no, why? 
 
 
3.10. What is the capacity of your incubation room?_________________________ 
 
3.11. Have you received any requests/proposals from your customers related to the availability and use of your incubation room? If yes, what were the major 
requests? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
Facility is too centralised    
Has low capacity    
High level of contamination    
Theft of bags    
    
    
 




3.13. Have you received any requests/proposals from your customers related to the availability and use of chopping, mixing, boiling and sterilizing 
equipment? If yes, what were the major requests? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
Location is too centralised    
    
    






3.14. How many people have you trained in mushroom production in the past 3 years? 
 
Year Constituency No. of trainees 
2010   
2011   
2012   
 
3.15. Are you satisfied with the way training in mushroom production is being coordinated? If not, which areas do you feel should be improved? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
    
    
    
 
3.16. Are you satisfied with the way extension services for mushrooms are being coordinated? If not, which areas do you feel should be improved? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
    
    














3.17. Have you received any requests/proposals from stakeholders related to mushroom production in general in Swaziland? If yes, what proposals were 
made? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
3.18. Have you received any requests/proposals from stakeholders related to mushroom marketing in Swaziland? If yes, what proposals were made? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
No coordination    
Too fragmented    
Lack of market information    
Poor marketing skills    
Lack of processing/value addition    
Lack of consumer awareness about 
mushrooms as a source of nutrients 
   
    
    
 











3.21. Which organization(s) do you collaborate with in fulfilling your mandate? 
 





3.22. Which other organization(s) would you like to collaborate with in future? 
 












3.24. Which national and/or international regulations (laws or policies) affect the mushroom production and marketing in Swaziland?  
 
Regulation How regulation affects you 
 
Any proposal Who has to act 
on proposal? 
    
    
    
    
 










4. Questionnaire- Food Science and Technology Unit  
 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 





















4.1. What is your current staff compliment? 
 
 
4.2. Is your unit adequately staffed to fulfill itsoverall mandate? If not, what other positions are required? 
 
 
4.3. Did you receive any training related to the mushroom enterprise? If yes, which field and who provided the training? 
 
 





4.5. How many people have you trained in mushroom processing in the past 3 years? 
 
Year Constituency No. of trainees 
2010   
2011   
2012   
 
4.6. Which organization(s) do you collaborate with in fulfilling your mandate? 
 






4.7. Which other organization(s) would you like to collaborate with in future? 
 









4.8. Are you satisfied with the way training in mushroom processing is being coordinated? If not, which areas do you feel should be improved? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
    
    
    
    
 
 
4.9. What is your impression of mushroom processing in Swaziland? What do you think should be done to improve the situation? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
    
    
    
    
 
 











Current average price 
of commodity form 
[E/kg] 
      
      



























4.14. Which national and/or international regulations (laws or policies) affect the processing of localy produced mushrooms? 
 
Regulation How regulation affects processing 
 
Any proposal? Who has to act 
on proposal? 
    
    


















5. Questionnaire – Input suppliers  
 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 




















5.1. Indicate the nature of your business 
a) Manufacturer  b) trader/agent c) wholesaler d)retailer 
 




5.3. What is your source of market and price information for your supplies?_______________________________ 
 
 




5.5. Do you require any regulatory permits/licenses to ell your products? 
1 = Very easy  2 = Easy 3 = Difficult 4 = Very difficult 
 
5.6. If yes, is it difficult to obtain such permits/licenses? 
1 = yes  2 = no 
 
5.7. Please specify any other regulatory requirements? 
 
 
5.8. Indicate the type, cost and source(s) of items used to produce your supplies 
 
Item Source of input 
material 
Indicate whether 
1=local or 2=import 







If own collection, what is the 
average distance traveled 
 
 
1=less than 10km 
2=11 – 20km; 3=21 – 50km 






















       
      
      
      






5.9. If you deliver, who pays for the cost of delivry 
a) separate payment by buyer (price/km)___ b) included in original price c) free delivery within certain radius 
 
 
5.10. Which organization(s) do you collaborate with in fulfilling your mandate? 
 






5.11. Which other organization(s) would you like to collaborate with in future? 
 






5.12. Which national and/or international regulations (laws or policies) affect your business in input trade? 
 
Regulation How regulation affects processing 
 
Any proposal? Who has to act 
on proposal? 
    
    
















6. Questionnaire – NAMBOARD  
 
 
Note to respondents: The information captured in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal to inform stakeholders how the production and marketing of mushrooms can be improved in Swaziland.  
Participation in the survey is voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time f they so wish. 
 
For further information, please contact: Prof. G.F. Ortmann (Research Supervisor), University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Agricultural, Earth 






















6.1. Does NAMBOARD provide market and price information in connection with the marketing of mushrooms? 
1=Yes 2=No 
 












6.4. Are you happy with the current marketing arrangement for local oyster mushrooms? If not, which areas would you want to see improved, and what 
proposals would you make? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 







Any improvement thus far? 
Low sale volume  
 
   




   




   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 









6.6. Have you received any requests/proposals from stakeholders related to mushroom marketing in Swaziland? If yes, what proposals were made? 
 
Area of concern Proposal 
 
Who has to act 
on these 
proposals? 
Any improvement thus far? 
No coordination    
Too fragmented    
Lack of market information    
Poor marketing skills    
Lack of processing/value addition    
Lack of consumer awareness about 
mushrooms as a source of nutrients 
   
    
    
 





















6.10. Some producers have reported that despite producing quality oyster mushrooms they cannot access local lucrative retail markets, either because they are 





6.11. What opportunities do you feel have not been exploited by stakeholders in the mushroom industry, and what proposals would you make that may lead to 





Who has to act on these 
proposals? 
Value addition (processing)   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE SURVEY!  
